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Abstract 
Demographic trends depict a vibrant increase of the world population, particularly in 
Africa and Asia, and the share of people living in urban agglomerations is steeply 
growing when compared to rural areas. Increasing urban population and urban water 
demand often implies competition with other uses and users, notably the agricultural 
sector that accounts for the largest share of water diversions over the world. 
This thesis undertakes a critical analysis of the case of Hyderabad in the South-Indian 
state of Andhra Pradesh, one of India's fastest growing cities, to shed light on the 
process of administrative water allocation to cities from irrigated agriculture, an 
underdeveloped area of research. It does this by examining -1) the implications of 
Indian water institutional set-up on intersectoral water allocation; -2) Hyderabad 
water supply decision-making process, with focus on the role that politics have 
played; and -3) the impact of the urban water transfer on agriculture in general and on 
poor farmers more specifically, also reckoning on the contribution of groundwater in 
irrigated agriculture. The methodology adopted is based on the collection of primary 
and secondary data and encompasses -1) the analysis of water institutions in India and 
Andhra Pradesh; -2) an historical reconstruction of the main policy milestones of 
Hyderabad water supply and the study of intersectoral competition through a conflict 
analysis framework; -3) the calculation of surface water balances and groundwater 
withdrawals at one of Hyderabad water sources; and -4) the statistical analysis of 
primary data for determining the impact of shortages in canal water supply on poor 
farmers and their adaptive responses. 
A main research finding is that institutions vesting overarching powers over surface 
water on governments can expose urban water supply to harsh political opposition and 
chronic delays, in particular where farmers represent a large share of the electorate 
and transfers occur across regional boundaries. Then, this thesis demonstrates that 
intersectoral water transfers don't necessarily only bear negative effects on 
agriculture, notably if intersectoral water sharing rules are in place, and that 
groundwater may play a major role in compensating agriculture for urban water 
allocation. The research findings also show that poor farmers are those more likely to 
be negatively affected by water reallocations, not only because of reductions in canal 
water supply, but also because of social inequities in access to agricultural inputs in 
general and groundwater in particular. 
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I Introduction 
This introductory chapter sets the stage for the rest of the thesis, in the first place by 
presenting the main features of the area of research investigated, that is water 
allocation from agriculture to urban areas. At the outset, section 1.1 gives the overall 
context in which allocations takes place: fast growing cities; irrigated agriculture 
using most of the water resources available; and looming water scarcity. 
Then, the chapter moves on to the case study context. After having reported on the 
main physical features of the state of Andhra Pradesh where Hyderabad is located, the 
general characteristics of irrigation and agriculture in the state are outlined, and 
Hyderabad urban growth and water supply delineated. 
Finally, section 1.3 deals with the research design: it presents in the first place the 
general research approach, followed by the thesis overarching aim, questions and 
objectives. This introduction concludes by exposing the organization of the thesis. 
1.1 Urbanization In developing countries and water allocation from agriculture to 
urban areas 
The steep increase in the volumes of water diverted for consumptive uses over the last 
decades, brought about in particular by policies aimed at increasing food production 
by extending the areas under irrigation, has trimmed down the share of non-utilized 
water available for other beneficial uses (Gleick, 1993; World Water Council, 2000). 
Water is by now considered a "scarce-resource" in many river basins. This view is 
substantiated by Seckler et al. (1998), who drawing from a study'of the International 
Water Management Institute (IWMI), have estimated that within the first quarter of 
the 21" century nearly 1.4 billion people, accounting to a quarter of the world's 
population or a third of the population in developing countries, will live in regions 
experiencing severe water scarcity. To add to this grim scenario, WHO et al. (2004) 
estimate that in 2002 there were still 1.1 billion people relying on unimproved water 
sources worldwide, two thirds of whom live in Asia. 
Countries in the developing world and particularly in Africa and Asia are 
experiencing a vibrant population shift, typified by a significant increase in the 
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absolute urban population as well as in the proportion of urban against rural dwellers. 
As shown in Figure 1.1 that draws from United Nations (2002), the urban population 
in Asia has been growing significantly since the early 1940s, and between 2005 and 
2030 the number of urban dwellers in Asia is expected to increase by 0.99 billion 
people, moving on from 3.94 to 4.93 billion. Estimates from the same source show 
that over the same period the urban population in India will raise from 313 million to 
some 576 million, and two persons out of five in India will live in an urban 
agglomeration. 
Figure 1.1: Population growth in Asia, actual data and projections up to 203 0 
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Population shifts from rural areas to cities in water-scarce environments call for water 
reallocation between sectors and users. Assessments on additional water demands by 
cities are provided by Seckler et al. (2000) that predict a 2.1% annual growth in 
domestic water use worldwide over the period 1995-2025, and 1.6% for water use in 
industrial processes. Shilkomanov (2000; quoted in Molden, 2007), has calculated an 
annual growth of 1.7% for 1995-2025 for domestic and industrial use; whereas 
Rosegrant et al. (2002) estimate a growth in non-irrigation consumptive water use of 
1.6% a year for 1995-2025. Drawing from Rosegrant et al. (2002), Table 1.1 shows 
water use in 1995 and projections for 2025 in the domestic, industrial, and irrigation 
sectors for different regions/countries. 
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1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040 
Table 1.1: Water use sector- and region-wisc in 1995 and projections to 2025 (data is in cubic 
kilometres unless otherwise specified) 
Trend 
domestic 
and 
Domestic Industrial Irrigation industrial Trend in 
Region/Country 1995 2025 1995 2025 1995 2025 uses 
irrigation 
N N 
Asia 79.1 156.7 48.3 90.7 920.2 933.3 94.2 1.4 
China 30.0 59.4 13.1 31.1 244.2 230.9 110.0 -5.4 
India 21.0 40.9 7.2 15.7 321.3 331.7 100.7 3.2 
Southeast Asia 13.9 30.4 11.2 20.9 85.5 91.9 104.4 7.5 
South Asia excluding 7 0 16 2 1 9 4 7 163.2 169.4 134.8 3.8 India . . . . 
Latin America 18.2 30.7 17.9 29.9 88.3 96.9 67.9 9.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 9.5 23.9 0.9 2.4 50.3 62.9 152.9 25.0 
West Asia/North Africa 7.1 13.1 4.6 8.7 121.6 137.1 86.3 12.7 
Developed countries 58.7 68.6 94.7 113.8 271.7 276.9 18.9 1.9 
Developing countries 110.6 221.0 62.2 121.4 1,163.8 _1,215.5 
98.1 4.4 
_ World 169.2 289.6 156.9 235.2 1,435.5 1,492.3 60.9 4.0 _ 
Source: Rosegrant et al. (2002) 
The last two columns of Table 1.1 show the trend in water use from 1995 to 2025 in 
irrigation as well as aggregated domestic and industrial uses. The most striking 
numbers refer to the increases in water use for domestic and industrial uses in China, 
India, Southeast Asia, and South Asia (excluding India), as well as in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Growth of water use in the irrigation sector is far less significant. In water 
scarce environments, the growing water needs of cities are generally satisfied by 
reallocating' water fiorn the agricultural sector. This phenomenon can be explained by 
the fact that irrigated agriculture is the largest water user, accounting for some 70% of 
all water diversions around the world (United Nations, 2003). Furthermore, water 
transfers from agriculture are generally justified by arguments resting upon the poor 
performance and inefficiency of the sector. It is widely acknowledged that only a 
fraction of the water diverted is eventually used by the crop, and even limited water 
savings in agriculture would be sufficient to cover all urban water needs (International 
River Network, 2003; Simon, 1998; Winpenny, 1994). Trends in reallocating water 
from agriculture to cities have also been reported in scholarly empirical studies. An 
1 In this thesis, the terms water "reallocation(s)", "allocation(s)", and "transfer(s)" are used 
interchangeably as it generally the case in the literature, the reason being that all of them can rcfer back 
to water rights ((re)allocation/transfer of water rights) or physical water ((re)allocation/transfer of 
volumes of water). Thus, it has not been possible to specifically adopt one term when dealing with 
water rights, and another when discussing volumes of water 
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example is Fereres et al. (1997; quoted in Molle et al., 2006) who argue that between 
1980 and 1996 water was normally supplied for agriculture in the Guadaquivir basin 
only in four years, with total prohibition of irrigation in 1995. In the Alentejo region 
of Portugal, supply to irrigation was curtailed during the 1993-1995 drought, while 
municipal and industrial use was sustained (Caldas et al., 1997; quoted in Molle et al., 
2006). McIntosh (2003) posits that in the Philippines all the water forrn the Angat 
dam, traditionally used by farmers, has been reserved for the city of Manila in times 
of drought. To quote an additional example, Anderson et al. (1997) report that in 1991 
the California State Water Project cut off supplies to farmers and the Bureau or 
Reclamation reduced its supplies to the Central Valley Project by 75%. 
Research on water reallocation from agriculture to cities is even more relevant if 
considering that vibrant urban growth and water scarcity occur concomitantly in some 
parts of Asia and most of Africa. Areas of economic and physical scarcity around the 
world are shown in Figure 1.2 below adapted after Molden (2007). 
Figure 1.2: Areas of economic and physical water scarcity 
Little or no water scarcity Approaching physical water scarcity F-Ij Not estimated 
Physical water scarcity Economic water scarcity 
1% 
2 
d, 
Source: Adapted after Molden (2007). Legend: "Little or no water scarcity": abundant water resources 
relative to use, with less than 25% of water from rivers withdrawn for human purposes; "Physical water 
scarcity": water resources development is approaching or has exceeded sustainable limits; 
"Approaching physical water scarcity": more than 60% of river flows are withdrawn; "Economic 
scarcity": human, institutional, and financial capital limit access to water even though water in nature is 
available locally to meet human demands 
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This thesis builds up knowledge and draws policy lessons for intersectoral water 
allocation from the study of Hyderabad city water supply, South-India (Andhra 
Pradesh state). The city population has grown at a vibrant pace since the 1990s and 
has now reached an estimated seven million people (HUDA, 2003). This growth, 
boosted in particular by a number of economic reforms introduced by the government 
to promote foreign and national investments (Kennedy, 2007; Naidu et al., 2000; 
Shifferes, 2007), has been accompanied by increased demands for water for domestic, 
commercial and industrial uses. This phenomenon has engendered new water 
tradeoffis between urban water supply and irrigated agriculture, in a state dominated 
by semi-arid climatic conditions and massive investments in the irrigation sector. Just 
to mention some numbers, in 2005-2006 the government of Andhra Pradesh has 
allocated around $US 1.5 billion under its irrigation budget line, that is around 40% of 
its total annual budget of $US 3.8 billion (budget data drawn from K. Rosaiah, 2005). 
These concomitant events, that is rocketing urban water demand in a semi-arid area 
where irrigated agriculture has been traditionally reserved the largest share of the 
resource, makes Hyderabad a suitable and particularly interesting case for the analysis 
of intersectoral water transfers. 
1.2 Case study context 
1.2.1 Main physical features 
Hyderabad is the capital city of Andhra Pradesh, a state located in south peninsular 
India (Figure 1.3). According to the 2001 Census of India, the state total population in 
2001 was of 75,727,541 individuals, living over an area of 275,068 kM2. In 
1999-2000, the persons below the poverty line constituted the 16% of the state total 
population. 
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Figure 1.3: Location map of the state of Andhra Pradesh and its capital city Hyderabad 
Km 
The climate in Andhra Pradesh is pre-dominantly semi-arid, with a hot and dry 
summer season from March to June, a monsoon season from July to September, and a 
dry winter extending from October to February. Precipitation is unevenly distributed 
over the state and can vary significantly from one year to another. In the coastal area 
precipitation ranges around 850-1,000 mm, whereas the southwest area is drought 
prone and receives only 450 to 600 mm of rainfalls annually (Biggs, 2005). The main 
rivers are the Godavari in the northern part of the state, the Krishna in the central part, 
and the Pennar in the south. 
1.2.2 Irrigation and agriculture in Andhra Pradesh 
Irrigation, the largest expenditure item in the state budget (see also 4.1.2 in this 
thesis), has always been pivotal for the economy of Andhra Pradesh. The main 
sources of irrigation consist of tanks (water impounded by earthen barrages); surface 
canal irrigation schemes; and groundwater. Irrigation schemes are classified into 
major (with an irrigable area of more than 10,000 ha); medium (irrigable area between 
2,000 and 10,000 ha); and small (less than 2,000 ha). The ultimate irrigation potential 
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of major and medium irrigation in Andhra Pradesh is five million hectares and the 
potential for minor irrigation is 6.2 million hectare (see Table 1.2). 
Table 1.2: Ultimate irrigation potential and achievement by source in Andhra Pradesh (area in '000 ha) 
Major & medium Minor 
Ultimate potential 5,000.00 6,260.00 
Potential created till 2000 
March 3,254.22 3,045.00 
% potential created to ultimate 65.00 48.60 
Actual utilization till 2000 3 206.22 831.16 2 March , , 
% achieved to the ultimate 64 00 45 20 
potential . . 
Number of new proposed 20 948 4 
projects , 
Expected new potential to be 349 78 139 00 
created . . 
Expected total potential 3,604.00 3,184.00 
% expected total potential to the 72 00 51 00 
ultimate . . 
Estimated costs (In I OMio Rs. ) 2,582 226 
Cost per hectare (in Rs. at 73,818 16,258 
constant prices) 
Source: V. Ratna Reddy (2003) 
While recapitulating the main features of irrigation in Andhra Pradesh, V. Ratna 
Reddy (2003) notes that: 
A secular increasing trend is observed in the irrigation expenditure 
A significant share of the irrigation expenditure goes towards major projects 
(about 80%) followed by medium and minor irrigation schemes 
Emphasis is more on new works rather than on the rehabilitation of old ones 
e Despite the huge investment in major and medium irrigation, area under canal 
utilization is either stagnant or declining 
* The neglect of operation and maintenance is more conspicuous in the case of 
minor irrigation despite the fact that operation and maintenance costs of minor 
irrigation are half that of major and medium irrigation 
The main crops grown in Andhra Pradesh measured in terms of area cultivated are 
cereals and millets, which account for 35.7% of the total area sown; rice (24.7%); 
groundnut (14.7%); total pulses (14.4%); and cotton that makes up the 9.4% of the 
total area sown (Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2006b). 
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1.2.3 Urban growth and water supply in Hyderabad 
Hyderabad, capital of the state of Andhra Pradesh in South-India, is an exemplar of 
vibrant urban growth in a water scarce environment. According to census data, the 
city's population has grown at an average annual rate of 2.4% between 1991 and 
2001, rising from 4.3 million to 5.7 million. This makes Hyderabad one of the fastest 
growing cities in India (K. C. Sivaramakrishnan et al., 2005), a country which itself 
has the world's fastest absolute annual population increase and that will, by 2050, 
have surpassed China (United Nations, 2005b). 
Hyderabad urban area, as defined in the 2001 Census, is administratively divided into 
ten municipalities; a central area named Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad (MCH); 
the Secunderabad Cantonment; 13 outgrowths; 2 and five Census Towns. 3 The ten 
municipalities of Hyderabad and the MCH are shown in the map of Figure 1.4. 
Water supply in the city is under control of the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply 
and Sewerage Board (HMWSSB, hereafter also called "Water Board"), whic h covers 
a service area of about 793 kmý. The HMWSSB was constituted in 1989 by 
consolidating two existing government Departments: the Public Health Engineering 
Department formerly in charge for water supply, and the Municipal Corporation of 
Hyderabad which was responsible for the sewerage serviceS. 4 So far, the HMWSSB 
provides bulk supplies of water to seven Municipalities, which maintain the control on 
the distribution of water and of the sewerage system (when existing), and directly 
control the distribution of water in the three remaining Municipalities (Qutubullapur, 
L. B. Nagar, and Kukatpally), as well as in the MCH area. Nevertheless, during the 
2 An "outgrowth" is a conglomeration of houses outside the formal limits of a town (not constituting a 
settlement/village on their own), having a high degree of interdependence with the town 
3 "Census towns" are those towns falling out of the categories of Municipality, Corporation or 
Cantonment (which are defined as "statutory towns"), and whose population size is of 5,000 or more, 
with a density of at least 400 persons per square kilometre, and at least 75% of the male workers to be 
engaged outside agriculture 
4 The HMWSSB was constituted in 1989 under the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and 
Sewerage Act 
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next years the Water Board has planned to take over the water distribution system in 
another six Municipalities. 
Figure 1.4: Hyderabad, boundary of the ten municipalities and Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad 
(MCH) 
20 Km 
Source: HUDA (2003) 
Presently, Hyderabad relies on a number of different sources. Besides groundwater, 
the city conveys water from three rivers: the Manjira on the north-west, through the 
Singur and Manjira off-take points (see Figure 1.5); the Krishna on the south-cast at 
Nagaijunasagar reservoir; and the Musi on the east of the city (Osmansagar reservoir) 
as well as one of its tributaries, the Isi (Himayatsagar off-take). 
9 
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Figure 1.5: Hyderabad's surface water sources and conveyance system 
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The HMWSSB estimated the city water demand in 2005 to 1,091,062 M3 /day, against 
an actual supply of around 950,133 m3 /day. The latter doesn't account for 
transmission and distribution losses and water pilfering. 
Water demand and potential supply (calculated with the capacity of the transmission 
systems, and not actual supply) in Hyderabad by source from 2001 to 2005 are shown 
in Figure 1.6. The supply gap in the city has major implications, notably on the poor 
that experience severe water shortages and have often to rely on private suppliers (C. 
Ramachandraiah, 2004). 
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Figure 1.6: Hyderabad daily water demand and water supply by source 
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Source: modified after HMWSSB (2005) 
1.3 Research design 
1.3.1 Research approach 
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The approach adopted in this thesis is multidisciplinary, the research investigating 
different but complementary aspects of urban water allocation from agriculture. From 
the outset, it has become evident that Hyderabad presented multiple interesting 
features for the study of intersectoral water transfers, and these have been investigated 
through research questions which focus on water institutions, politics and conflict, and 
water allocation impacts on agriculture. 
1.3.2 Research aim, questions and objectives 
The aim of the research is to provide a balanced and nuanced understanding of 
administrative water allocations from agriculture to cities, as opposed to market 
mechanisms. The contention of this thesis is that administrative water allocation can be a 
highly contested process which negatively impacts on water availability in irrigation schemes; 
and that farmers tend to adopt coping strategies when canal water supply is reduced. 
Accordingly, the central question addressed by the PhD research is, "how do 
administrative intersectoral water reallocations function, and what are the salient 
issues and equity challenges that water law and policy need to consider in making 
administrative water reallocation? ". 
II 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
The central question of this thesis, so to say, subsumes the four questions and related 
research objectives specified below. 
1. How are water institutions (law, administration, and policies) in Andhra 
Pradesh characterized, and how could they better account for water 
reallocation among sectors? Objective: to determine whether the institutional 
set-up in Andhra Pradesh properly addresses water allocation by providing 
appropriate rules and regulations, and by defining which organizations are 
responsible for administering water resources so as to meet "optimal water 
allocation" criteria 
2. What role does politics play in administrative reallocations from agriculture to 
other sectors? Objective: to investigate in particular the role that politics play 
in administrative reallocation of water from agriculture to urban areas. Politics 
are identified in the literature as one of the main transaction costs of 
administrative mechanisms which can considerably delay the urban water 
supply, and thus supposedly negatively impact the poorest section of the urban 
population 
3. What is the impact of water reallocations from agriculture to cities on the areas 
of origin, and what role does groundwater play as a substitute and/or 
supplement to surface canal water? Objective: to assess the actual impact of 
water reallocations and groundwater availability on the agricultural sector in 
terms of modifications of quantity and timing of water availability, and related 
changes in areas cultivated and agricultural gross revenue 
4. How may poor farmers be impacted by reductions of canal water supply 
brought about by urban water transfers, and what strategies may they adopt? 
Objective: to single out the potential impact of water transfers on poor 
farmers, and to assess the extent to which they could become more resilient to 
reductions in canal water by adapting specific adaptive strategies 
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Though addressing different aspects of water allocation from agriculture to cities, the 
questions and objectives above are complementary in nature. Question 1 on water 
institutions is fundamental for our study, since it addresses the very rules that 
determine and shape water reallocation and distribute water rights. As this thesis will 
show, one characteristic of the Indian system of surface water rights is that it vests 
proprietary rights over public state authorities (see section 2.1.3), which has major 
implications in the decision making process for reallocating water, a matter tackled 
with question 2. Then, question 3 is also pivotal and deals with a major concern in 
water transfers research, since it addresses the impact of water reallocation. It is 
widely acknowledged that optimal water allocation (see also section 2.1.2) is 
contingent upon reducing the impact of water transfers, and that water law must be 
established so as to properly account for it. Question 3 also inquiries into the role of 
groundwater in irrigation schemes, thus providing for a comprehensive view on the 
impact of urban water transfers on farmers. Finally, question 4 takes a closer look to 
the consequences of the water transfers to cities, notably by investigating how those 
may affect poor farmers, and which are the strategies that the latter could adopt to 
face reductions in surface canal water. 
1.4 Organization of the thesis 
This thesis is divided in nine chapters. In this introduction the justification for 
carrying out the thesis has been first presented in the light of the major trade-offs 
occurring between water use in agriculture and urban areas, as well as prevailing 
water scarcity conditions in some areas of Africa and Asia. The appropriateness of 
having selected Hyderabad as a case study has also been discussed. Then, the context 
of the case study has been presented by highlighting the physical and climatic features 
of Andhra Pradesh; outlining the characteristics of irrigation and crop cultivation in 
the state; and by recalling the main features of Hyderabad urban growth and water 
supply. Finally, the research approach, aim, main questions and objectives 
underpinning the whole PhD research have been presented. 
Chapter two reviews in the first place the fundamental theoretical tenets on 
intersectoral water transfers. A framework that places water allocation within the 
development of water resources at the river basin scale is presented, followed by a 
discussion on the concept of optimal water allocation. Chapter two proceeds by 
13 
addressing water institutions and policies, and further by presenting the different 
existing water transfers mechanisms, that is marginal cost pricing; water markets; 
administrative reallocation; and user-based allocation. Then, the historical 
development of theory on water transfers is discussed through a review of the main 
literature on the topic. After having presented a list of major water transfers to urban 
area around the world, chapter two concludes by evidencing the research gaps and 
underdeveloped areas of research on agriculture to urban areas water transfers. 
Chapter three addresses the methods of the thesis. Reflecting the multidisciplinary 
approach adopted, this thesis is supported by mixed methods of research. Chapter 
three provides the reader with a complete methodological overview, and how it relates 
to the research questions and objectives. The chapter unfolds into three main sections: 
data sources and type; data collection; and data analysis. The second section on data 
collection is split into two main parts looking distinctively at primary data and 
secondary data. The third section successively discusses the analytical tools and 
frameworks adopted from chapter four to chapter seven where the empirical findings 
are presented. 
The fourth chapter looks at relevant water institutions for water reallocation in Andhra 
Pradesh, providing the empirical basis for answering in particular the first research 
question. After the content outline, chapter four brings up the empirical evidence in 
three steps: first by addressing the Indian national water policy as well as various 
water policies in Andhra Pradesh; then by looking at water law in India first and 
focusing then on the water law reforms promoted in Andhra Pradesh since 1997; and 
finally by shedding light on water allocation administrative set-up in Andhra Pradesh. 
The chapter concludes by summing up the main empirical findings on water 
institutions and allocation. 
Chapter five deals with the role of politics in the water transfer to the city from the 
agricultural sector. After the content outline, the chapter develops into four main 
sections. The first describes the political and governance context in Andhra Pradesh, 
and in particular the regional set-up of the state and its implications for resource 
allocation, as well as the main characteristics of Andhra Pradesh politics. Then, 
section 5.2 historically reconstructs the main policy milestones of Hyderabad water 
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supply. The third section performs an assessment of the politics of Hyderabad water 
supply by taking leverage from a conflict analytical framework that addresses 
successively the origins of the political conflict; the actions actually undertaken; and 
some options for resolving the conflict. Chapter five wraps up by summing up the 
main research findings. 
The impact of water allocation is dealt with in chapter six that looks in particular at 
the transfer to Hyderabad from the Manjira River. At the outset, an outline is 
provided. The remainder of the chapter is organized into three main sections. The first 
one illustrates the main features of the Manjira River and Nizamsagar irrigation 
project. The physical and historical characteristics of the Manjira River as well as the 
development and utilization of water resources over time in the basin are described. 
After having presented the main features of Nizanisagar irrigation project, the section 
concludes by describing the standing rules for sharing water between irrigated 
agriculture along the Manjira River and Hyderabad. Then, based on water balances 
and a set of research hypothesis, section 6.2 calculates the actual impact of the water 
allocation to Hyderabad on agriculture under Nizamsagar reservoir. While also 
accounting for groundwater use in the irrigated area, the implications of the transfer 
on agricultural output and gross agricultural revenue are calculated. Chapter six 
concludes by summing up the main research findings. 
Chapter seven draw from primary data collected through household questionnaires at 
Ghanpur and Nizamsagar irrigation projects along the Manjim River. Following the 
chapter outline, the primary data survey sample is described and a proxy for poverty is 
chosen based on evidence showing that farmers' wealth is correlated with their social 
category. Then, irrigation and agricultural production in the study area as resulting 
from the data collected is presented. Chapter seven further addresses resource access 
by farmers, and in particular land; surface canal water; groundwater; subsidized seeds 
and fertilizers; and sources of information. Then, before concluding by summing up 
the research findings, chapter seven describes the strategies that farmers have adopted 
when confronted with scarcity in supply of canal water. 
The main PhD findings are discussed in chapter eight that is divided into two main 
sections: the first one re-examines existing knowledge on water allocation from 
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agriculture to urban areas in the light of the PhD findings; whereas the second 
discusses the original contribution of this thesis in the field. 
Chapter nine, which consists in two main sections, concludes this thesis. In the first 
place, the core features of water allocation from agriculture to Hyderabad are 
discussed. Then, the second section places the Hyderabad case into the broader 
context of administrative water allocation from agriculture to urban areas, and draws 
policy recommendations. The following issues are addressed -1) politics of 
administrative water allocation and the possibilities of compensating farmers for the 
water transfers; -2) the impact of reallocations; -3) the role of groundwater in surface 
water allocation; and -4) equity issues in administrative water transfers. 
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2 Intersectoral water allocation: a review of theory and evidence 
This chapter presents a detailed theoretical and empirical review on intersectoral 
water reallocation, so as to provide the reader with a clear picture on the state of 
research on the topic, and pave the way for the analysis and discussions of the 
following chapters. For clarity stake, what follows has been divided into four main 
sections. The first reviews the theoretical pillars over which this thesis unfolds, that is 
-1) water allocation within the context of the development of water resources in a 
river basin; -2) principles of optimal water allocation; -3) water institutions and 
policies; and 4) main water transfer mechanisms. 
Section 2.2 addresses the evolution of water transfers theory and practice in an 
historical perspective. Early studies essentially concerning cases in the Western 
United States are first presented. Then, the Chilean case is discussed, since promoted 
in the 1990s by many researchers as the example of successful introduction of water 
markets in a developing country, to be taken as a model for water law reforms in other 
developing countries. At last, in sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 the administrative water 
allocation mechanism is discussed as opposed to markets. 
After section 2.3 that briefly describes a number of cases of existing and planned 
projects for transferring water to cities, which adds to the preceding review of theory 
and evidence, the chapter concludes by discussing the existing research gaps on 
administrative water allocation from agriculture to cities. 
Z1 Theoretical tenets 
Z1.1 Water use and allocation in a river basin perspective 
Water resources are essential for life but also for the development of societies, since 
they support a wide range of human-related activities and the environment. Water can 
be a production factor, as in the case of agriculture where it serves the plant for the 
transport of nutrients, temperature stabilization, and photosynthesis. But it also 
provides services, as making possible navigation or recreational activities. Water uses 
are diverse, and there is no unique globally accepted understanding on how they 
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should be classified. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization recognizes the following water uses-. agriculture; domestic; hydropower; 
industry; inland navigation; and recreation (UNESCO, n. d. ). To take another example, 
the United States Geological Survey classifies water uses into domestic; commercial; 
public-supply; irrigation; industrial; livestock; mining; electricity production; 
hydroelectric power; and wastewater treatment (USGS, n. d. ). USGS classification is 
far too detailed within the scope of this thesis, and in the remainder of this thesis the 
one proposed by UNESCO is adopted. Water use can further be classified as 
in-stream (used within a source); consumptive (not fully returned to the stream); and 
non-consumptive (fully returned to the stream). In-stream uses are usually 
non-consumptive; for example, fishing and swimming (Productivity Commission, 
2003). 
A number of researchers have described water reallocation as a phenomenon 
occurring along with - and brought about by - the development of water resources in 
a river basin. The first published works have been those of Keller et al. (1998) and 
Keller (2000), who conceive the development of a river basin as a succession of three 
distinct phases labelled "exploitation"; "conservation"; and "augmentation". 
Exploitation is characterized in its first stages by water abundance in respect to 
demand, and diversion from nearly close water sources and/or shallow groundwater 
aquifers; and then by capture of water through large-storage projects and pumping 
from deeper aquifers. Conservation happens when pressure on water resources has 
become high, and the demand for water move closer to the resource available. During 
this stage notably, efficiency in water use increases, and return flows are reused. The 
last phase starts when river basins reach closure (no more surface water from the 
basin reaches the estuary), and inter-basin water transfers are called upon. 
Drawing from the works of Keller, Molden et at. (2001) propose a quite similar 
model, where river basins develop in three phases: "development" first; then 
"utilization"; and eventually "allocation". Though similar to the framework discussed 
in the previous paragraph, the work of Molden et al. (200 1) is relevant since it 
perceives water allocation within and across sectors as a response to water scarcity. 
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Drawing from existing studies on river basin development and from theory on societal 
adaptive responses to water scarcity, and notably those of Turton et al. (1999), Molle 
(2003) proposes a framework that explains the development of water resources as 
resulting from the interaction of three different categories of responses to water 
scarcity, called "conservation"; "allocation"; and "supply augmentation" (Figure 2.1). 
The interplay of these three categories makes up the responses of societies to water 
scarcity. 
Figure 2.1: Type of responses to water scarcity 
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Source: Molle (2003) 
Actions aimed at conserving water, augmenting the supply, and allocating the 
resource happen at the local as well as at the state levels, and are carried out by a wide 
spectrum of water stakeholders. 
A response to water scarcity with potentially far reaching implications for agriculture 
to cities water transfers shown in Figure 2.1 is water conservation. Increasing 
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irrigation efficiency is often perceived in the literature as a method for "freeing" water 
for cities. Though there are many definitions of irrigation efficiency, it is often 
expressed as the ratio of the water used by the crop (in evapotranspiration) to that 
diverted to the field (National Research Council, 1996). If irrigation is more efficient 
in the sense that it uses less water for growing the same quantity of crop, then the 
"conserved" water can be available for other users, notably urban areas. Irrigation 
efficiency in the context of water scarcity and allocation is extensively discussed in 
National Research Council (1996), while relevant case studies have been reported for 
instance by Lankford et al. (2004) with a case from Tanzania; or Molle (2001) with 
cases from Thailand. Though irrigation efficiency has been often depicted as the 
"tailor-made" solution to urban water needs, recent studies have highlighted that in a 
river basin perspective this is not necessarily the case, since water that is not used by 
crops is not lost and serves other uses and users downstream (Cai et al., 2003; Molden 
et al., 2005). Basin trajectories evolve according to the societal responses to water 
scarcity, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. Though empirical evidence shows that the 
general trend is to move towards closure of river basins, successive adjustments to 
water scarcity can take place. Those happen as a result of the implementation of a 
range of individual, collective, and state responses categorized in supply 
augmentation; conservation; and allocation. 
Figure 2.2: Trajectories of river basins 
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The different potentials shown in Figure 2.2 account for the fact that if total renewable 
resource can be hydrologically defined, the share that is available at one point in time 
often depends on the existing technological level. For instance, basins can be 
reopened by achieving a new increment in supply through trans-basin diversions. 
ZI. 2 Optimal water allocation 
Achieving socially optimal allocation is the overarching guiding principle for 
distributing - or redistributing - land, water, or fisheries when those resources 
become scarce. Though this is a widely acknowledged point, definitions and 
understanding of what "optimal" should stand for are far from unique. Below, this 
section provides for some different interpretations. 
Starting points for our argument are a series of landmark international conferences 
that took place in 1992, and notably the International Conference on Water and the 
Environment held in Dublin, and the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (best known as the Earth Summit) held in Rio de Janeiro. These 
conferences, along with the Second World Water Forum held in the Hague in 2000, 
have brought about an international consensus on, the need for major reforins in water 
laws, policies, and management to address the worsening problems of water scarcity 
and conflicts (see e. g. Bauer, 2004b). The three pillars that make up the concept of 
sustainable development have taken shape: economic efficiency and growth; social 
equity; and environmental protection. Optimal allocation can thereby be defined as 
allocation that better achieve the sustainable development of the resource under 
consideration. 
There is also another perspective, taking its roots into neo-classical economics, which 
considers that optimal water allocation is achieved when water use generates the 
greatest net value (Wichelns, 1999). In this perspective, transferring water rights from 
low-value water uses (for instance irrigating staple crops) to higher-value uses (as 
irrigating cash crops or use in indu strial production) is a move towards a more 
economically efficient allocation. 
Notwithstanding this, water reallocations must also take into account social 
equitability (see e. g. Dinar et al., 1997; Lankford et al., 2007). Equity is a rich and 
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complex subject that extends well beyond the narrow views of neoclassical economics 
where it stands for equality of income. Dictionary definitions of "equity" include: 
"that which is fair or right; impartiality; the recourse to the principle ofjustice; the 
quality of being equal orfair" (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 3d edition, quoted 
in Green, 2003). Equity relates both to the outcome of a decision and the procedure by 
which the decision is reached. According to Green (2003), the moral principles that 
have been proposed as the basis of decision regarding the provision and allocation of 
goods are often conflicting and include the following: 
0 The benefits should be distributed on the basis of the contribution of the 
individual to the provision of the good 
0 The benefits should be distributed according to the relative need of the 
individual or group (quoted after Farmer et al., 1995) 
The benefit should be shared equally between individuals 
The cost should be bome according to the value of resource to the individual 
or group ("users-pays" principle) 
0 That the polluter ought to pay according to their contribution to the problem 
(6epolluters-pay principle") 
Still drawing from Green (2003), possible questions testing the adequacy of the 
decision process (that is procedural equity) are: 
* Were all key'stakeholders engaged in the decision process? 
0 Were the key objectives that the different stakeholders bring to the choice 
considered? 
* Was an adequate range of options considered, including these favoured by 
particular stakeholders? 
* Were all the most probable and most important consequences of adopting each 
option considered? 
9 Was the process of analysis rigorous and logical? 
0 Was the best available data (not incurring excessive cost) used in the analysis? 
Examples of allocation in water-scarce environments considering equity are for 
instance Maas et al. (1978) that reports on irrigation projects in Spain and in the 
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Western United States; Sangameswaran (2006) that discusses equity aspects of the 
implementation of a watershed project in Maharashtra, South-India; or S. D. 
Gorantiwar et al. (2005) that propose a methodology for assessing the performance of 
irrigation schemes that takes into account equity considerations. 
Environmental protection is the criteria for optimal allocation of water that still needs 
to be discussed here. Though the environment is a strong pillar of sustainable 
development, it has raised concerns more in developed countries than in developing 
ones. Protection of in-stream waters has been a crucial issue for instance in 
intersectoral water reallocation in the Western United States (National Research 
Council, 1992), or in Australia (Turral et al., 2005). These cases notwithstanding, 
economic growth in developing countries like India and China still partially rests on 
the exploitation and deterioration of natural resources, and actual protection of water 
from degradation is low in governments' agenda. 
2.1.3 Water institutions 
In this thesis, water institutions refer to institutional environment as well as 
institutional arrangements (Davis et al., 1970; quoted in Saleth et al., 2004). 
Institutional environment is defined by a set of fundamental political, social, and legal 
rules that establish the basis for production, exchange, and distribution; whereas 
institutional arrangements provide a structure within which members of a society 
cooperate or compete. Within these terms, water institutions can be understood as the 
interrelation of three distinct components, that is water law defining the "rules of the 
game" (North, 1990); water policy; and water administration. Further, Saleth et al. 
(2004) decompose the three formal institutional components in major institutional 
aspects. Water law can thereby be decomposed to highlight -1) inter-govertimental 
responsibility; -2) water rights; and -3) accountability provisions and mechanisms. 
Water policy can be decomposed to shed light on -1) project selection criteria; -2) 
pricing and cost recovery; and -3) users and private sector participation policy. 
Finally, the administrative dimension of water institutions can be decomposed to 
focus on -1) organizational structure; -2) financing and management; -3) regulatory 
mechanisms; and -4) conflict resolution arrangements. 
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2.1.3.1 WaterDolicies 
Though generic in nature, water policies are essential since providing guidelines and 
directions for taking actions in water resources management. Policies can be defined 
as "a definite course or method of action selectedfrom among alternatives and in 
light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions" 
(Merriam Webster, n. d. ). 
Water-related policy decisions are made in broad terms, and may include 
determinations concerning water resources ownership; water use rights; priorities of 
uses; limitations; restrictions or obligation governing uses; payment of water rates; 
public participation; and so forth (Caponera, 2007). 
2.1.3.2 Water law and water rtqh 
The manner in which water is allocated is determined by water law, that is written 
statutory provisions (or legislation), and all other water-related regulations. Water law 
may make provision for multiple aspects of water management, as water resources 
policies; inventory and information on water resources; water rights definitions; water 
use in - and allocation between - sectors; water administration; water resources 
planning at the national, basin, and local levels; or then issues related to water quality. 
The juridical status of water is determinant for the way in which allocation can take 
place. Generally speaking, water resources may be defined as public, private, 
common, of nobody, or community (Caponera, 2007). The first three are discussed 
hereafter. Public waters are those which are considered to be either the property of the 
state or to be held in trust by the state or the public authority. Generally, these waters 
are inalienable, that is they cannot be given away permanently, but can only be the 
object of an administrative grant. Private waters are those which the legislation 
considers to be the possible object of private ownership, and are in particular relevant 
in the case of groundwater, on the basis of the principle that the owner of the land 
owns everything located above and below his land. Finally, common waters are 
considered as the common entitlement of the whole or of a specific community. 
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The term "righf' can be defined as the "The ability to do somýthing which is 
recognized directly or indirectly in law, to the extent that the law can be expected 
positively to protect the ability or negatively to prevent others from interfering with 
that abiliV' (Scott et at., 1995). An important distinction must be made between the 
right to use water and water'ownership, though this distinction often does not appear 
in water legislation. The rights to use water may be acquired in the following ways 
(Caponera, 2007): 
0 By the legal effect of the law, through inheritance, gift, sale, acquisition or 
donation of the land on or under the which water is located 
0 By appropriation, that is through the prior use and, in some cases, registration 
of the water right with the competent water administration 
* Through the granting of an administrative authorization, permit, licence or 
concession 
Schlager et al. (1992) have proposed a useful classification of water rights based on an 
hierarchy of entitlements, as shown in Table 2.1. This classification has the strength 
of clearly illustrating that a right to water can be made up of several different 
entitlements, or specific rights. In the case ownership rights, some or even many 
rights may be relinquished temporarily without loss of ownership (Walker, 1980; 
quoted in Desheng Hu, 2006). 
Table 2.1: Bundle of rights associated with positions 
Entitlement Owner Proprietor Claimant Authorized User 
Access: the right to enter a 
defined physical property 
Withdrawal: to gain 
benefits from that property 
Management: to define 
withdrawal entitlements 
Exclusion: to define who 
will have an entitlement to 
access 
Alienation: to sell or lease 
withdrawal entitlements 
Source: Schlager et al. (1992) 
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Authorized users are those who have permission to access the resource as well as to 
withdraw some of it; claimant have the same rights as authorized users, plus the right 
to define withdrawal entitlements; proprietors can also define who will have an 
entitlement to access; whereas ownership consists of the aforementioned rights plus 
the right to alienate the resource through sale, donation, transfer, and inheritance. 
Other important attributes of water rights useful for comparing how they have been 
defined in different jurisdictions are (Productivity Commission, 2003): 
a Universality, that is all available water resources are covered by the system of 
rights 
Predictability of volume: users have a reasonable expectation of the volume of 
water that they can extract from a source 
" Enforceability: the right can be protected from encroachment by others 
" Certainty of the title, that is there is legal recognition and protect ion of rights 
" Duration: the time period that users possess the title to a right is specified 
" Exclusivity: at the margin, the benefits and cost of possessing and exercising a 
water right accrue to the owner 
Detached from land title and use restrictions. The right is separate and free of 
any requirement to hold land or any restrictions on how the right may be 
exercised 
9 Divisibility and transferability. The right may be subdivided and is freely 
tradable to others 
Water rights can be conditional for instance on location of extraction and use; nature 
of the use, or rate of extraction and time of use. They can be granted for specific users 
(for instance irrigators); for specific uses; for an individual; or for a group of users 
(Economic & Social Commission for Asia & the Pacific, 2001; quoted in Productivity 
Commission, 2003). 
2.1.3.3 Water administration 
In addition to water law, water administration plays a crucial role in managing the 
resource. Water administration consists in any form of organization responsible for 
the management of water resources. The main purpose of a water resources 
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administration is to ensure the successful implementation of a government water 
resources policy. Caponera (2007) classifies water organizations - according 
to their 
specific features and notably: 
0 The powers that they can exercise: political, executive, technical, or judicial or 
quasi-judicial 
e The function they accomplish: inventory, research, policy formulation, 
coordination, planning, and so forth 
0 The uses (or sectors) they serve 
0 Their territorial level of jurisdiction: international, national, intermediate 
(interstate, state, inter-basin, basin, ... ), or local (municipalities, village 
authorities, ... ) 
Their legal regime: fully governmental, semi-govermnental (or mixed, or 
para-govemmental), or private 
2.1.4 Water transfer mechanisms 
Four different mechanisms for transferring water within or between sectors have been 
identified in the literature. These mechanisms, which may concomitantly exist within 
a same country, are the following: -1) marginal cost pricing; -2) water markets; -3) 
administrative (or "public") allocation; and -4) user-based allocation (Dinar et al., 
1997). Marginal cost pricing takes leverage on prices for shaping water users 
behaviours. Water markets consist of allocation driven by market forces and 
conditions of trade agreed upon by water buyers and sellers. Water markets can occur 
in various ways, depending upon the country-specific legal and socio-economic 
conditions. Administrative allocation is characterized by rights of trading water vested 
within public authorities, generally at the state level, which provides governments 
with the capacity of transferring water between users by administrative procedure. 
User-based allocation happens when water is treated as a common pool resource and 
elected representatives within a group of water users decide upon water entitlements. 
Below, this section discusses in some detail the four principal different water transfer 
mechanisms. 
27 
2.1.4.1 Maminal cost pricin 
Pricing has been since long deemed an appropriate way for fostering voluntary 
transfers of water, notably from low to high value users, and promoting water 
conservation. The underlying idea is that by establishing an appropriate water rate and 
by collecting water fees, users would restrain from using excessive water. The water 
so spared, or conserved, would then be available for other users and uses. 
Marginal cost pricing targets a price for water to equal the marginal cost of supplying 
the last unit of water. An allocation that equates the price of one unit of water with the 
marginal cost is considered economically efficient or socially optimal (13hatia et al., 
1995; Dinar et al., 1997). This method assumes that users collectively employ 
strategies to reduce their water use and defer or eliminate the acquisition of 
incremental supplies that cause appreciable rate increases (Teerink et al., 1993). 
Applying this principle requires that the consumption of water be measured (by 
metering) and that charges be volumetric, that is, proportional to the amount 
consumed. Though theoretically appealing, marginal cost water pricing is usually not 
practiced in developing countries, notably because of the high transaction costs of 
metering water use (Perry et al., 1997). In irrigated agriculture for instance, 
landholding is generally characterized by a large number of farmers holding small 
size lands, thus making metering an unfeasible option. Furthermore, marginal cost 
pricing neglect equity issues (Dinar et al., 1997), and as Molle (2001) points out, the 
economic and political risks of defining too high water fees restrain decision-makers 
from using water pricing as a mean to allocate water. 
2.1.4.2 Water markets 
Easter et al. (1998) subdivide water markets into formal and informal ones, the former 
referring to permanent transfers; the latter to temporary exchanges of the right to use 
water while ownership right remains within the seller. A more detailed subdivision is 
provided by Lund et al. (1992), that classifies the different water markets transfer 
arrangements into the following seven categories: -1) permanent transfers; -2) long 
term lease of water; -3) spot market transfers; -4) water banks; -5) contingent 
transfers/dry years options; -6) transfers of reclaimed, conserved and surplus water; 
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and -7) wheeling and exchanges. These different types of water markets are dealt with 
in the following sections. 
Permanent transfers 
Formal market allocation refers to the permanent sale and purchase of water rights, as 
well as to transfer of water rights by forfeiture, or by involuntary loss (Shupe et al., 
1989). Transfer by forfeiture occurs when water is not used for beneficial purposes 
over a given period, this particular type of transfer notably occurring within the prior 
appropriation and riparian doctrines in the United States (Getches, 1997). Water users 
are said to involuntarily lose their water rights when rights are transferred against the 
will of the of the water right holder (Shupe et al., 1989). Different types of pen-nanent 
water transfers are discussed in the remainder of this section, and notably water 
ranches; block of water district shares; standing purchase offers; individual sales; and 
investment per se. 
Water ranches 
In many water law systems, water rights and particularly groundwater rights are 
associated with ownership of land. Water rights are said to be "appurtenant to land". 
Within such systems, water rights can not be traded without a corresponding 
5 transaction in land ownership. 
Example of acquisitions of land solely for their associated water rights is the city of 
Scottsdale in Arizona that began an acquisition program in 1984 by purchasing 
several thousand agricultural acres with water rights for $US 11.6 million. Another 
instance is Thornton in Colorado that announced. in 1986 that it had made 
arrangements to purchase 12,000 acres of irrigated farmland for $US 52 million in 
order to obtain the associated water rights (Shupe et at., 1989). 
Blocks of water district shares 
In the United States, municipalities have the possibility of purchasing water rights 
from agricultural water districts stock independent of the land. Water districts are 
managing water resources owned by the federal government. This practice has been 
5 Though a temporary transfer of the whole or part of the right to use water may also occur without land 
transactions 
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going on for long times in north-eastem Colorado, where active market exists for 
Colorado Big Thompson shares (Shupe et al., 1989). 
Standing purchase offers I 
Standing purchase offers consist in standing offers to existing water rights. For 
instance, though having more than adequate water supplies, the city of Albuquerque 
in New Mexico is planningTor its future needs by slowly acquiring rights under its 
standing offer. Farmers that sell their water rights to Albuquerque under this program 
are automatically allowed to lease the right to use water back for a nominal fee for ten 
years (Shupe et al., 1989). 
Individual sales 
These are simple water rights transactions at the local scale involving single sales 
between buyers and sellers, independent of standing offers, land purchase, or district 
shares. 
Investments per se 
Purchase of water rights are not only done for fiilfilling users' needs, but in some 
cases carried out by individuals and corporations as an investment operation, because 
they believe that the value of water rights will escalate. A typical investment 
transaction involves the purchase of irrigation water rights and leasing back of the 
rights to the farmer for continued irrigation until the investor is ready to resell the 
right. 
Long term lease of water 
Water rights owners often wish to retain ownership of water rights, while entering 
into long-term arrangements with other water users. In long-term leases, the lessee 
secures a water source for a long period, which might by of 20 or more years. 
Concomitantly, the lessor retains long-term investment flexibility in anticipation of 
potentially future values for water leasing or sale of a water right (Lund et al., 1992). 
Spot market transfer 
Spot market transfers are short-term transfers or leases typically agreed to and 
completed within a single water year. Parties to a spot market are able to customize 
the arrangement to accommodate their specific need. An exemplar of spot exchanges 
are groundwater markets in South-Asia's, where farmers exchange water according to 
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a great variety of bargaining rules. Examples in India have been reported among 
others by Mukhedi (2004) and Saleth (1998); whereas Meinzcn-Dick (1998) has 
discussed groundwater markets in Pakistan. 
Water banks 
Water banks are forms of spot markets operated by a central banker. Users sell water 
to the bank for a fixed price and buy water from the bank at a higher fixed price, the 
difference typically going to covering the bank's administrative and technical costs. 
The California Drought Emergency Water Bank was established in 1991 as a response 
to severe water shortages and was meant to provide water for critical municipal, 
industrial, and agricultural needs, preservation of fish and wildlife, and carryover 
storage as a precaution against yet another dry year (Wahl, 1993). 
Contingent transfersldry years options 
Dry-year options consist in a negotiated agreement where one of the parties acquires 
an option to lease water form another party specifically during dry years. Long-term 
contingent transfer agreements can be established for a duration of 10-50 years. They 
can help a water utility to reduce the need for long-term, new sources development. 
Intermediate-term contingent transfers (three to ten years) might be employed to help 
reduce the susceptibility of the buyer's system to drought during periods leading to 
the construction or acquisition of new supplies. Short-term (one to two years) 
contingent transfers might be utilized by a system in the middle of a drought, with 
depleted storage, in preparation for the possibility that the drought might last a year or 
two longer. This type of arrangement would prevent the buyer from engaging in less 
secure spot markets (Lund et al., 1992). 
Dry-year options have been negotiated between some cities and farmers in the 
Western United States, as the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California that 
initiated negotiations in 1987 on a dry-year option with farmers in the Palo Verde 
Irrigation District (Shupe et al., 1989). 
Transfers of reclaimed, conserved and surplus water 
Municipal and industrial users have obtained agriculture water by investing in the 
modernization of irrigation systems. The surplus made available, for instance by 
reducing seepages by lining canals, is made available for the city, though it can create 
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problems where canal seepage recharges groundwater. One exemplar of conservation 
offsets is brought by the city of Casper, Wyoming, that in the early 1980 s financed 
canal lining and other means of reducing irrigation losses in the district, then diverted 
the salvaged water for municipal use (Shupe et al., 1989). Another instance is the 
transfer of water from the Tone River Basin to urban purposes in Japan, documented 
by Matsuno et al. (2007). 
But transfer can also occur within cities: drawing from DWR (1988; 1991), Lund et 
al. (1992) report that numerous urban water utilities in the United States have become 
involved in purchasing water back from their retail customers, notably by putting in 
place schemes that provide rebates to customers for installing low-flow toilets or 
removing relatively water-intensive forms of landscaping. 
Wheeling and exchanges 
Exchanges occur in particular when parties hold water rights that are not appropriate 
to their respective needs, or to improve the system performance. Exchanges involve 
the transfer of water users and agencies. An example of exchange (or "operational 
wheeling") is the conveyance of water through conveyance and storage systems 
controlled by others. "Wheeling to store watee, is a common form of water exchange 
in which cities provide excess surface waters to farmers during wet years, either using 
this water in part as a substitute for groundwater or for groundwater recharge. In 
exchange, the irrigators agree that the resulting stored groundwater will be available 
to the city during dry years (Lund et al., 1992). 
2.1.4.3 Administrative allocation 
Administrative water allocation occurs when water rights are property of the state or 
held in trust by the state or the public authority (see also section 2.1.3.2 above). Public 
allocation is seen in the majority of large-scale irrigation systems, where the state 
decides what water resources can be used by the system, and allocated and distributes 
water within different parts of the system. In the domestic water sector, both 
municipal water supply corporation and many rural water supply and sanitation 
programs represent public allocation mechanisms (Dinar et al., 1997). Under 
administrative reallocations, a public or quasi-public water authority (for instance a 
river basin commission) would identify water demands or alternative uses and simply 
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reallocate existing water allocations or rights (Rosegrant ct al., 1994b). Administrative 
water allocation is by far the mechanism mostly practiced in developing countries, 
when the conditions for the introduction and functioning of water markets are not met, 
and/or where the state is not willing to devolve significant water rights to users. 
Below, this section deals in the first place with the advantages and disadvantages of 
administrative water allocation, then moves on to the issue of compensating farmers 
when water transfers from agriculture occur. 
Features, advantages and disadvantages of administrative water allocation 
Water resources have several distinguishing features that can define a role for public 
action (World Bank, 1993; quoted in Dinar et al., 1997): 
0 Large capital requirements and economies of scale in water infrastructure tend 
to create natural monopolies, warranting regulation to prevent overpricing. 
Moreover, many water investments produce joint products, such as recreation; 
electric power supply; flood control; and irrigation, which make pricing and 
allocation decisions difficult 
o Large size and extremely long time horizons of some investments reduce 
incentives for private investments in the sector 
0 Uses of water within a river basin are interdependent. These interdependencies 
suggest that having all users agree to the rules of the game could improve the 
social value of water resources 
0 Certain aspects of water activities, such as the control of floods and 
waterbome diseases, are public goods, which cannot easily be charged for on 
the basis of individual use. In such cases, public initiative may be required to 
ensure that levels of investment are appropriate 
0 Water resources are often developed because of their strategic importance for 
national security and for regional development. Governments thus typically 
maintain ownership of water thoroughfares 
When compared to market allocation, public water transfers are also deemed better 
achieving equity objectives, that is, ensuring water supply of areas of insufficient 
quantity. They can also better protect the poor, address the impact of transfers on 
33 
other water users (as for instance the environment), and provide given levels of water 
to meet minimal needs in the receiving sector. In unregulated water markets, these 
objectives are hard to achieve, in particular because water is reallocated among a 
limited number of users, and externalities are generally not considered in the transfers 
(Turral et al., 2005). 
Though presenting the advantages spelled out above, administrative water allocation 
is also characterized by a number of shortcomings, or disadvantages. The main ones 
discussed in the literature (Dinar et al., 1997; Meinzen-Dick et al., 1996b) are as 
follows: 
0 Structure of fees does not provide incentives to water users to conserve water 
and improve water conservation 
& Government-operated systems are characterized by poor performance, as 
leaking municipal water supply systems; licensing irregularities and 
inadequate controls over industrial water use; or damage to fish and wildlife 
habitats 
0 Poor participation of water users in the decision-making process and in the 
implementation of the transfers 
9 Decision-making mechanisms are lacking of transparency and can be highly 
politicized 
-, Most implementing agencies dealing with water resources have only sectoral 
responsibility, thus the incentives for creating integrated projects or to balance 
the needs of various users is lacking 
Compensations 
Compensations provided by the public authorities are meant to reduce the impact of 
reallocations on farmers, and to smooth the opposition against the transfers. 
Compensation typology differentiates between direct and indirect compensations, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.3 that draws from Levine et al. (2007). In direct compensations, 
payments can be done directly to farmers that experience crop losses, or to irrigation 
associations for improvements of the irrigation system (Chemonics, 2005). Indirect 
mechanisms are generally put in place when the water transfer affects a relatively 
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large fraction of the irrigation sector. In that case, compensations may include tax 
relief; crop subsidies; or education on improved irrigation and cropping practice 
(Levine et al., 2007). 
Figure 2.3: Characteristics of administrative water allocation and compensation mechanisms 
Administrative 
allocation 
With 
compensation 
Direct 
Farmer 
Irrigation II 
Association 
Source: Modified after Levine ct al. (2007) 
Without 
compensation 
Indirect 
Farmer Irrigation II 
Association 
Studies of administrative water allocation providing compensation to farmers or 
irrigation association are scanty. Matsuno et al. (2007) report on the case of water 
allocation in the Tone River basin in Japan, where water was allocated within the 
Agricultural Water Reorganization Measures (AWRM) framework. AWRM stems 
from the principle of capturing excess water from agriculture for other uses by relying 
on the modernization of existing irrigation infrastructure (see transfers of reclaimed, 
conserved and surplus water, section 2.1.4.2 of this thesis). In the Tone River basin, 
farmers have been indirectly compensated by improving and modernizing irrigation 
projects, which has freed important volumes of water for domestic uses (Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2: Water allocation from agriculture to domestic purposes from the Tone River basin in Japan 
Allocation for domcstic 
Project namc Project pcriod purposcs (Mm 3 /ycar) 
Kasai irrigation 1968-1972 84 
Gongcndou and Sattc-Ryou 1973-1987 50 
Saitama Goukuchi (11) 1978-1994 97 
Tone Chuo 1992-2003 120 
Source: Adapted after Matsuno ct at. (2007) 
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Another case study is the water transfer from the Rio San Juan basin to Monterrey 
metropolitan areas in Mexico (Scott et al., 2007). While transferring water, 
compensation arrangement for farmers have been established, including crop loss 
payments in order of $US 100 per hectare non irrigable due to the diversion of water 
to Monterrey, plus 60% of water diverted to be returned to farmers as treated effluent. 
In Taiwan, according to the standing water law, potential new water users must 
submit a water transfer plan to the water provider, including the amount of water to be 
transferred; transf6r duration; compensation and payment measures (C. C. Huang et 
al., 2007). In the Changhwa and Yunlin case, the recipient of the water transfer, a 
petroleum corporation, had to pay three items including: fees ý associated with using 
irrigation water conveyance structures; extra irrigation management; and 
administration fee for water re-allocation. As irrigators and recipients could not come 
to an agreement, the government eventually had to intervene and arbitrate the transfer 
compensation. I 
Z 1.4.4 User-based allocation 
User-based allocation systems are controlled by users with direct stake in the use of 
water, and that operate within an established water rights framework. Organizations 
functioning under this allocation mechanism include water conservancy districts and 
ditch companies (see e. g. Hartman et al., 1970); irrigation districts (see e. g. Loeve et 
al., 2003); water users association (see e. g. Hooja, 2002); and village-based 
organizations (see e. g. Mosse, 2003). 
User-based allocation requires collective actions institutions that can fon'n and 
develop spontaneously (Ostrom, 1990) or then be constituted by sanctioned law as in 
the case of water users associations. Studies of such systems have shown a great 
diversity of rules in allocating water between users. In irrigation systems water can for 
instance be allocated according to water availability; land-size; spatial location of the 
plot in the system; or then seniority of use (Yoder, 1997; Mosse, 2003; Maas et al., 
1978). In domestic water supply sector, there are reported cases of local communities 
efficiently and equitably regulating the use of wells and hand-pumps (Watson et al., 
1997). 
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Users-based systems present the advantage of directly involving the users in the water 
allocation decision-making process; in collecting water fees; performing operation 
and maintenance tasks; enforcing established rules; and sanctioning infractions. 
Moreover, since users are directly involved in the management of water resources, 
user-based allocation is expected to react more swiftly - and be more resilient - to 
climate changes and protracted drought than other allocation mechanisms (Meinzen- 
Dick et al., 1996a). 
Z2 Evolution of Intersectoral water allocation theory: a literature review 
2.2.1 Early studies: water markets in the Western United States 
Early studies on water reallocation mainly drew from case studies from the Western 
United States, a region characterized by a dry climate; a number of interstate 
litigations on allocation of trans-boundary watercourses; and an economic transition 
from ranching, irrigated farming and mining to urban growth, services, tourism, and 
industry. Aware of the limitations and constraints of the existing water allocation 
regime based on time of appropriation, the so-called prior appropriation doctrine 
("first in time, first in right"), the scientific and political discourse has rapidly turned 
towards a debate on strengths and weakness of water markets for transferring water 
from low value uses (notably agriculture) to highest ones, in particular cities (Brajer et 
al., 1989). Reported instances of transfers of water from agriculture to cities are 
Tucson in Arizona (Woodard, 1988), or Pueblo in Colorado (Saliba et al., 1987). A 
more well known example is the oldest and controversial transfer from the Owen 
Valley to Los Angeles in the early 1990s that, according to the Economist (2003; 
quoted in Libecap, 2005), "has poisoned subsequent attempts to persuade farmers to 
trade their water to thirsty cities", and from which the well known movie 
"Chinatown" released in 1974 takes inspiration. Especially between 1924 and 1934 
when most farm properties were acquired by the city of Los Angeles in the Owen 
Valley, negotiations between farmers and the Los Angeles Water Board often 
involved lengthy disputes over farm characteristics, including the amount of water 
conveyed, as well as farmland and water valuation (Libecap, 2005). 
Early literature focussing on the Western Untied States has tackled different aspects 
of water allocation, though with a paramount focus on the markets mechanism. 
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Markets were praised by some, as for instance Anderson (1985) that concludes his 
article by unambiguously stating that "there is simply no substitutefor the market 
process". On the opposite front, pessimistic views on the efficiency of markets for 
transferring water are clearly illustrated in an article by Chan (1989), that posits: "A 
common theme runs through all the arguments presented in this article: the market 
has its place in society, but society needs to keep the market in its place". 
Apart from clearly profiled positions as those reported above, a great number of 
publications on markets for water reallocation in the late 1980s and 1990s draw their 
attention on strengths and shortcomings of water users trading their water rights. In a 
balanced analysis, Brajer et al. (1989) note that markets are far from being perfect or 
well functioning because of-, uncertainties regarding property rights; few market 
participants; potentially high transaction costs; and inadequate information. One 
consequence of those potential shortcomings is notably the possibility of buyers and 
sellers to accrue profits at the expense of society as a whole. In a similar perspective 
looking at the downsides of market allocations, Livingston et al. (1986) discuss the 
effect of general in-stream rights on the transfer of water between traditional users. 
On the other hand, Rosegrant et al. (1994a) note that water markets present the 
following strengths: 
They empower water users by requiring their consent to any reallocation of 
water and compensation for any water transferred 
0 If transferring water rights is a profitable activity, then there will be an 
increased incentive to conserve water and increase the amount of saleable 
water (see also Green et al., 2000) 
9A system of marketable rights to water would induce water users to consider 
the full opportunity cost of water, including its value in alternative uses 
0A system of tradable water rights would provide incentives for water users to 
take account of the external costs imposed by their water use 
9 Compared to the often-recommended volumetric pricing of irrigation water, 
the rights-based approach would be more acceptable to farmers 
* Allocation of water through tradable rights provides maximum flexibility in 
responding to change in crop prices and water values 
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Another issue of concern that pooled the efforts of researchers has been to devise 
innovative arrangements for circumventing the drawbacks of water markets. Frederick 
et al. (1982; quoted in Dudley, 1992) for instance address water banking as a mean of 
providing incentives for water trading under the control of government agencies. The 
most well known case of publicly controlled water banking as a mean of transferring 
water between users is the drought water bank established in California in 1991 as a 
response to four years of severe drought (Wahl, 1993). Looking at temporary transfers 
between agriculture and cities as a response to water scarcity, Shupe et al. (1989) 
consider dry-year options which are long-term arrangements allowing cities to use 
farmers' water especially and particularly during spells of drought. 
2.2.2 Chilean water law and markets: a model for the developing countries 
The inefficiencies in the water sector in -developing countries in respect to water 
conservation and intersectoral reallocation, particularly in t he 1990s, are very well 
acknowledged (see e. g. Gleick, 1993). Since water rights in developing countries, at 
least when it comes to surface waters, are solidly vested within state's governments, 
the latter were naturally blamed for the inefficiencies, and the effectiveness and 
efficiency of so-called administrative mechanisms for dealing with water scarcity and 
transfers was questioned. 
Reforms in water law and administration were called upon in order to tackle the 
problem, and water law reforms in Chile provided for a legal, economic, but also 
ideological model on how developing countries could more efficiently manage their 
water resources. In 1981, Chile had introduced a swift reform in its water law by 
passing a new water Code that relinquished water rights to users; established 
transferable water rights; and eventually paved the way for water markets (Bauer) 
1998; Hearne et al., 1997). The Chilean water Code is still unique under many 
aspects. For fostering transfers, water rights have been first of all separated from land 
ownership. Then, and this is the most distinctive feature of Chilean water law, water 
rights can be freely bought, sold, mortgaged, and transferred like any other piece of 
real estate. According to Bauer (2004b), the unconditional nature of private water 
rights in Chile differs from water laws of all other countries around the world. 
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The Chilean model has attracted the attention of major international financial 
institutions and notably the World Bank. From the early 1990s, a number of 
supportive voices advocating water privatization and free marketing upon the Chilean 
model came from economists within the Bank and its close entourage. Worthy to be 
reported here are for instance the studies of Thobani (1997) that discusses in the 
World Bank Observer why water markets should be introduced, supporting his case 
with the Chilean example by (over)stating that "Such measures [that is those 
associated with the privatization of water] have contributed to Chile's success in 
providing water to virtually all urban residents". The most thorough assessment of 
the efficiency of water markets in Chile is brought by Carl J. Bauer. In his book 
"Siren song. Chilean water law as a modelfor international reform" (2004b) notably, 
Bauer notes that empirical evidence shows that the new Water Code, together with the 
Constitution, have been fairly effective in achieving several of its original priorities, 
mainly those having to do with strengthening private property rights. Notwithstanding 
this, the Water Code has been much less effective in achieving other original 
objectives, particularly those having to do with the smooth operation of water markets 
and markets incentives. 
2.2.3 Markets versus administrative reallocation: impact and transaction costs 
The debate on water reallocation in developing countries essentially unfolded over the 
introduction of water markets as a better substitute to administrative water transfers, 
view oAen substantiated by the Chilean discourse as discussed in the previous section. 
Though some pieces of research have actually compared markets and public 
reallocation mechanisms (e. g. Dinar et al., 1997), most scholars have approached the 
issue by looking at strengths and weaknesses of the water market only, and then by 
inferring lessons for their possible application in developing countries. This approach 
holds a quite straight forward explanation: in the early 1990s a great deal of literature 
on water markets was already at hand, notably focusing on the Western United States 
and on the Chilean case. Conversely, there was little empirical evidence detailing the 
functioning of administrative water reallocations in developing countries. 
Howe et al. (1986) are among the first and most often cited authors having proposed a 
number of criteria for examining water allocation mechanisms. The criteria are 
notably the flexibility of the mechanism in the allocation of supplies; the security of 
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tenure for established users; whether the resource user is confronted with the real 
opportunity cost of the resource available for his use; the predictability of the outcome 
of the allocation process; equity of the allocation; and political and public 
acceptability. 6 
Nevertheless, most of the discourse has developed around the analysis of a few issues 
considered as pivotal in determining the efficiency of water transfers mechanisms, 
notably the impact and transaction costs discussed in the following two sections. 
2.23.1 IMDact of water transfers 
"Impacf' stands for any effect experienced by water users because of allocation of 
water from agriculture to urban areas. The general categories of parties who stand to 
be affected by transfers are -1) other water users; -2) agriculture (including business 
and farmers in the area of origin); -3) the environment; 4) urban interests; -5) 
non-agricultural rural communities; and -6) other taxpayers (adapted from National 
Research Council, 1992). 
Environmental effects can include for instance in-stream flows; wetland and other 
ecosystems; water quality; and other interests affected by environmental change. One 
of the most controversial issues has nevertheless been the impact of water transfers on 
agriculture and farmers in the area of origin. As discussed in section 1.1, water 
transfers to high value uses are generally carried out by curtailing water supplies to 
established users, in most of the cases long standing irrigators. Since farmers 
generally avail of strong poliiical power, impact on agriculture has been one the main 
impediments to water transfers (Molle et al., 2006). Notwithstanding evidence and 
theory calling for a deeper understanding of the impact of water allocation, pertinent 
published studies are astonishingly sparse, and depict a somewhat contradictory 
picture showing negative impacts on agriculture as well as positive ones. Research 
conducted in Tamil Nadu by Palanisami (1994; quoted in Rosegrant et al., 1999) 
shows that farmers sell water to urban residents to alleviate diverse labour problems; 
6 Howe et al. (1986) note that these criteria "relate closely to ( ... ) economic efficiency", though they 
would more commonly apply to the concept of "performance" and they partially overlap with the 
criteria defined in section 2.1.2 for optimal water allocation 
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achieve high profits; or dispose of unutilized surplus water. Thobani (1998) reports on 
new employment possibilities for farmers who sold their water rights in Chile and 
Mexico; whereas Rosegrant et al. (1994c; quoted in Rosegrant et al., 1999) present 
evidence suggesting that area-of-origin effects in Chile are small and that agricultural 
regions have benefited substantially from water trading and sale. 
Negative effects on the other hand are reported by Hearne (1998), who found out that 
the sale of water rights by a few farmers in market water allocation systems can have 
substantial negative impacts on the farmers community. Dixon et al. (1993; quoted in 
Rosegrant et al., 1999) observe that operating costs, crop sales, and agribusiness 
revenues in California dropped between 2% and 3% because of water sales to 
California's 1991 drought water bank. The impact also depends on the characteristics 
of the area-of-origin. Severe economic and social impacts, if any, are to be mostly 
expected in specialized, marginal agricultural regions rather than in prosperous basins 
(Howe et al., 2003). Taking California as a case study, Philip (2003) notes that though 
water transfers are likely to reduce farm income and employment in some farming 
areas, they engender relatively small effects, largely because farmers tend to adjust 
away from water-intensive crops. 
2.2.3.2 Transaction costs 
There are diverse and sometimes contrasting definitions of the term "transaction 
costs" in the economic literature (see e. g. McCann et al., 2005). The aim of this 
section is not to give a detailed exposure on transaction costs, since this thesis is not 
going to dig into the economics of water allocation. Rather, a general overview in 
provided. Transaction costs can be defined as '! /actors that prevent markets from 
operating efficiently or as factors that prevent markets from forming altogethee' 
(Colby, 1990). 
In the general literature, there are several works looking at the transaction 
' 
costs of 
water markets. Determinants of transaction costs are for instance discussed in Brajer 
et al. (1989) that look at clarity in property rights over water; influence of the number 
of buyers and sellers; mobility of the resource; and availability of information. Other 
works include Chong et al. (2006) that shed light on the legal costs associated with 
litigations over transferring water; explicit barriers to trade federal water (in the 
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United States); infrastructure costs and constraints; and political and social barriers. 
Works dealing with developing countries include Dinar et al. (1987) that discuss the 
politics of introducing water law reforms in developing countries; and Dinar ct al. 
(1997) that addresses advantages and disadvantages (among whose transaction costs) 
of administrative water reallocation when compared to other allocation mechanisms. 
Within the scope. of this thesis, it is worth mentioning the work of McCann et al. 
(2004) that consider the transaction costs not only of markets, but also other transfer 
mechanisms such as administrative reallocations. These scholars propose a framework 
for estimating the transaction costs incurred by alternative water allocation 
mechanisms, and notably formal and informal tradable water rights; public (that is 
administrative) allocation; and opportunity cost pricing. Drawing among others from 
works of Saleth et al. (1999a; 2004) that discuss the institutional economics of water, 
McCann et al. (2004) consider the cost associated with the development of a water 
allocation mechanism as well as its functioning, as shown in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3: Typology of transaction costs and effect determinants 
Type of transaction cost I Major determinants of increased transaction costs 
Hydrological and climatic uncertainty, lack of system storage, water 
Research and information 
transferred out of agriculture and/or out of the basin, significant impact 
including environmental effects, dependence on return flows, lack of clear 
water rights 
Enactmcnt or litigation 
(initial transaction) 
Design and implementation 
Support and administration 
Significant impact, dependence on return flows, duration of the transfer, 
riparian water rights, lack of clear water rights, complexity of water law, 
incidence of costs is concentrated, lack of water users associations, lack of 
familiarity with markets, lack of social capital, weak government 
Water transferred out of agriculture and/or out of the basin, infrastructure 
not suited to transfers of water, significant impact, existing institutional and 
administrative structure not designed for water marketing, riparian water 
rights, lack of clear water rights, complexity of water law, lack of water 
users associations, lack of familiarity with markets, lack of government will 
Larger areas, increasing number of people involved, increased precision of 
contracts required with respect to quantity, quality, time, and place, lack of 
effective water users associations. lack of familiaritv with markets 
Contracting (second-ordcr 
Lack of rule of law, lack of social capital, increased precision of contracts 
transactions) required, 
lack of water users associations, lack of familiarity with markets, 
lack of system storage, lack of water rights registry 
Lack of social capital, poor monitoring technology, increased precision of 
Monitoring/detcction contracts required, lack of water users associations, disagreement about initial distribution of water rights, high transportation and communication 
I costs 
Hydrological uncertainty, lack of water users associations, lack of conflict 
Prosecution/enforcement resolution and contract enforcement mechanisms, weak government, high 
notential for violence 
Source: Modified from McCann et al. (2004) 
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In addition to the major determinants of Table 2.3, another element that can increase 
the transaction costs of water allocation in developing countries can be corruption and 
rent seeking by public authorities and public representatives, as well as by civil 
servants. Examples in this regard are the seminal work by Wade (1982) that describes 
political and administrative corruption in canal irrigation systems in South-India, or 
Davis (2004) who sheds light on corruption in public service delivery in South-Asia in 
the water and sanitation sectors. 
2.2.4 Reasserting administrative water allocation 
From the late 1990s, new evidence started questioning the water markets model, and 
particularly the suitability and feasibility of introducing markets in developing 
countries. A number of factors are responsible for this shift. First of all, the efficiency 
of the so praised and cheered Chilean model for reallocating water began to be 
questioned, particularly in the light of new empirical evidence. In this regard, Bauer 
(2004a) notes that "Much of the debate around Chilean water markets ( ... ) has been 
based more on theoretical or political beliefs than on empirical studies". Further 
down, he concludes by saying, among others, that "Examples of significant market 
activity, as indicated by the frequency of water rights transactions or the amount of 
water resources reallocated, remain limited to afew areas of the desert north and the 
metropolitan area ofSantiago". 
But also two other factors have contributed to question the introduction of the market 
model in developing countries. The first is that a number of conditions are 
determinant for markets to perform well, and most of them are far from being met in 
developing countries (Molle, 2001; Saleth et al., 2001; Sampath, 1992). Among those 
conditions are well functioning institutions and good governance; irrigation systems 
where water availability and delivery can be measured with precision; and physical 
irrigation infrastructure and irrigation management systems capable of allocating 
water in accordance with market principles (Perry et al., 1997). 
The second factor having restrained reforms in developing countries for introducing 
water markets is related'to the legal reform process itself, and more particularly its 
unpredictability; uncertain political gains or losses; and eventually uncertain outcomes 
in terms of more optimal use of the resource. In this regard, the case of Sri Lanka 
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(Madar, 2005) and Peru (Trawick, 2003) are eloquent examples of failures in 
reforming water law towards privatization of water resources. 
In the light of the evidence discussed above, notably the problems in establishing 
tradable surface water rights in developing countries, research on how to enhance 
existing administrative water allocation by reducing its impact and transaction costs 
have surfaced. Among the existing works, some examine how to regulate water 
reallocations through water transfer arrangements and appropriate operation of 
multipurpose reservoirs (Matsuno et al., 2007; Scott et al., 2007), or how to provide 
compensations for administrative water allocation (C. C. Huang et al., 2007; Celio et 
al., 2007a). Another important strand of research focuses on how to increase water 
productivity in irrigated agriculture, so as to "free" water for other uses and notably 
for urban water supply. Water productivity is defined as the ratio of the net benefit 
from crop, forestry, fishery, livestock, and mixed agricultural systems to the amount 
of water required to produce those benefits. Put in simple terms, it means growing 
more food and gaining more benefits with less water. Increasing water productivity is 
a critical response to increasing water scarcity, including the need to leave enough 
water to sustain ecosystems and to meet the growing demand of cities and industries. 
Molden et al. (2007b) mention the following primary ways to increase productivity of 
water in a basin context: 
0 Increasing the productivity per unit of evapotranspiration by, for instance, 
improving soil and water management, changing plant varieties, or adopting 
mulching practices 
Minimizing non productive depletion of blue water7 flows, by reducing water 
flows to sinks, minimizing salinization and pollution of return flows, or 
avoiding use of freshwater to dilute wastewater 
9 Providing additional supplies for human uses by tapping uncommitted 
outflows, while taking care to address possible tradeoffs with downstream 
human and ecological uses 
7 Blue water is water in rivers, groundwater aquifers, reservoirs, and lakes and is the main water source 
for irrigated agriculture. Conversely, so-called green water refers to the soil moisture generated from 
rainfall that infiltrates the soil and is available for uptake by plants (drawn from Molden et at. (2007a)) 
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a Reallocating and co-managing water among uses. Reallocation would take 
place from lower value to higher value uses within and between sectors, but 
taking care of compensation and consequences to other users and uses 
In the literature, there are examples of water reallocation from agriculture to cities that 
have come along with the increase of water productivity and crop production in the 
area of origin. For instance, Loeve et al. (2004) assert that crop production and water 
productivity increased in the area irrigated by the Zhanghe Reservoir in China after 
reallocation to other sectors had taken place. Furthermore, Nickum (1997; quoted in 
Barney et al., 1999) reports that because of a shift to high value crops and increase in 
water productivity, grain and overall agricultural outputs were continuing to increase 
in the suburbs of Beijing even after water was being diverted to the urban core and the 
overall irrigated area had declined. 
Z3 Thirsty cities: review of cases of water transfers to urban areas 
in this section a number of projects of transfers of inter-basin water to urban areas are 
listed, mostly drawing from Vijayan et al. (2007). Though these existing and proposed 
transfers do not necessarily represent a transfer from the agricultural sector, they 
provide the reader with relevant instances of transfers of water to growing urban 
centies. Table 2.4 shows the list of projects and gives for each of them a succinct 
description of their main features. 
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Z4 Research gaps 
Though there has been a profusion of works on water markets for reallocating water 
between and within water sectors; research on administrative water reallocation has 
only marginally interested the scientific community. As discussed in section 2.1.4 of 
this chapter, inefficient water use in developing countries has been pre dicated upon 
goverm-nent centralized water management. The mainstreamed solution suggested by 
researchers has been to reform the law so as to enable water markets; rather than 
addressing the existing shortcomings in administrative water allocation. Research 
needs in the field are multiple, and can certainly not be addressed within the works of 
one single PhD. This section highlights the main research gaps on administrative 
water allocation identified in the literature, and further specifically addressed in this 
thesis. 
It is the stand in this thesis that administrative reallocation can be more optimal8 if a 
number of conditions (or "requisites") are met, and appropriate reallocation 
mechanisms are put in place. 9 In the first place, attention has to be paid to water 
institutions. There is a widely acknowledged need to better understand shortcomings 
and strengths of existing institutions for reallocating water (see e. g. Saleth et al., 2004, 
2005). In particular, water law must be designed and implemented so as to allow for 
reallocating water while achieving basic economic and social objectives; as well as 
for protecting senior water rights without barring access to the resources to new users 
(Caponera, 2007). Particular attention should be paid to water organizations, able to 
negotiate and implement water transfers along with government authorities (Bruns et 
al., 2005). Apart from studies on users' participation in irrigation schemes and on 
participatory irrigation management, research dealing with organizational aspects of 
water allocation in developing countries is still at its infancy. This gap is addressed in 
this thesis, which looks at water institutions for water allocation in Andhra Pradesh. 
An additional underdeveloped area of research in water allocation is about the politics 
of water transfers. In the last decades, the question of water and politics has in fact 
' On optimal water allocation, see section 2.1.2 
9 See section 2.1.4 on water allocation mechanisms 
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been addressed in a variety of water resources research and is perhaps 'best 
exemplified by the development of the term "hydropolitics" (Elhance, 1997). 
However, the hydropolitics literature has been applied primarily in the context of 
international (e. g. Elhance, 1999; Sneddon et al., 2006; Toset et al., 2000) and 
resource scarcity related (e. g., Gleditsch et al., 2006; Homer-Dixon, 1999; de Soysa, 
2002) water conflicts; as well as in political ecology studies such as those by scholars 
such as Swyngedouw (e. g 1995), Castro (e. g. 2004), Kaika (e. g. 2003), or Steinberg 
and Clark (1999). Hydropolitics has still not been mainstrearned in water management 
studies (Wester et al., 2002), and more attention still needs to be devoted to politics 
surrounding water (Bryant, 1998). The politics of water reallocation are dealt with in 
chapter five of this thesis, which draws from the case of the water transfer to 
Hyderabad from the Krishna River. 
The impact that water reallocations can have on agriculture is among the main focuses 
in research on water transfers from agriculture to urban areas. Negative effects on the 
area of origins have to be minimized and those affected by the transfers compensated. 
Reducing the impact is also key for smoothing the opposition against water transfers 
to urban areas (National Research Council, 1992). The main difficulty in determining 
the impact of water transfers is to do with the complexity of the water natural 
environment, and notably the physical interconnectedness between surface waters and 
groundwater. As previously seen in section 2.2.3.1, the literature on the impact of 
water reallocation is relatively scanty, and more research is required to avail of 
sufficient case studies so as to draw a neat picture of the implications of water 
transfers from agriculture. 
Chapter six in this thesis addresses this research gap by calculating the impact on 
agriculture of the water transfer to Hyderabad from the Manjira River, while also 
closely considering the contribution of groundwater to irrigated agriculture in surface 
canal water irrigation. Chapter seven looks more closely at the impact of the transfers 
at the scale of the farmers' household, thus adding evidence and research insight into 
the impact of water allocation. 
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3 Methods of research 
This chapter discusses the methodology adopted for answering the research questions 
previously presented in section 1.3.2. Since each research question addresses water 
reallocation to Hyderabad from the Manjira and the Krishna rivers from a different 
angle, this thesis relies on mixed methods of research, encompassing analytical 
frameworks that draw from the social as well as the technical sciences, and the 
collection of both primary and secondary data from different sources. Following this 
introduction, this chapter discusses the data sources and types that are used while 
addressing the research questions of this thesis. Then, the methods followed for 
collecting data are presented. Finally, section 3.3 deals with the frameworks and tools 
adopted for analyzing the data collected. 
3.1 Data sources and type 
The PhD questions are addressed using both secondary and primary data. The latter 
was collected by the author through household questionnaire surveys, the respondents 
consisting of fan-ners in the command areas of Ghanpur and Nizarnsagar irrigation 
projects along the Manjira River. Secondary data sources entail government agencies; 
the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water -Supply and Sewerage Board (HMWSSB); 
unpublished scholarly works from Universities in Andhra Pradesh (AP); newspapers 
daily clippings; Census of India data; and published as well as unpublished works 
from the Internet, the International Water Management Institute (IWMI), and the 
Water, Engineering. and Development Centre (WEDC) at Loughborough University. 
Primary and secondary data sources and types used to answer the research questions 
are listed in Table 3.1. 
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3.2 Data collection 
3.2.1 Primary data 
Primary data collection through household questionnaire surveys can be broken down 
into different stages, and notably -1) research design and planning; -2) questionnaire 
preparation; 3) questionnaire survey; and 4) data cleaning and entry. Table 3.2 shows 
the time period over which each one of these stages has been carried out; its duration 
in months; and the main activities undertaken. An accurate description is provided 
further down in the sub-sections that follow. 
4-V 
Table 3.2: Various stages of primary data collection 
Phase Time period Duration Main activities 
Research design Literature review and questionnaire design 
and planning 
Sep 06 1 month Planning logistical details of fieldwork 
Hiring fieldwork assistant 
Preliminary field visits 
Questionnaire Questionnaire I st draft and testing 
preparation 
Oct 06 - Nov 06 2 months Questionnaire 2nd draft and testing 
Translation of questionnaire in Telugu and 
retranslation in English 
Data collection in seven villages in 
Questionnaire Dec 06 - Apr 07 5 months 
Ghanpur irrigation project and four villages 
survey in Nizamsagar command area, for a total of 
219 households 
Data cleaning and 0 
Data cleaning and entry into a MS Access 
May 07 - Jun 07 2 months database entry 
0 Further data cleaning in MS Access. 
DesAqnandplannin 
The main issues addressed while designing and planning the household survey 
concerned theoretical as well as logistical aspects. For the former, a decision had to be 
taken in regard to the specific questions to be asked, keeping in mind that the primary 
data so collected had to allow for answering the 4th research question of this thesis 
that deals with the implication of the water reallocation on poor farmers, and their 
adaptive strategies. Moreover, the primary data had also to provide reliable 
information on cropping patterns, crops yields and prices that could be used for 
assessing the impact on agriculture of the water reallocation to Hyderabad (P 
research question, see Table 3.1). To help in this design phase the main relevant 
literature has been gathered and consulted, and opinions on the topic have been 
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exchanged with colleagues at IWMI in Hyderabad and with the supervisors at 
Loughborough University. 
Then, logistical aspects had to be decided, that is the selection of the villages in 
Ghanpur and Nizarnsagar command areas to be included in the survey and the number 
of respondents for each village. The choice has been made to carry out the highest 
number of questionnaires, so as to increase the precision of the survey estimates. Two 
main constraints have finally determined the size of the sample: the first being to 
ensure a good quality of the data collected; the second to fit within the time available 
(on household surveys theory, see e. g. United Nations, 2005a). Data quality was 
enhanced by -1) hiring a field assistant fluent in Telugu (the local language) and 
English that had considerable experience in carrying out household surveys and by 
accompanying and training him during the first weeks of the survey, but also -2) not 
asking him to carry out too many questionnaires per day, so as to avoid that he had to 
rush through the questions, which would have led to a certain loss of data quality. The 
second constraint is time-related. The survey has not to stretch beyond the month of 
April 2007 since from May up to the mid of June the extreme hot climate strongly 
impinges on the number of questionnaires that can be carried out daily and also on the 
quality of the responses. 
Given the criteria above, as well as the fact that during the day farmers are available 
during a relatively short time (that is approximately from 9AM to noon, and from 
2PM to 5PM), the decision was taken to select seven villages along the right bank 
canal of Ghanpur irrigation project and four in Nizamsagar command area (see Figure 
1.5 for the location of these two projects), and to carry out 20 interviews in each of 
those villages. The villages to be included in the survey were chosen so as to be 
located in different parts of the command areas from the head-end reaches where 
canal surface water is generally abundant to the tail-end reaches that receive canal 
water only during years characterized by precipitations well above the average. 
3.2.1.2 Questionnaire preparation 
After the first draft of the questionnaire was prepared, a dozen farmers located in 
villages in the study area but not selected for the survey were interviewed, so to check 
the pertinence of each question and of the questionnaire as a whole. Based on this 
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experience, another draft was prepared, and an additional verification carried out. The 
final version of the questionnaire was then prepared, and translated in Telugu by 
professional translators of the International Crop Research Institute for the Scmi-Arid 
Tropics (ICRISAT) in Patancheru. The field assistant and*translator was then asked to 
translate it back to English, so to make sure that there were no discrepancies between 
his understanding of the meaning of questions and the author's. Moreover, in order to 
increase the quality of the survey the questionnaire was designed so to allow for cross 
checking the answers given by the respondents. " 
3.21.3 Questionnaire surve 
The survey was carried out between December 2006 and April 2007 in seven villages 
in the command area of Ghanpur irrigation project right back canal, and in four 
villages in Nizarnsagar command area. 12 A total number of 20 interviews were carried 
out for each village, except for Chityal village in Ghanpur command area where 19 
interviews were conducted, so that eventually a total of 219 interviews have been 
undertaken, 139 in Ghanpur command area, and 80 in Nizarnsagar. During the first 
weeks, the survey was carried out by the field assistant along with the author, so to 
make sure that the former could grasp the precise meaning of each question and the 
logic of the questionnaire as a whole. The approach followed at the village level 
consisted in the first place in going to the house of the gram panchayat 13 and 
informing the village sarpanch 14 of the interview. Farmers located around the house 
were then asked to participate to the interview which would take place in a room of 
the gram panchayat, and attention was paid to include individuals belonging to 
different social categories. The advantages of this approach were threefold: firstly, the 
interviews were legitimated since the respondent was sure that the survey had been 
endorsed by the sarpanch; secondly, since there were generally many farmers around 
the house, it was possible to select them so as to cover the whole spectrum of social 
categories; and thirdly, the time for conducting the survey was dramatically reduced. 
"A template of the questionnaire used in the primary data survey is reported in Appendix 5 
12 See maps in Appendices 3 and 4 for the localization of the villages included in the questionnaire 
survey 
13 Local goverment body afthe village level 
14 Head of the gram panchayat 
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Anybody but the respondent would take part to the interview, which was conducted in 
the first place by informing him or her on the scope of the interview and wider 
research, and on the time that it would approximately take. To avoid the respondent to 
understate his/her assets so to get more chances to receive government subsidies or 
access to public schemes, he/she was also informed from the outset that the 
government was not meant to have access to the data collectcd, and if it did then the 
identity of the respondents would not have been disclosed. 
3. Zl. 4 Data cleanina and ent 
The data collected was entered in a MS Access database through a form that 
reproduced the format of the questionnaire, so to reduce the chances of typing 
numbers in the wrong place as it might more likely occur if using MS Excel. Then, 
typing errors were checked by performing basic descriptive statistics, notably to 
pinpoint those entries located at the extremes of the sample. 
3.2.2 Secondary data 
3.2.2.1 
IData sources 
The main source of secondary data has been the government of AP, and more 
specifically the Irrigation and Command Area Development Department, the 
Agricultural Department, the Groundwater Department, and the Directorate for 
Economics and Statistics. Obtaining data on water from the government proved to be 
a hard and time consuming task for a number of different reasons. To begin with, 
there is a general culture of secrecy surrounding water resources information in AP, 
which is mostly due to the importance of water for the state economy and the standing 
semi-arid climatic conditions that contribute to create water-scarcity. The reluctance 
in providing data also stems from the fact that water has been a source of tension and 
conflicts since a long time in the state, notably in the context of the ongoing interstate 
conflict with Maharashtra and Karnataka over the sharing of the Krishna River waters 
(D'Souza, 2006; Ramana, 1992); and regional struggles. 
Apart from some exceptions, the general procedure followed for getting data from 
government of AP departments consisted in submitting an official request on 
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International Water Management Institute letter-head to a high official of the 
concerned department in Hyderabad. Clearance for receiving the data was done by the 
official by signing and stamping the letter that he was presented. The next step was to 
set off for the regional office for checking whether the data was actually available and 
collecting it if affirmative, since for the projects investigated water-related data is not 
centralized in Hyderabad. Since a photocopy machine is not always at hand, and if 
affirmative frequent power cuts or lack of paper engender long delays, copy of data on 
documents was done by taking snapshots with a digital camera. One of the problems 
encountered while collecting information was missing data. Generally, the 
explanatory reason put forth by government officials for this was that the person 
formerly in charge of the office had taken the concerned books and registers along 
with him when leaving the post. The whole process described above has been very 
time consuming. High officials in Hyderabad were often out of station for duty, and 
scheduling times for meeting them proved to be of little use, since it happened that 
they did not show up at the time and place agreed upon. 
Information pertaining to Hyderabad water supply was in' the first place collected 
from the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (HMWSSB). 
Apart from some recent data on water supply to the city from its different sources 
collected at the HMWSSB in Hyderabad, all the data collected is from the HMWSSB 
library located at the HMWSS13 Training and Resources Centre in Hydemagar. As 
previously discussed, permission from high officials was sought in the first instance in 
Hyderabad. Copies of the relevant documentation have been made using a digital 
camera in the premises of the library. In addition to the above, information on the 
history of Hyderabad water supply was inferred from debates of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of AP obtained from the library of the Legislative Assembly in Hyderabad, 
as well as from the screening of past daily editions of the local newspaper "Deccan 
Chronicle". Editions from the 1970s onward were notably available at the Central 
Library of Hyderabad. After having obtained permission from the Head of the library, 
copies of the relevant articles were taken with a digital camera. 
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Crop data aggregated at the Mandal'5 level was collected from the Directorate of 
Economics and Statistics in Hyderabad in the form of an MS Excel file, while 
village-level data was photocopied from original paper documents from the Mandal 
Revenue Officer located at the Mandal headquarter. 
In addition to the above, relevant unpublished works have been collected in 
Hyderabad at the Central University and at the Osmania University, as well as at the 
Nagaduna University in Guntur District of AP. Last but not least, this research draws 
from and builds upon unpublished and published works available on the internet, as 
well as at IWMI and WEDC libraries. 
3.2.2.2 Secondarv data accurac 
Getting a sense on the accuracy' 6 of secondary data collected is important for 
determining the validity of the research results obtained from the analysis of the data, 
as well as for tracing back the reasons of discrepancies in the results if any. This 
section qualitatively discusses some aspects pertaining to the accuracy of secondary 
data collected during the PhD research. The discussion refers in particular to the 
hydrologic and crops-related secondary data used for determining the impact of the 
water transfer to Hyderabad on water availability and crop production at Nizamsagar 
irrigation scheme, which is the subject of chapter six. 
Hydrologic data supporting part of the findings of this thesis result from the 
measurement of water flows and storages along the Manjira River. In particular, data 
refers to four projects, that is Singur Reservoir; the Manjira Barrage; Ghanpur 
irrigation scheme; and further downstream Nizamsagar irrigation project. The field 
visits carried out at the Irrigation and Command Area Development Department office 
in Singur with the purpose of checking the way in which Singur Reservoir and 
Manjira Barrage data is collected by officials proved that the latter are quite dedicated 
to their work. The registers in which the readings are reported are properly organized 
15 See supra note 10 
16 Accuracy is the degree of conformity of a measure to a standard or a true value (definition drawn 
from Merriam-Webster's online dictionary (n. d. ) 
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and maintained. 17 The same remark is valid for Ghanpur and Nizamsagar irrigation 
projects, where the officials of the Irrigation and Command Area Development 
Department in charge of reading the gauges demonstrated a good dedication to their 
work. The relative clarity in the copies of the gauging registers also confidently 
indicates that the data collected present a sufficient accuracy for being used in the 
hydrologic calculations of chapter six. 
In regard to crops data, the main sources of information have been the Directorate for 
Economics and Statistics (for data aggregated at the mandal level) and various 
mandals headquarters in Nizamabad district for village-level data. It has not been 
possible to check the way in which data on crop cultivation is aggregated from the 
village to the mandal levels. Notwithstanding this, some conclusions on the accuracy 
of the data can be drawn, notably by observing village level data. The latter show that 
generally only the major crops (that is rice, sugarcane, sunflower, total pulses, and 
maize) are reported with some accuracy in the village registers., 8 Thereby, in the 
calculation of chapter six only these crops have been taken into account, discarding 
the information on other crops that appeared in the aggregated data at the mandal 
level from the Directorate for Economics and Statistics. 
3.3 Data analysis 
As declared at the outset of this chapter, each of the research questions of this thesis 
addresses different aspects of administrative intersectoral water reallocation. As 
shown in Table 3.3, different methods of analysis have been adopted, some applying 
uniquely to one specific question, whereas others to more than one. 
Below, this section is articulated into four parts, each one detailing the methods of 
analysis adopted in the following chapters (from number four to seven) of this thesis 
presenting and analyzing the data collected within the works of this thesis. 
17 For an extract of the register of Singur Reservoir, see Appendix I 
18 See Appendix 2 
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3.3.1 Research question 1: How are water institutions (law, administration, and policies) In 
Andhra Pradesh characterized, and how could they better account for water 
reallocation among sectors? 
The institutional reform analysis mainly draws from Saleth et al. (2004) and Saleth 
(2004). As previously seen in section 2.1.3, water institutions can be broken down 
into water law, policies, and administration. Similarly, each of these three components 
can be decomposed in order to highlight different aspects of water institutions. In line 
with the focus of this research, the analysis carried out in chapter four highlights those 
aspects of water institutions that are influential for water allocation in general and 
water transfers from agriculture to cities. Accordingly, water law is examined 
specifically in regard to: 
" Format of surface water and groundwater rights 
" Inter-jurisdictional allocation powers 
" Role of water users 
" Establishment of water authorities 
" Centralization tendency 
Water policy components addressed in this thesis include the following policy-related 
institutional aspects: 
0 Interregional and/or'sectoral water transfer 
0 Prioritization of water uses 
Users participation 
On the other hand, water administration components addressed by this research 
include the following aspects: 
0 Spatial organization 
0 Arrangements for intersectoral allocation 
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Water law, policies, and administration are addressed at different levels ranging from 
national, state, and urban institution, according to their importance for water 
allocation. Table 3.4 shows the institutional aspects addressed and levels of analysis. 
Table 3.4: Institutional aspects studied and levels of analysis 
Water law Water policy 
Water 
administration 
Constitutional provisions and National Water Policy, Not addressed 
legal acts (Easement Act, 1882; 2002 
National level Transfer of Property Act, 1882; 
and Land Acquisition Act, 
1894) 
State legal acts (Farmers' Irrigation and drinking Organization for 
Management of Irrigation water policies, as administering 
Systems Act, 1997; Water infcrred from the state interscctoral water 
State level Resources Development annual expenditures and allocation 
Corporation Act, 1997; and government funding 
Water, Land and Trees Act, schemes 
2002) 
Urban legal acts, notably the Urban water policies, Organization for 
Hyderabad Metropolitan Water notably on water administering 
Supply and Sewerage Act, 1989 conservation, rainwater intcrsectoral water 
harvesting, water pricing, allocation, notably 
and wastewater reuse sharing of 
responsibilities 
between the 
Hyderabad level Hyderabad 
Metropolitan 
Water Supply and 
Sewerage Board, 
and the Irrigation 
and Command 
Area Development 
Department 
3.3.2 Research question 2: What role does politics play in administrative reallocations from 
agriculture to other sectors? 
The politics of water reallocation are addressed by using concomitantly two analytical 
frameworks: the policy analysis framework proposed by Blaikic et al. (2001), and the 
conflict analytical framework of Bartos et al. (2002). The former requires the 
identification of key policy milestones; outlining the political and governance 
contexts of those milestones; and studying the interactions and actions of actors 
around policy formulation. It has notably been used so as to draw the main lines of 
policy formulation around augmenting Hyderabad water supply. Building upon this 
policy-making assessment, the conflict analysis framework of Bartos et al. (2002) has 
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been used to shed light on the causes of - and possible solutions to - the politicization 
of the water transfer. Below, this section discusses the main features of the framework 
proposed by Bartos et al. (2002) that will be used in chapter five to understand the 
politics of the water transfer to Hyderabad from the agricultural sector. 
The first step for proceeding with the analysis of a conflict is to adopt a working 
definition of the term "conflict". There are several different ways, sometimes quite 
divergent, in which the term "conflict" has been defined. This is not surprising given 
the diverse theoretical orientation of those who have studied social conflicts: 
psychologists; social scientist; political scientists; and others. This thesis follows the 
definition of Bartos et al. (2002), that considers a conflict as a situation in which 
66actors use conflict behaviour against each other to attain incompatible goals andlor 
to express their hostility". Some terins of this definition need clarification. Goals are 
incompatible when they cannot be achieved simultaneously by those who pursue 
them. Conflict behaviour is any behaviour that helps the party to achieve its goal that 
is incompatible with that of the opponent or that express its hostility toward him or 
her. 19 
The different elements that characterize a social conflict can be illustrated through 
flow diagrams. The Bartos et al. (2002) framework that is applied in this article gives 
an explanation for the paths and causes that may bring about incompatibility of goals, 
and then illustrates the conditions under which incompatible goals can lead to open 
conflict. As shown in Figure 3.1, one of the possible causes of goal incompatibility is 
that people contest the distribution of resources as wealth (money, but also wealth 
production factors such as land and water), power, and prestige. Resources can be 
contested because a party is deprived relative to the other party and feels treated 
unjustly; because s/he does not have enough resources to live a decent life (absolute 
deprivation); or because their members have a belligerent culture or personality. 
19 Bartos et al. (2002) speak about conflict action when actors are assumed to be guided by rational 
considerations, whereas by using behaviou instead they mean that actors might also be guidcd by 
non-rationality 
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Figure 3.1: Possible causes of goals incompatibility 
Relative 
deprivation 
Sense of Injustice % "A 
Incompatible 
Absolute 
Contested resources goals 
deprivation 
Belligerent culture 
or personality 
Source: Adapted from Bartos et al. (2002) 
But having incompatible goals does not necessarily mean that two parties will engage 
in direct confrontation. So-called overt conflicts only emerge when two main 
conditions are met: the formation of "conflict groups", and a sequence of events that 
ignite conflict. Further, when moving beyond individuals, groups can only become 
conflictive if their members have attained a sufficient degree of solidarity and have 
sufficient resources (as money, knowledge, time, etc. ) to engage in conflict. Figure 
3.2 shows the paths and causes that can lead to overt conflict it there is 
incompatibility of goals. 
Figure 3.2: Causes that lead to open conflict 
Start of conflict 
Incompatibile 
action 
4K 
Triggering 
goals o Conflict solidarity 
t 
event 
Conflict groups 
Conflict 
organization Conflict mobilization 
Conflict resources 
Source: Adapted from Bartos et al. (2002) 
Additional elements required to form groups engaging in longer term conflict include 
organization and conflict mobilization, the latter being the motivation and willingness 
of the individuals of a group to actually engage in the action. In many cases of short 
term conflicts, groups are often driven by solidarity alone, as represent by the dashed 
line sidestepping the organization and mobilization phases in Figure 3.2. Once the 
conflict groups are created, conflict can occur because of triggering events that might 
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or might not be in direct relation with the issue over which the parties at odds have 
developed incompatible goals. 
3.3.3 Research question 3: What is the impact of water reallocations from agriculture to 
cities on the areas of ýfigin, and what role does groundwater play as a substitute 
andlor supplement to surface canal water? 
Chapter six reckons water balances and simple reservoirs models so as to calculate the 
impact of the water transfer to Hyderabad on water availability and crop production at 
Nizamsagar irrigation scheme. Since presented along with the text in chapter six; the 
methodological details are not reported in the remainder of this section that only 
outlines the different methods adopted, that is: 
0 The calculation of the runoff. rainfall coefficient at Nizarnsagar 
* The calculation of surface water balances in the Manjira River and 
establishment of model for canal utilization at Nizarnsagar reservoir 
9 The assessment of groundwater withdrawals in Nizarnsagar command area 
3.3.3.1 Calculation of the runoff., rainfag coefficient at Nizamsa-qa 
Time-series of the runoff. rainfall coefficient is calculated at Nizamsagar from 
1925-1926 up to 1999-2000, so as to provide the reader with the impact of overall 
water resources development in the Manjira River on inflow into Nizamsagar 
irrigation scheme. Calculation of the runoff. rainfall coefficient requires rainfall data 
on the catchment area of Nizamsagar as well as information on the spatial extent of 
the catchment. The latter was established by using Digital Elevation Model data from 
the GTOP03 0,20 processed with the Geographic Information Systems (GIS) software 
ArcView 3.2 and Spatial Analyst 1.1. Then, the catchment area is split in a regular 
grid, with at the centre of each element of the grid annual rainfall information 
provided by the Climate Research Unit (CRU), Tyndall Centre for Climate Change 
Research in the UK (Mitchell et al., 2005). Annual runoff generated over the Manjira 
River basin in Nizarnsagar catchment is reckoned by summing the volumes of water 
generated on each elements of the grid, which are calculated by multiplying the area 
20 http: //edc. tisLs. gov/products/clevatioii/j,, topo3O/iztopo3O. htmi (May 2007) 
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of the grid element by the corresponding rainfall. The catchment area determined with 
the use of GIS and the grid for the calculation of the runoff in Nizamsagar catchment 
area are shown in Figure 3.3. 
Figure 3.3: Catchment area of Nizarnsagar irrigation scheme (area in grey) and grid for the calculation 
ofthe annual runoff. The numbers at the center of the grid elements correspond to the Identi I ier of the 
rainfall data provided by the Climate Research Unit (CRU), Tyndall Centre for Climate Change 
Research in the UK 
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3.3.3.2 Calculation of surface water balances in the Manfira River and establishment of a 
model for canal utilization at Nizamsa-qar reservoir 
Two distinct water balances are used in chapter six. The first calculates the monthly 
inflows at Nizarnsagar if water had not been reallocated to Hyderabad, by considering 
inflows and outflows over the stretch of the Manjira River spanning from Singur 
reservoir to Nizarnsagar irrigation project (see localization on Figure 1-5). The 
monthly water balance adds to the runoff in the Manjira River the volumes that have 
been withdrawn for Hyderabad; and accounts for changes in evaporation and water 
use for irrigation upstream Nizarnsagar brought about by the difference of water 
availability in the river. 
The second water balance is based upon the inflow without reallocation to Hyderabad 
(calculated with the previous water balance) and outflows at Nizarnsagar. The purpose 
of such a water balance is to determine canal water utilization at Nizarnsagar if water 
had not been reallocated to Hyderabad. Water use for irrigation is reckoned by using a 
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simple model that determines how much water is released for crop production 
depending upon the available storage in Nizarnsagar reservoir and the specific month 
of the year, the latter reflecting crops water needs. Before applying the model to the 
theoretical scenario in which water is not reallocated to Hyderabad, validity of the" 
model is checked by calculating canal utilization based upon the actual inflow 
received in Nizarnsagar (and not the one without reallocation), and then by comparing 
the result obtained against data on actual canal utilization provided by the Irrigation 
and Command Area Development Department of Andhra Pradesh. 
3.3.3.3 Assessment of groundwater withdrawals in Nizamsa-gar command area 
Annual groundwater withdrawals for agriculture in Nizarnsagar command area are 
calculated in two ways: the first consisting in multiplying the number of active 
borewells in the study area by their average discharge, then by the daily pumping 
duration which is inferred from timing of electricity supply, and eventually by paddy 
(the main crop cultivated) growing duration in days. The latter is inferred from 
primary data collected through the household questionnaire survey. The second 
method for the calculation of groundwater abstraction is based on an empirical 
formula established by Dewandel et al. (2007) that correlates groundwater 
withdrawals with area cultivated under different crops. 
3.3.4 Research question 4: How may poor farmers be impacted by reductions of canal 
water supply brought about by urban water transfers, and what strategies may they 
adopt? 
The potential implications of the water reallocation to Hyderabad on poor farmers and 
their coping strategies when canal water supply dwindles are addressed in chapter 
seven. Farmers' access to surface water and groundwater as well as other agricultural 
inputs is analyzed, and hardship in accessing these inputs is considered as reducing 
farmers' ability to cope with canal water shortages. Then, light is shed on how 
farmers have actually responded to poor canal water supply in 2004-2005 and 2005- 
2006 under Nizamsagar reservoir. Though poor water supplies over those two years 
cannot be solely related to the water transfer to Hyderabad (see section 6.1.2 in this 
thesis), the assumption is made that in case of reductions of water supplies in 
agriculture specifically brought about by urban water transfers, the observed coping 
strategies would be among those that farmers may choose to adopt. 
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In order to address farmers' coping strategies when facing significant reductions of 
canal water supply, primary data collected at Ghanpur and Nizarnsagar irrigation 
schemes is analyzed in chapter seven in this thesis. At the outset, the assumption that 
the wealth of farmers can be inferred from the social category the farmers belong to is 
put forth and tested. 
Primary data is analyzed by using the statistical software SPSS version 15.0. Two 
kinds of analysis have been performed: the first is frequency analysis, a descriptive 
statistical method that shows the number of occurrences of each response given by the 
respondents; the second is the Pearson chi square statistical test, which reflects the 
degree to which two variables are linearly correlated. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient r ranges from +1 to -1. A correlation of +1 means that there is a perfect 
positive linear relationship between variables; whereas a correlation of -1 means that 
there is a perfect negative linear relationship. As a rule of the thumb, values of r for 
positive correlations are interpreted as follows (Arkkelin, n. d. ): 
r values greater than 0.50 indicate a strong correlation 
0r values around 0.30 indicate a moderate correlation 
r values less than 0.20 indicate a weak correlation 
The Pearson correlation coefficient can be tested for statistical significance, and SPSS 
calculates the probability that r is statistically significant (this probability is labeled by 
SPSS "Sig. (2-tailed)"). If this probability is 0.05 or lower, then there is a real 
(statistically significant) relationship between the two variables. Conversely, if the 
probability is more than 0.05, then the relationship may be due to chance. 
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Water institutions and allocation 21 
"As water is a scarce resource, however, there must be some rule over precedence in 
its use. Paramount is the right to quench thirst. Even appropriated water is overruled 
by the necessity to provide waterfor man and beasts where no other suitable supply is 
available" 
Wilkinson (1990), Muslim land and water law 
"If normally the use of waterfor drinking andfor animal watering has priority over 
other uses, in the case of fire, preference in given to fire-extinguishing needs. 
Irrigation has priority over orchard water and, within an irrigated area, first crops 
are given priority over second and third crops, provided that this corresponds to the 
general interest" 
Caponera (2007), Principles of water law and 
administration, Water law principles in the Hindu subak 
system of Bali 
The main purpose of this chapter is to analyse those water institutions in India and in 
Andhra Pradesh that are relevant for water allocation from the agricultural sector to 
urban areas. The research findings presented in this chapter provide for the necessary 
information and analysis for answering the first research question of this thesis that 
asks: "How are water institutions (law, administration, and policies) in Andhra 
Pradesh characterized, and how could they better account for water reallocation 
among sectors? ". 
21 The findings presented in this chapter have been published in Celio (2008) 
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This introduction is followed by four main sections. The first analyses water policies 
at three different scale levels: the Indian nation, the state of Andhra Pradesh, and 
Hyderabad city. Water-related policies are inferred from official policy documents, as 
the Indian National Water Policy issued in 2002; as well as from policy indicators like 
sector-wise financial outflows in Andhra Pradesh; or Indian central funding schemes 
for drinking water. Then, section 4.2 examines surface water and groundwater law in 
India, and discusses inter-jurisdictional responsibility over water resources. Water law 
reforms in Andhra Pradesh are then reviewed, with particular regard to their 
implications for water allocation. Section 4.3 completes the preceding ones by 
discussing water administration in Andhra Pradesh in a water allocation perspective. 
The last part of this chapter sums up the main research findings on water institutions 
and intersectoral reallocation in Andhra'Pradesh. 
4.1 Waterpolicies 
In this section water policies in India and Andhra Pradesh are discussed, stressing 
those aspects relevant for water allocation. In particular, attention has been paid to -1) 
the National Water Policy issued in 2002 by the Indian central government; -2) central 
funding schemes related to drinking water supply; -3) trends in Andhra Pradesh state 
expenditures; and -4) various documeqts from which urban water policies in 
Hyderabad can be inferred. The section is organized according to the scale of analysis, 
that is the nation, Andhra Pradesh state, and eventually Hyderabad city. 
4.1.1 Indian national context 
4.1.1.1 Indian National Water Polic 
The Indian government issued its first national water policy in 1987, whose main 
goals were the promotion of conjunctive use of surface and groundwater; 
supplemental irrigation; water-conserving; crop patterns; and irrigation and 
production technologies (Government of India, 1987). Later on in 2002; the central 
government has issued a reviewed National Water Policy (NWP) heavily drawing 
from its predecessor of 1987. 
Drinking water is held in high consideration in the NWP presently in force, which has 
as a crucial and ambitious target to provide adequate safe drinking water facilities for 
the entire population in urban and rural areas. Along these lines, irrigation and 
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multipurpose projects should invariably include a drinking water component wherever 
there is no alternative source of drinking water. The paramount importance of water 
for drinking purposes is also addressed in the NWP when it comes to give priority to 
water uses. Notably, water allocation priorities should be as follows: drinking water 
should come first; then irrigation; hydro-power; ecology; agro-industries and 
non-agricultural industries; and at last navigation and other uses (Government of 
India, 2002). Notwithstanding this declared goal to put drinking water high in policy 
and action, prioritisation is somehow watered down, since the priorities could 
be modified or added if warranted by the area / region specific considerations". 22 
Unfortunately, prioritising drinking water over other uses is a weak instrument for 
transferring water to cities, since water conveyed to urban centres is used for a 
multitude of uses extending well beyond drinking. Furthermore, transferring water out 
of irrigation projects doesn't mean that only agriculture will be affected, since in 
many cases irrigation canals also feed surface reservoirs that are utilized for drinking 
purposes. This is the case in Nizarnsagar irrigation project, where a share of the water 
storcd in the reservoir is reserved for Nizarnabad city and Bodhan town in the case of 
protracted drought putting at risk urban water supply. Irrigation and drinking uses are 
moreover intimately intertwined because of the physical interconnectedness between 
surface and groundwater. For instance, strictly implementing a policy that aims at 
reducing water supply for irrigation in favour of transfer to cities for domestic 
purposes would have consequences on groundwater recharge and return flows in 
irrigation schemes. This would have a lot of chances to affect drinking water supply in 
rural areas, which generally depends to a large extent on groundwater availability. 
This linkage between water uses at the river basin level, named "cascading reuse 
systems" by Molden et al. (2005), significantly reduces the scope of prioritizing water 
uses as a means of reallocating water to high value sectors. 
The 2002 NWP also advocates for planning and setting-up institutional mechanisms 
capable of dealing with intersectoral water uses and competition: "Water resources 
development and management will have to be planned ( ... ) multi-sectorally ( ... 
)"'. " 
Moreover, the importance of decentralizing the administration of water resourceg and 
22 Section 5, National Water Policy, 2002 
23 Section 3(3), National Water Policy, 2002 
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handing over responsibilities to water users is clearly declared: "With a view to give 
effect to the planning, development and management of the water resources on a 
hydrological unit basis, along with a multi-sectoral, multi-disciplinary and 
participatory approach ( ... ), the existing institutions [meant as "organizations"] at 
various levels under the water resources sector will have to be appropriately 
reoriented / reorganized and even created, wherever necessary". 24 Further down the 
NWP states that "Special multi-disciplinary units should be set tip to prepare 
comprehensive plans taking into account not only the needs of irrigation but also 
harmonising various other water uses ( ... )99 . 
25 
4.1.1.2 Central fundina schemes for drinkinq water su 
Funding schemes also provide evidence on public authorities' water policies and 
priorities. According to Panikar (2007), drinking water supply was first recommended 
priority in India and elaborate plans established within the works of the Bhore 
Committee in 1946 and the Environmental Committee in 1949. In 1954, the central 
government provided assistance to the states for establishing special investigation 
divisions in the fourth Five Years Plan, 26 so as to identify villages with particularly 
difficult access to protected water sources. The Accelerated Rural Water Supply 
Programme (ARWSP) was introduced in 1972-73 to accelerate the pace of water 
access in villages without a safe water source within a distance of 1.6 km, or where 
water is available at a depth of more than 15 meters, or if groundwater quality was not 
suitable for putting it to drinking uses. In 1986, a Technology Mission (TM) was set 
up by the central government to assist the states in the provision of drinking water 
supply. The TM was further renamed "Rajiv Gandhi National Drinking Water 
Mission" (RGNDWM) which main objective was to provide sufficient and safe 
drinking water to all villages in the country. The central government introduced in 
1993-94 the Accelerated Urban Water Supply Programme (AUWSP) to cover towns 
24 Section 4(l), National Water Policy, 2002 
25 Section 4(2), National Water Policy, 2002 
26 In the so-called Five Years Plans, the central government of India defines its expenditure priorities 
for the 5 years to come. Other expenditures plans are the central Annual Plan, as well as plans at the 
states level 
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having a population of less that 20,000 as per the 1991 Indian Census, and allows the 
states to receive matching funds from the centre (Government of India, n. d. -a). 
Water supply in mega cities is sponsored by the central government through the 
Infrastructure Development of Mega Cities (IDMC) scheme initiated in 1993-94 and 
the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) in 2005. The 
IDMC primary objective is to "( ... ) undertake infrastructure development projects of 
city-widelregional significance covering a wide range of components like water 
supply and sewerage, roads and bridges, city transport, ( ... )" (Government of India, 
n. d. -a). Cities that can benefit from this scheme are Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, 
Bangalore, and Hyderabad. The overall goal of the JNNURM, the more recent 
funding scheme, is to "( ... ) encourage reforms andfast track planned development of 
identified cities". The JNNURM comprises of two sub-entities: the sub-Mission for 
Urban Infrastructure and Governance, whose main thrust encompasses water supply 
and sanitation infrastructure projects; and the sub-Mission for Basic Services to the 
Urban Poor (Government of India, n. d. -b). 
4.1.2 Andhra Pradesh state's expenditures: inferring ihigation and water supply policies 
Andhra Pradesh has still not an exclusive water policy, though a draft is currently 
being worked upon. In absentia of a formal water policy, the government attitude and 
priorities towards water allocation can be inferred from funds allocation. The plot of 
Figure 4.1 builds upon annual financial data spanning from 1956-57 to 1996-97 drawn 
from V. Hanumantharao et al. (1996). 27 Actual expenditures classified under the 
heaýings of "water supply and sanitation" and "irrigation and flood control" are 
reported, as well as the percentage they represent against the total state outflow. 
27 Since V. Hanumantharao (1996) has compiled data up to 1997-1998, and he does not mention the 
data-sources in his article, it has not been possible to include in the plot more recent information 
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Figure 4.1: Andhra Pradesh state government annual actual expenditures under the heading of 
"irrigation and flood control" and "water supply and sanitation", and percentages to the total state 
annual outflow. Thick lines represent the five years running average 
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Data represented in Figure 4.1 does not specifically refer to outflows in urban water 
supply, since sanitation is also included; Moreover, expenditures are for rural and 
urban water supply and sanitation altogether. Notwithstanding this, Figure 4.1 is 
instructive since outlining important trends in state funds allocations over the 40 years 
considered. In absolute terms, between 1956-57 and 1996-97 expenditures for 
irrigation and flood control have been steadily increasing, till around 1982-83 at 
moderate pace, and further on more vigorously. Data on water supply and sanitation 
tend to show a comparatively more attenuate increase, and expenditures have been 
less when compared to those dedicated at irrigation and flood control. These data 
suggest that irrigation has received more attention by policy-makers, fact explained by 
the high dependency of the state population on the agricultural sector and as well 
concerns related to food security. Priority on the irrigation sector is also highlighted 
by figures on the percentage of expenditure for irrigation and flood control, 
respectively water supply and sanitation, as compared against total state annual 
outflow. A detailed interpretation of the trends observed in Figure 4.1 would require a 
thorough analysis of history and events in Andhra Pradesh over the period considered, 
800 
400 
0 
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which would go far beyond the purpose of this section. It is nevertheless worth noting 
that from 1984-85 to 1996-94 the expenditures for irrigation and flood control have 
represented a relatively constant percentage of the total state outflow; whereas the 
percentage of spending for water supply and sanitation had decreased. This 
observation tends to reasserts the paramount policy importance that irrigation is given 
in Andhra Pradesh when compared to water supply and sanitation. 
A recent and illustrative example of the importance of the irrigation sector in Andhra 
Pradesh is brought by the Jalayagnam programme promoted and carried out by the 
present government headed by the Chief Minister Dr. Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy. The 
programme aims at completing 30 major and 18 medium irrigation projects in five 
28 years, at a cost of InR 460 Billion, that is around $US 11.6 Billion. Jalayagnam can 
be considered as the spearhead of the present government that clearly targets farmers 
which constitute its main electoral basis. 
4.1.3 Hyderabad urban water policies 
Since the constitution of the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage 
Board (HMWSSB) in 1989, a number of policies aimed at improving the service to' 
the water users and promoting water conservation have been put forth. Policies 
targeting water tariffs have been among those. Water fees in the city have been 
increased in an effort to cover the operation and maintenance (O&M) costs of 
Hyderabad water supply, and promote water conservation at the end-user level. Water 
fees and connection charges were raised by 17% in 1993, by another 25% in 1997, 
and again by a sizable 64% further increase in 2002 (Davis, n. d. ). If all the water users 
in Hyderabad did pay their water bills, the present tariffs structure would cover the 
O&M costs of the urban water supply system. In reality, still according to Davis 
(n. d. ), only around 50% of metered users pay for the water they use, and most of those 
who receive water from the HMWSSB pay flat rates since they haven't yet installed a 
meter on their connection. 
Another water conservation policy in Hyderabad has consisted in tackling water 
transmission and distribution losses as well as water tampering (Unaccounted For 
28 Exchange rate of October 3,2007 
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Water - UFW). The UFW problem was dealt with in 1996 by sctting-up a new 
division within the HMWSSB in charge of conducting area-wisc campaigns to 
identify and replace damaged pipes and consumer service lines (HMWSSB, 1997). 
Notwithstanding this, UFW is still a major concern of the HMWSSB, since estimates 
indicated that it ranges between 40 to 55% of the water withdrawn at source (Davis, 
n. d. ). 
Another initiative of the government of Andhra Pradesh intended to conserve water as 
well as to cope with groundwater depletion has been the establishment in 1997 of a 
Rain Water Harvesting Cell within the HMWSSB main office (HMWSSB, 1998). 
This measure was actually a follow-up of an administrative order making mandatory 
the installation of rainwater harvesting structures in new layouts and multi-storied 
buildings of Hyderabad. 
Though increasing water fees, tackling UFW, or fostering rainwater harvesting in 
Hyderabad have been praiseworthy initiatives, their contribution towards reducing the 
need of "importing" water from agricultýre has been very limited. Notably, the gap 
between water supply and demand in Hyderabad is too wide and calls upon additional 
transfers from outside the city's boundaries (see section 1.2.3). 
The last and certainly most ambitious plan of the HMWSSB and of the government 
has been to reuse treated wastewater generated by Hyderabad for non-drinking 
purposes, including industrial processes; irrigation; or for recharging aquifers. 
According to the feasibility study commissioned by the government, there is a scope 
for reusing 700,000 rn 3 of water per day by 2031 (PA Consulting Group, 2004). 
Depending upon its quality after treatment, the wastewater reclaimed would be reused 
by the industries, for groundwater recharge, for commercial establishments, and 
replenishment of existing drinking water reservoirs. 
4.2 Water law 
4. Zl Indianwaterlaw 
Water law is supposed to give effect to the course of action indicated in existing water 
policies, or in any case to provide for regulations that respond to existing water 
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challenges and opportunities. Below, this section is structured in two distinct parts, the 
first looking at surface and groundwater law as specified in national legislation and 
constitutional provisions; the second discussing water law reforms in the state of 
Andhra Pradesh. For the national as well as the state-level analysis, the emphasis is on 
the implications of the legal provisions for water allocation between water sectors. 
2 1.1 Surface waters 
Constitutional powers 
The constitution of India provides for the separation of powers between central 
government and states in regard to water. Notably, the right to legislate over "Mater, 
that is to say, water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and embanknents, 
water storage and water power ( ... )" is given to the states through the seventh 
Schedule of the Constitution, List Entry 17 . 
29 Notwithstanding this, states' power over 
water resources can be curtailed in case of disputed interstate rivers. With Entry 56 of 
the Union List of the seventh Schedule of the constitution, the central government is 
notably conferred with powers to regulate and develop interstate rivers, to the extent 
that parliament declares it by law to be expedient in the public interest. Therefore, as 
most of important rivers in India are interstate, water is potentially as much a central 
subject as a state subject (Iyer, 2003). Powers of the central parliament in the matter 
of interstate watercourses are further specified through constitutional article 262, 
which rules that the parliament may by law provide for the constitution of a tribunal 
for the adjudication of any dispute or complaint with respect to the use, distribution or 
control of the waters of, or in, any interstate river or river valley. The legislative 
competence of a state under Entry 17 must thus be exercised in such a manner as not 
to prejudice the interests of other states and create a dispute in the meaning of Article 
262. Under Article 262 the Parliament further enacted the Inter State Water Disputes 
Act, 1956 and the River Boards Act, 1956. 
Since 1994, there is now a third tier in the constitutional structure established by the 
enactment of the 73 d and 74h constitutional amendments, that is local bodies of 
29 Schedule VII of the Constitution specifies subject-matters of law made by Indian Parliament (List 1, 
or "Union List"), by the Legislatures of States (List II, or "State List") and by the concurrence of both 
(List 111, or "Concurrent Lisf') 
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governance at the village and city level: the village panchayals (Art. 243G) and the 
city nagarpalikas (Art. 243W). The Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules of the 
Constitution lay down the lists of subjects to be devoted to the panchayats and 
nagarpalikas. The panchayats list includes, inter alia, minor projects, drinking water, 
water management, watershed development and sanitation. 
Statutory provisions 
In India, there is no exclusive national water law. Water-related legal provisions are 
dispersed across various irrigation acts, central and state laws, constitutional 
provisions, court decisions, customary laws, and various penal and criminal procedure 
codes. 
British legislation in India during 1859-1877 recognized the customary water rights of 
individuals and groups (Saleth, 2004). But a change occurred with the Easement Act 
of 1882, which is still today a determinant nation-wide statute defining powers over 
surface and groundwater. According to Singh (1992b), the Easemcnt3o Act was passed 
under the pressure of reallocating powers over water in the late nineteenth century, 
which was necessitated by changes in political structures and boosted by the industrial 
revolution which made possible new technologies for water harvesting. Section 2 of 
the Easement Act declares that states' rights over surface water are not affected by 
easement and customary rights and that: "Nothing herein contained shall be deemed 
to affect any law not hereby expressly repealed, or to derogatefrom ( ... ) any right of 
the government to regulate the collection, retention and distribution of the water of 
rivers and streams flowing in natural channels, and of natural lakes and ponds, or of 
the water flowing, collected, retained or distributed in or by any channel or other 
work constructed at the public expense for irrigation". In addition to the Indian 
Easement Act, state governments' rights over surface water are generally further 
reasserted and reinforced in laws enacted by the states, notably those dealing with 
irrigation (Dubash, 2002; Singh, 1992b). 
30 An "eascmcnf' is defined as a "( ... ) right which the owner or occupier of certain landpossesses, as 
such, for the beneficial enjoyment of that land, to do and continue to do something Drawn from 
the Indian Easement Act, 1882 
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4.2.1.2 Groundwater 
Groundwater rights in India are appurtenant to land, that is contingent upon land 
ownership. Section 7 (g) of the Indian Easement Act declares that every landowner 
has the right to "( ... ) collect and dispose within his own limits of all water under the 
land which does not pass in a defined channel ( ... )". Hence, by this Act, the owner of 
a piece of land does not own the groundwater under the land or surface water on the 
land; he only has the right to collect and use the water. However, it is customarily 
accepted across India that a well on a piece of land belongs to the owner of that land, 
and others have no right to extract water from the well or restrict the landowner's 
rights to use the water. This belief and practice is indirectly supported by various laws 
such as land and irrigation Acts that list all things on which the government has a 
right, and groundwater is not mentioned. Additionally, interpretations of the Transfer 
of Property Act of 1882 and the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 also support the 
position that a landowner has proprietary rights to groundwater; that it is connected to 
the dominant heritage (the land), and cannot be transferred apart from it (Poorest 
Areas Civil Society (PACS), n. d.; Saleth, 2004; Singh, 1992a). 
4.2.1.3 Indian water law and dghts: implications for water allocation within and between 
sectors 
Indian water law described in the sections above is determinant in shaping the manner 
in which water is allocated, and a fundamental difference exists between allocation of 
surface water on the one hand, and groundwater on the other. 
Surface waters are allocated by the Indian states, except in the case of disputed 
inter-state watercourses. States overarching powers upon surface waters have notably 
permitted the massive development of water resources after India gained 
independence in 1947, during the so-called "green revolution". This would not have 
been possible to the extent witnessed in India if a prior appropriation system or 
riparian doctrine had been in place as it was for instance in the United States. Holding 
powers over surface waters, states are also the main actors in reallocating water from 
agriculture to cities. 
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The situation for groundwater is very different, notably because of the link between 
land ownership and groundwater rights. The most striking feature of groundwater 
utilization in India and other Asian countries is certainly the massive spread of 
borewells and prosperous groundwater markets. According to Shah et al. (2003a), in 
India the total number of mechanized wells and tubewells grew from a small fraction 
of a million in 1960 to some 19 million in 2000. Groundwater markets are particularly 
active in the states of Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Orissa, Bihar, and Uttar 
Pradesh, where it is held that they provide for wider access to water as compared to 
situations in which water is not shared and is utilized only by the owner of the 
groundwater structure (Vikas Rawal, 2002). 
Though generally available in lesser proportions when compared to surface water and 
not tightly controlled by a central authority (namely the state), groundwater can also 
play an important role for urban water supply. In general, groundwater is supplied by 
tanks privately operated or temporarily or permanently contracted by urban water 
boards. The role of these private providers can be particularly determinant in case of 
protracted droughts, during which the availability of surface water dwindles. 
Groundwater supply to Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh during the 2003 drought is an 
exemplar of the crucial service that this resource can provide to cities (The Hindu, 
2003). Another case of urban dependency upon groundwater is Chennai in Tamil 
Nadu, where farmers would sell water to private tankers that further convey it to the 
city (Nickurn et al., 1994; Ruet et al., 2007). 
4.22 Water law in Andhra Pradesh 
4.2.2.1 Waterlawreform 
Over the last decade, the government of Andhra Pradesh (AP) under the lead of its 
former Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu introduced a series of water law reforms. 
In 1997 the state passed the AP Farmers' Management of Irrigation Systems Act 
(APRMIS) that has handed over water management responsibilities in irrigation canal 
systems to associations of water users. In the same year, the AP Water Resources 
Development Corporation Act (APWRDC) was enacted sanctioning the setting-up of 
a corporation in charge of managing water resources in an integrated manner, notably 
through planning and coordinating water use by different sectors. Finally, in 2002 was 
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passed the AP Water, Land and Trees Act (APWALTA) that addresses in particular 
issues of groundwater as well as surface water protection, and makes provision for the 
constitution of an authority in charge of performing a number of functions related to 
the provisions spelled out in the Act. These three different Acts are discussed in the 
three following sub-sections. 
Andhra Pradesh Farmers'Management of Irrigation Systems Act (APFMIS), 1997 
By passing the Andhra Pradesh Farmers' Management of Irrigation Systems Act 
(APFMIS) in 1997, Andhra Pradesh has been the first state in India to introduce major 
reforms in the legal system providing for handing over the management of water 
resources in irrigation schemes sub-sections to water users associations. In 1996 the 
government issued a white paper on irrigation that identified the following 
shortcomings in the irrigation sector: decline in net irrigated area; low irrigation 
system efficiencies; low yields and farmer incomes; low agricultural growth 
(Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1996; quoted in Madhav, 2006). The blame for 
these weaknesses were put on different factors, and notably: government dominance 
and limited user involvement; poor cost recovery; insufficient operations and 
maintenance allocations; deteriorating conditions of the irrigation and drainage 
network; low quality of agricultural extension; and weak incentives for government 
agencies to perform (Oblitas et al., 1999). 
The APFMIS was seen as a solution to redress the inefficiencies of the irrigation 
sector. The reform. was inspired by international examples in which allowing for the 
active participation of farmers had had-a positive impact on the performance of the 
agricultural sector. Notably, the involvement of farmers in countries like the 
Philippines, Turkey, and particularly Mexico had permitted improvement in operation 
and maintenance of infrastructures, rate of collection of water fees, and allowed for an 
institutional mechanism for resolving water conflict (Mollinga, 2002; Vermillion, 
1997). Under the APFMIS, a total of 10,292 water users associations (W'UA) were 
constituted on a war footing in Andhra Pradesh minor, medium and major irrigation 
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31 
projects, with the support of a $US 141 million loan provided by the World Bank 
under the Andhra Pradesh Economic Restructuring Project (Peter, 2002). 
Andhra Pradesh Water Resources Development Corporatlon Act (APWRDC), 1997 
The enactment of the AP Water Resources Development Corporation Act 
(APWRDC) is particularly interesting in a multi-sector perspective since the Act deals 
with the broad spectrum of water uses, such as the "promotion and operation of 
irrigation projects, command area development and schemes for drinking water and 
industrial water supply to harness the water of rivers of the state ofAndhra Pradesh 
andfor matters connected therewith or incidental thereto including flood control". 
The setting-up of such an organisation for managing water resources in an integrated 
manner fits well in the river basin development model previously presented in section 
2.1.1: as the resource becomes scarce and interscctoral tensions develop, institutions 
overseeing the water use in large water units such as river basins arc generally 
created. 
Andhra Pradesh Water, Land and Trees Act (APWAL7), 2002 
The last reform in water law promoted by the former Chief Minister Chandrababu 
Naidu has been the enactment of the AP Water, Land and Trees Act (APWLT) in 
2002. The Act puts a strong focus on water conservation, as well as on protection of 
surface and groundwater from pollution. Moreover, it makes provision for the 
constitution of a Water, Land and Trees Authority for promoting water conservation, 
regulating surface- and groundwater exploitation, and advising the government on 
matters related to the Act. 
4.22.2 Water law reform implications for intersectoral water allocation 
In this section the AP Farmers' Management of Irrigation Systems (APFMIS) Act, the 
AP Water Resources Development Corporation (APWRDC) Act, and the AP Water, 
land and Trees (APWLT) Act are reviewed in the light of their potential and actual 
scope for smoothing water allocation in Andhra Pradesh. 
31 In Andhra Pradesh, irrigation projects arc classified according to the area they serve. Minor irrigation 
projects have a command area which is less than 2,000 ha; medium projects between 2,000 and 10,000 
ha; whereas major irrigation projects are designed so as to being able to irrigate more than 10,000 ha 
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The devolution of a set of powers over water resources to WUAs through the 
enactment of the APFMIS Act bears a dramatic potential for smoothing intersectoral 
water transfers out of the agricultural sector. Farmers' organizations can constitute a 
counterpart to governments for negotiating the modalities of water reallocations, as 
points and timing of diversion; quantities to be withdrawn; or compensations to be 
provided to farmers for the water loss they experience. An example of WUAs having 
facilitated water reallocations from agriculture is brought by Hearne et al. (1995) that 
relate upon the Chilean case and particularly the transfers in the Elqui Valley. On the 
other hand, Hannan et al. (1970) discuss the role of Ditch Companies 32 in water 
transfers in the United States; whereas Franks et al. (2004) examine the potential role 
of agricultural water organizations in the Usangu Wetland in Tanzania in improving 
irrigation efficiency thus restoring dry season flows. A major difference between the 
WUAs constituted in Andhra Pradesh with the ones active in Chile or in the United 
States is the water rights system under which they, evolvc. Notably, WUAs in Chile 
are entitled to transact water according to market principles and forces, as enshrined 
within the 1981 Chilean water code (see section 2.2.2 above in this thesis). In the 
United States, in some states Ditch Companies can trade water because allowed by 
existing legislation. 33 Conversely, farmers in Andhra Pradesh have been vested with 
very limited powers over water resources through the enactment of the APFMIS Act. 
Though allocation and distribution of water within sub-sections of irrigation systems 
is now under the responsibility of an elected body of farmers' representatives, 
allocation water rights (or "management" rights according to the concept of "bundle 
or rights", see section 2.1.3.2 above) are exercised only within the respective 
sub-sections. No claims can be put forth in regard to receiving any specific quantity of 
water from the headwork, or to sell or exchange the resource with other water users 
outside the sub-section. Even if farmers had water transfer rights, inefficient irrigation 
infrastructure would impinge upon putting them into practice. Surface water markets 
in irrigation systems in Australia for instance (Turral et al., 2005) show that for 
markets to happen, relatively efficient physical irrigation infrastructure and irrigation 
32 A Ditch Company is a private water organization, owned by farmers' associations, and incorporated 
under state charger, whose main purpose is to supply members with water 
33 Although water transfers are generally subject to a number of conditions, notably protecting other 
water users from negative effects (see e. g. Getches, 1997) 
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management must be in place (Perry et al., 1997). This can be easily understood: for 
marketing a good one must know how much of it is available - or will be available - 
for trading. Another crucial element for efficient trading is availing of information. In 
irrigation systems, information on water availability and release patterns from the 
main reservoirs requires relatively well working gauging systems and other 
measurement devices; efficient mechanisms and trained staff for transmitting of 
information between administrators of the irrigation system and water users; and good 
governance practices. This degree of efficiency is generally not reached in irrigation 
schemes in developing countries, and not in India (Wade, 1981,1982). 
A 
In addition to the APFMIS Act, the constitution of a Water Resources Development 
Corporation in 1997 through the Andhra Pradesh Water Resources Development 
Corporation Act might have provided the opportunity to constitute an organization 
capable of regulating or providing advice on intersectoral water allocation. 
Unfortunately, the Water Development Corporation in AP is not explicitly entrusted 
with the function and powers to plan intersectoral water allocation in an integrated 
manner, but only to look at each of the sectors separately. Though there is little 
written evidence allowing for the evaluation of the works of the Corporation and of 
the effectiveness of the APWRDC Act, Gulati et al. (2005) suggest that the legislation 
has not been as strong in including transparency and accountability in its 
performance; nor in providing incentives and disincentives to staff and water users (in 
all sectors) to enhance water use efficiency. The Act is not clear about water rights 
and emphasizes controlling extraction only of surface water, and groundwater is 
untouched. Furthermore, instead of setting up an independent body and actually 
delegating some of the government responsibilities on water allocation, the APWRDC 
Act further strengthens the role of the state, since the members of the Corporation 
either belong to - or are elected by - the government of AP. In this regard, it is 
interesting to report the case of water law reforms in the neighbouring state of 
Maharashtra, where in 2005 was passed the Water Resources Regulatory Authority 
Act that provides for the constitution of a Water Regulatory Authority (WRA). Unlike 
Andhra Pradesh, the membership structure of the WRA excludes political leaders, so 
as to reduce political interferences and government influences. 34 Among the powers, 
34 For a discussion on water law reforms in Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh, see Cullct (2006) 
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functions, and duties of the WRA there is the clear specification that it has to 
"determine the distribution of entitlementsfor various categories of use', 33 including 
domestic; agricultural irrigation; industrial and commercial. 
The last piece of legislation to be considered here, the Andhra Pradesh Water, Land 
and Trees Act of 2002 only marginally accounts for the regulation of interscctorat 
water use, notably when it gives priority to drinking water through banning the 
sinking of tubewells within a pre-established distance from groundwater drinking 
water sources. 36 It has thereby only a very marginal relevance for interscctoral water 
allocation. 
4.3 Water administration 
4.3.1 The Hyderabad Water Supply and Sewerage Board 
The Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (HMWSSB - 
hereafter also referred to as "Water Board") established in 1989 is in charge of 
Hyderabad water supply and sanitation. 37 The HMWSSB was constituted under the 
Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Act by consolidating two 
existing public departments, namely the Public Health Engineering Department 
formerly in charge of water supply, and the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad 
which was responsible for the sewerage services. The constitution of the Water Board, 
encouraged by the World Bank, was seen as a means of establishing a water and 
sewerage authority with great financial autonomy, as well as heightened 
accountability to the costumers (Davis, n. d. ). Financial autonomy was notably 
perceived as a means to entrust the HMWSSB with great operational and 
decision-making control, thus insulating it from political interferences. In practice, it 
has never been able to achieve financial autonomy, largely because of extremely low 
rates of water fees collection. The Water Board eventually became highly dependent 
on - and controlled by - the government of AP. This dependence on the political 
establishment is further accentuated by the fact that the Chief Minister of AP acts as 
the chairman of the Board of Directors of the HMWSSB. 
35 Chapter 3, Section II (a), Maharashtra Water Resources Regulatory Authority Act, 2005 
36 Chapter 3, Section I 0(l), Andhra Pradesh Water, Land and Trees Act, 2002 
37 httl2: //NvwNv. hvderabadwater. ý,, ov. in/ (October 2007) 
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4.3.2 Administrative arrangements for allocating water from agriculture to Hyderabad 
As seen in the previous section, the HMWSSB is entrusted with the management of 
Hyderabad water supply and sewerage systems. Water supply is responsibility of the 
HMWSSB by virtue of the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Act 
of 1989 which posits in particular the following: "On andfrom the date ofcoming into 
force of this chapter, all public reservoirs, tanks, cisterns, fountains, wells, and bore 
wells, pumps, pipes, taps, conduits and other works connected with the supply of 
water to the Hyderabad Metropolitan area, including the head work, reservoirs ( ... ), 
shall vest in the Board and be subject to its control". 38 Contrasting this statement is 
the actual situation, in particular in regard to the control over the reservoirs that feed 
the city, notably Singur on the Manjira River and Nagarjunasagar on the Krishna. 
Both reservoirs are multipurpose and serve Hyderabad; agriculture; and hydropower. 
The operation of Singur and Nagadunasagar is under the responsibility of the 
Irrigation and Command Area Development (CAD) Department of Andhra Pradesh, 
the explanation being that the Water Board has not the know-how and capacity to 
operate water reservoirs, a task traditionally entrusted to the Irrigation and CAD 
Department. Not controlling the operation of the reservoir has eventually curtailed the 
control of the Water Board upon Hyderabad water sources. 
The case of Singur reservoir on the Manjira River is illustrative. The dam is operated 
by the Irrigation and CAD Department, though it serves Hyderabad on a priority basis 
and then agriculture. Water sharing between the two sectors is governed by a set of 
allocation rules laid down by the government of Andhra Pradesh through two 
administrative orders issued in 1989,39 respectively in 199040 (Celio et al., 2007a). 
Each and every release of water from Singur for agricultural purposes has to be 
sanctioned against abidance by the allocation rules, and has to be jointly agreed upon 
by the Principal Secretary for Irrigation and the Managing Director of the HMWSSB- 
In case of discordance of opinion between Principal Secretary and Managing Director, 
38 Chapter IV, Section 17, Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1989 
39 Andhra Pradesh Housing, Municipal Administration and Development (A2) Department, 
Government Order Ms No. 190, dated April 12,1989 
0 Andhra Pradesh Irrigation and CAD (Irrgn. V) Department, Government Order Ms No. 93, dated 
February 14,1990 
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the matter is brought to the attention of the Chief Minister who, finally takes the 
decision. In an attempt to establish its authority over Singur, the HMWSSB has put 
forth some proposals to the government of AP for being entrusted with the control of 
the dam, but these have been turned down because of the stiff opposition of the 
Irrigation and CAD Department (M. Satyanarayana, Director Technical, HMWSSB, 
personal communication, April 14,2006). 
A comparable situation in which control over Hyderabad water sources is shared 
between the Water Board and the Irrigation and CAD Department is the transfer of 
water from the Krishna presently carried out by utilizing pre-existing structures that 
are under the control of the Irrigation and CAD Department, and notably the so-called 
Akkampally balancing reservoir. The HMWSSB is now trying to obtain government 
approval and financial assistance for constructing an independent structure over which 
it would have total control (M. Satyanarayana, Director Technical, HMWSSB, 
personal communication, April 14,2006). 
The duality in the administrative set up that characterizes Hyderabad water supply had 
consequences for the allocation of water from agriculture to the city. By mandate, the 
Water Board and the Irrigation and CAD Department have divergent interests, and 
"clients": the former has to ensure sufficient water supply to Hyderabad water users; 
the latter to provide farmers with the maximum water possible so as to satisfy crop 
requirements. Though it cannot be definitively proved with the evidence collected for 
this thesis, the existing organizational configuration has very likely led to tensions and 
internal struggles between the Water Board and the Irrigation and CAD Department. 
The Singur case shows that decision upon allocation of water between Hyderabad and 
agriculture has directly involved the state government executive, and particularly the 
Chief Minister, and this has led to the politicization of annual water allocation 
between the two sectors. 
4.4 Summing up 
Effective water institutions, that is water policies, law, and administration, are 
considered pivotal for the sustainable development and efficient use of water 
resources (see e. g. Saleth et al., 2004). In this chapter, water institutions and water 
allocation between 4nd within sectors in Andhra Pradesh have been reviewed. Water 
88 
policies, law, and administration have been discussed at different scale-levels: the 
nation; Andhra Pradesh; and Hyderabad city. 
The only exclusive water policy determinant for water allocation is the National 
Water Policy of 2002, as the government of Andhra Pradesh has not issued its own 
state policy yet. In section 4.1.1 it was shown that the prioritization of drinking water 
uses is not such a strong instrument for transferring water from agriculture to cities, 
notably because of multipurpose use of water in irrigation schemes and in urban areas. 
In addition to exclusive water policies, the willingness of the Indian Central 
government to foster water transfers to cities can take effect through funding schemes, 
which are dealt with in section 4.1.1.2. At the level of Andhra Pradesh, the state's 
expenditures between 1956-57 and 1996-97 show that irrigation expenditures have 
been high in the state government agenda, and given higher priority when compared 
to urban water supply and sanitation. This pattern can be explained by the high 
dependency of the population on agriculture, and by the positive electoral pay-offs of 
pro-farmers policies. The last part of section 4.1.1 concludes by addressing urban 
water policies in Hyderabad. Water conservation and demand-side oriented policies 
have been introduced by the Hyderabad Water Supply and Sewerage Board, as 
rainwater harvesting; controlling unaccounted for water in Hyderabad distribution 
system; increasing water tariffs in the city so as to modify customers' behaviours 
towards water saving practices; and commissioning studies for the reuse of 
wastewater. Though there are no detailed studies on the actual impact of these urban 
water policies, evidence in Hyderabad and notably chronic water scarcity tends to 
show that itmust have been limited. 
Section 4.2 has addressed groundwater and surface water law. While ownership rights 
over groundwater are linked with land ownership, surface water rights are vested upon 
the states' government. In Andhra Pradesh, the reform in water law initiated in 1997 
has paved the way, among others, for constituting Water Users Associations (W`UAs) 
in irrigation schemes. The research findings presented in this chapter have shown that 
throughout the whole reform process, the government of Andhra Pradesh has 
strengthened its grip over surface water resources, notably by keeping tight control 
over the Water Resources Corporation established within the Andhra Pradesh Water 
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Resources Corporation Act in 1997, and by handing over very limited management 
powers to the WUAs. 
Finally, the research findings presented in section 4.3 have shown that the Hyderabad 
Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board does not have full control over the 
city's water sources. The Irrigation and Command Area Development Department is 
notably in charge of operating the multipurpose reservoirs that also serve Hyderabad. 
This sharing of powers has led to interdepartmental tension; is regulated by unclear 
rules; and has been highly pervious to political interferences. 
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5 Water allocation politics: evidence from the study of the water 
transfer to Hyderabad from the Krishna River4l 
"The Nizam, without losing time, passed thefollowing orders on 91h March 1915, to 
be carried out by the Public Works Department. "The views expressed by the Minister 
for Finance are quite appropriate. Matters like this [the supply of drinking water to 
Hyderabad] should receive immediate attention and should be submittedfor decision 
and orders without unnecessary delay, procrastination and red-tapism. Action should 
be initiated on the proposal made in the memorandum and the technical and other 
formalities regarding Osman Sagar project befinalized and submittedfor approval as 
early as possible "' 
Ashraf (2002), The Seventh Nizam of Hyderabad An 
archival appraisal 
"The Finance Minister has warned about "a growing set of little civil wars over 
water" and the Minister of Water Resources notes wryly that he is really "the 
Minister of Water Conflicts 
World Bank (2005), India's water economy: bracingfor 
a turbulentfuture 
This chapter analyzes the role that politics played in transferring water from the 
agricultural sector to Hyderabad. The second research question of this thesis is 
addressed, which asks "What role does politics play in administrative reallocations 
from agriculture to other sectors? ". 
41 Some of the findings of this chapter are reported in Celio et al. (submitted); while the conflict 
analysis appears in Cclio et al. (2007b) 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized in four main sections. The next section 
illustrates the characteristic regional sct-up in Andhra Pradesh, and how it shaped the 
political discourse in the state. Moreover, the historical developments of parties' 
politics in the state are presented and discussed. 
Section 5.2 reconstructs the policy milestones of Hyderabad water supply, from its 
early stages and the construction of Osmansagar and Himayatsagar reservoirs; to the 
transfer from the Manjira River; and further and more recently the mostly debated 
reallocation from the Krishna River. For clarity's stake, the policy milestones are also 
reported along timelines in the figures that accompany the text. 
Following the discussion on the policy milestones, section 5.3 sheds light on the 
politics of Hyderabad water supply from agriculture. Notably, an analysis is 
performed by considering political contestation as being a conflict. Accordingly, a 
conflict analysis framework is applied. The framework allows in the first place for 
detailing the causes explaining the harsh opposition against the water reallocation to 
Hyderabad from the Krishna River. Then, the way in which the conflict emerges and 
develops is discussed, and finally possible solutions for smoothing the political 
opposition against water transfers to Hyderabad are put forth. 
The last section sums up the main research findings of the analysis of water politics in 
Andhra Pradesh with specific reference to their implications for water allocation from 
agriculture to Hyderabad. 
5.1 Political and governance context in Andhra Pradesh 
5.1.1 Regionalpolitics and divides 
The contest for water resources has distinguished the state of Andhra Pradesh even 
before its formation. Inter-regional economic disparities and the politicisation of 
regional identities have affected state politics and elections (K. C. Suri, 2002), and it is 
often within a regional discourse that political forces have contested economic 
resources, and claimed entitlements to, among other things, water. An outstanding 
feature characterizing the political discourse over water in Andhra Pradesh is its 
"regionalization", that is its subtle blending within the overall debate over regional 
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disparities, injustices, and secessionist claims within the state. Andhra Pradesh is 
historically divided into three geographical regions: Telangana in the north; 
Rayalseema in the south; and Coastal Andhra in the east (Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1: Situation map of Andhra Pradesh and its regional sct-up. Legend: AP: Andhra Pradesh; 
KA: Karnataka; MH: Maharashtra 
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In 1953 the Indian government appointed the States Reorganization Commission to 
put forth recommendations op the formation of new states after India gained 
independence from the British rule in 1947. The state of Andhra was formed in the 
same year by combining the drought prone and ill-developed state of Rayalseema and 
more economically advanced Coastal Andhra. To facilitate integration, the formation 
was conditioned on the implementation of the 1937 Sri Bagh Pact in part related to the 
use of water resources. In particular, the pact state that "to ensure the rapid 
development of the agricultural and economic interests of Rayalseema ( ... ) to the 
level of those in the coastal districts, schemes of irrigation should, for a period of ten 
years or such longer period as conditions may necessitate, be given a preferential 
claim ( ... )" (K. V. N. Rao, 1972). 
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The Commission suggested the joining of Andhra with the Telangana region of the 
Hyderabad state, specifically positing that "( ... ) the advantages of theformation [of 
Andhra Pradesh] are obvious. The desirability of bringing the Krishna and Godavari 
river basins under unified control, the trade affiliations between Telangana and 
Andhra and the suitability of Hyderabad as the capitalfor the entire region are in 
briefthe arguments infavour ofthe bigger unit"(Government of India, 1955). 
The desirability of constituting the new state was contested from the outset by leaders 
in Telangana, because of regional disparities and fears of economic subjugation by the 
wealthier Coastal Andhra region. In spite of this, Andhra Pradesh was formed on 
November first, 1956, when the leaders of Telangana and Andhra state signed the 
so-called "Gentlemen's Agreement", in which provisions meant to safeguard 
Telangana economic development in the years to come were established (Forrcstcro 
1970). Notwithstanding the provisions of the agreement, in the years following the 
formation of Andhra Pradesh the existing regional disparities were only accentuated 
(K. R. Acharya, 1979). This led in 1969 to the outbreak of a major agitation, resulting 
in more than 5,000 people being arrested and almost 40 killed by policy firings, 
asking for a separate Telangana state, grounded on regional disparities and the non 
respect of the provisions of the Gentlemen's Agreement. A second major agitation 
asking for bifurcation of the state broke out in 1973. 
Disparity over access to water and irrigation facilities between the three regions was 
among the factors that contributed to the agitations (Forrester, 1970), and it is still an 
argument exploited today by regional leaders for political purposes, and particularly 
for backing secessionist claims (V. Ratna Reddy, 2006). As shown in Table 5.1, 
government-funded canal irrigation was and is still predominant in Coastal Andhra, 
whereas Rayalseema and Telangana presently rely largely on groundwater for 
irrigated agriculture. 
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Tablc S. 1: Arca irrigatcd sourcc. and region-wisc in Andhra Pradcsh 
Ycar Canal (%) Tank (%) Wcll (%) 
Andhra Rayal- Tclan- Andhra Rayal- Tclan- Andhra Rayal. Tclan- 
sccma gana sccma gana sccma gana-- 
1960 47 18 14 25 32 48 5 24 13 
1970 32 16 14 13 15 25 4 19 12 
1980 63 31 27 23 18 36 11 47 33 
1990 59 27 22 21 15 23 13 56 49 
1998 40 15 14 I1 11 1 14 46 45 
Source: V. Ratna Reddy et al. (2002) 
5.1.2 Party politics after the formation of Andhra Pradesh in 1956 
Daily life has always been strongly influenced by party politics in Andhra Pradesh, 
and resource allocation has naturally been in the centre of political attention. The 
scope of this section is to provide the reader with an historical background on parties' 
politics in Andhra Pradesh, thus facilitating the understanding of the remainder of the 
chapter. 
For nearly two decades after the constitution of the state in 1956, the political scene in 
Andhra Pradesh was dominated by the Congress Party, a period that K. C. Suri (2002) 
defines as the "era of Congress dominance". The Congress won all the elections held 
for the Indian Parliament and the state Legislative Assembly, and proved to be very 
effective in keeping different factions and groups within the party fold. The situation 
changed with the outbreak of the regional struggle in Telangana region between 1969 
and 1973. The leadership for the agitation came from dissident factions of the 
Congress. A classical example, according to K. C. Suri (2002), of how the dissatisfied 
leaders in the ruling and dominant party put the regional identity and the sense of 
injustice that prevails among the people of a region to political use. 
The 1970s is the period during which the electoral popularity of the Congress Party 
started to erode. According to Kohli (1988), the Congress decline was caused by 
repeated and increasing interventions from the central all-India Congress Party, that 
appointed Chief Ministers without significant independent basis in Andhra Pradesh. A 
political shift occurred in 1982, when N. T. Rama Rao, a multi-millionaire cine star 
formed the Telugu Desam Party (TDP). This event brought radical changes to the 
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structure of politics in Andhra Pradesh. N. T. Rama Rao emphasized regional themes 
of Telugu nationalism. He stressed the Congress' corrupt political culture and 
promised special new government programs to help women and youth secure better 
educational facilities and jobs (Kohli, 1988). In the elections of 1983 the TDP 
recorded a massive victory that put an end to the onc-party dominance of the 
Congress of the previous nearly three decades (see Figure 5.2). 
Figure 5.2: Parties fortnation and parties holding power in Andhra Pradesh from 1956 up to date. 
Legend: CP: Congress Party; TDP: Telugu Desam Party 
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The TDP secured 46.8% of the popular vote and two-thirds of scats in the Legislative 
Assembly (K. C. Suri, 2002), and maintained power till 1989. Between 1985 and 
1989, the Congress recovered lost ground by attacking the style of functioning of the 
TDP leader, by astutely exploiting the arbitrary decisions of the government led by 
N. T. Rama Rao, and by taking hostile opposition towards the TDP (T. 
Bhaktavatsalam, 1991; quoted in K. C. Suri, 2002). 
When the Congress came back to power in 1989, factionalism within the party once 
again came to the fore and characterized the following five years. Beyond all 
projections and expectations, the TDP scored a massive victory in the 1994 
Legislative Assembly elections. The TDP success is attributed by some to the 
charismatic appeal of N. T. Rama Rao, to trust the poor in his resolve to implement 
welfare schemes and his pro-peasant and pro-women position. In 1995, Chandrababu 
Naidu took over the head of the TDP from N. T. Rama Rao and became Chief Minister 
of Andhra Pradesh, position that he held till 2004 when the Congress Party regained 
power. In the meanwhile, in 2001 Chandrasekhara Rao, a TDP dissident, constituted 
the Telangana Rashtm Samithi (TRS). The TRS has emerged as a formidable regional 
political force calling for a separate Telangana state. 
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During his stay in power, Chandrababu Naidu wanted to transform the role of the 
government from being primarily a controller of economy and provider of welfare to 
one of facilitator of private sector activity and promoter of business (Government of 
Andhra Pradesh, 1999). The defeat of the TDP in 2004 is attributed by many to the 
fact that farmers resented Chandrababu Naidu's policies. The Chief Minister was 
notably blamed for caring more about the development of Hyderabad and its 
Information and Technology sector than about farmers' distress, as illustrated in the 
sketch of Figure 5.3 representing Chandrababu Naidu that was published after the 
May 2004 election in The Hindu newspaper. 
Figure 5.3: Picture published in the newspaper The Hindu atIcr the TDP lost the general elections in 
Andhra Pradesh in May 2004, and Chandrababu Naidu had to step down from the position of Chief 
Minister 
Source: S. Nagesh Kumar (2004) 
It is worth mentioning that Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy of the Congress Party who 
became Chief Minister after the 2004 elections grounded his electoral campaign on 
the development of the agricultural sector. Among others, he promised to supply 
farmers with free power for withdrawing groundwater, a highly sensitive issue. 
As per today's situation, the three major political forces in Andhra Pradesh are the 
Congress Party, with its leader Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy still in power as Chief 
Minister; the TDP and its leader Chandrababu Naidu that is aspiring to regain power 
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in the next general elections in 2009; and the TRS that can still count on a significant 
number of supporters, particularly in the northern Telangana region of the state. 
5.2 Policy milestones In Hyderabad water supply 
5. ZI The early stages 
From its creation and up to the beginning of the 20th century, water resources for the 
city for domestic, small-scale agriculture, livestock and other uses were secured 
locally by storing water in so-called tanks, as well as by tapping groundwater via 
shallow dugwells. The first water supply system conveying water to Hyderabad from 
outside the urban area was commissioned by H. E. H Osman Ali Khan, seventh Nizam 
of the erstwhile Hyderabad state. Two reservoirs were constructed across the Musi 
River around eight km upstream the city (HMWSSB, 1983): the Osmansagar, 
completed in 1920, and the Himayatsagar in 1927 (see situation map in chapter six, 
Figure 6.1). The two reservoirs and their respective transmission systems are still 
operative today, and can convey 0.2 Mm 3 of water daily to Hyderabad. . 
5.2.2 Reallocation from the Manjira River 
Impelled by the urban growth in Hyderabad that followed the formation of Andhra 
Pradesh and the deepening gap between water demand and supply, work was started 
in the 1960s to draw water from the Manjira River, a tributary of the Godavari, at a 
take-off point located around 60 krn northwest of the city (see localization on Figure 
5.1). Water from the so-called Manjira. Reservoir was first conveyed to Hyderabad in 
1965 (Figure 5.4). 
This water was still insufficient to meet demand and so the government of Andhra 
Pradesh in 1972 appointed the so-called Srcenivasarao expert commission to 
recommend options for augmenting Hyderabad water supply. The water sources taken 
into consideration were groundwater, additional supplies from the Manjira River, and 
the Godavari and Krishna Rivers. Groundwater was deemed not a suitable option, 
since it was scarce and pollution-pronc. The Manjira River was already largely 
committed to agricultural uses. And drawing water from the Godavari was eliminated 
based on costs. The commission therefore suggested in 1973 to conduct further 
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investigations for drawing water from the Krishna River (Government of Andhra 
Pradesh, 1973). 
Figurc SA: Milestoncs in watcr supply to flydcrabad from the Manjira Rivcr mcntioncd in the tcxt. 
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These events occurred at a time when the Godavari Water Dispute and the Krishna 
Water Dispute tribunals were adjudicating the allocation of the water of these two 
mighty rivers between Andhra Pradesh and the other riparian states. The two 
Tribunals were appointed by the central government of India in the 1970s. Within the 
works of the Godavari Waters Dispute Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh signed two separate 
agreements with Maharashtra and Karnataka (riparian on the Manjira, a tributary of 
the Godavari) in 1975 and 1978 respectively. 42 These two allowed the withdrawal of 
an additional 113 Mm 3 of water annually from the Manjira River for the supply of 
Hyderabad, despite the fact that the water was already used for agriculture. These 
agreements concluded, the option of the Sreenivasarao expert commission of drawing 
water from the Krishna River was dropped, and the Singur reservoir across the 
Manjira, with a storage capacity of 850 Mm 3, was started. The system to convey water 
to Hyderabad was completed in two phases, one in 1991 and one in 1993 
(Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2005a). 
In order to compensate the people whose lands would have been submerged by the 
reservoir, the government of Andhra Pradesh issued a Government Order (GO) in 
1980 to provide for 57 Mm 3 of water from Singur to the farmers located just 
downstream from the reservoir. However, the GO was never implemented, and in 
42 On interstate allocation of the Manj ira waters, see also section 6.1.1 
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April 2003, one year before the General Elections in Andhra Pradesh, a major 
agitation led by political leaders affiliated with the Congress Party (CP), which was in 
the opposition, broke out. Following their victory in the 2004 elections, the CP 
government issued a new GO in 2006 ordering the implementation of the 1980 GO. 
5. Z3 Reallocation from the Krishna River 
Despite the new promise of new supplies from the Manjira, it was clear to the 
government that Hyderabad would need more water to sustain its growth. In 1986, the 
government of Andhra Pradesh appointed the Sri J. Raja Rao expert commission to 
submit technically and economically sound alternatives for augmenting the 
Hyderabad water supply. The options considered by the committee were the Krishna 
River as well as the Godavari (Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1987). In its final 
report, the commission recommended drawing the required 467 Mm 3 of water 
annually from Nagadunasagar reservoir of the Krishna basin. While this would 
require a reallocation from the agricultural sector, the expert commission pointed out 
that priority had to be given to drinking water over irrigation, quoting from a 
landmark report of the India Irrigation Commission that was issued some years earlier 
(Government of India, 1972), as well as from the award of the Krishna River Disputes 
Tribunal given in 1976 (Government of India, 1973 & 1976). Moreover, the 
Committee asserted that "( ... ) the water supply to Hyderabad city which is the capital 
of Andhra Pradesh state where people belonging to all the districýs of the state are 
living, is to be treated on par, if not on a higher priority, than the schemes already 
taken upfrom Krishna river ( ... )" (Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1987: 
11). 
Endorsing the recommendations of the expert commission, the government issued a 
GO in August 1988 sanctioning the supply of water to Hyderabad from the Krishna 
River (see Figure 5.5). This decision, the first ever officially sanctioning the transfer 
of water from Krishna to Hyderabad, occurred in a climate of particular political 
tensions between the Telugu Dasarn Party (TDP) in power and the CP (T. 
Bhaktavatsalam, 1991). In this sensitive political climate, the decision of the 
government to take up the Krishna project brought about vehement agitation by 
legislators of the CP who organized sit-ins in the State Legislative Assembly, and 
some party members went on hunger strike (Deccan Chronicle, 1988). The agitation 
was conducted by representatives of Rayalseema, the southern and dry region of 
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Andhra Pradesh. Allegations of regional disparities and discriminations were put forth 
during the protest. In particular it was argued that before bringing water to Hyderabad, 
the government had to provide Rayalsccma with its due share of water, as allocated by 
the Krishna Waters Dispute Tribunal and according to the specifications of the Sri 
Bagh Pact of 1937 (Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1988). 
Figure 5.5: Milestones in water supply to Hyderabad from the Krishna River mentioned in the text. 
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The TDP lost the elections in 1989 and in January 1990 the newly elected CP Chief 
Minister appointed another expert committee, whose recommendations induced the 
government to sanction the withdrawal of 467 Mm 3 annually from the Krishna River, 
at Nagadunasagar rcservoirs. 
The period of time from 1990 to 1994 during which the Congress Party stayed in 
power was characterized by high political instability, strong factionalism within the 
CP, and Hindu-Muslim communal violence in Hyderabad that shif[cd the concern of 
the political class far away from Hyderabad's increasing water needs. As a result, the 
project to supply water from the Krishna River did not go further than the foundation 
stone. However, the withdrawal from the Krishna was again sanctioned through GOs 
issued in 1997,2002, and 2003, and eventually resulted in the execution of the 
"Krishna Drinking Water Project" in 2003. This outcome was triggered by two 
monsoons with exceptionally low precipitation in 2001 and 2002 which put the city 
under severe water stress (The Hindu, 2003). This water crisis, the risk of depending 
on only one major water source, and the chronic water deficit in Hyderabad are 
important factors that eventually triggered the decision of the government to start the 
works for bringing water to the city from the Krishna River. 
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5.3 Smoothing water transfers politics: a conflict analysis of the water transfer from 
the Krishna River to Hyderabad 
This section draws from the conflict analytical framework of Bartos ct al. (2002) 
presented in chapter three, section 3.3.2, for analyzing the causes of the politicization 
of the transfer of water from the Krishna River to Hyderabad, and how these might be 
addressed. Below, this section consists of three separate parts: the first one addresses 
the origins of the conflict over the water reallocation to Hyderabad; the second studies 
how the conflict has emerged and developed; whereas the third looks at the outcomes 
of the conflict and how it could be possibly resolved. 
5.3.1 Conflict origins and goals Incompatibility 
The whole decision-making process that led to the water reallocation from the 
Krishna River to Hyderabad has been characterized by tensions and political struggle, 
as discussed in section 5.2 above. Political leaders have either supported or contested 
the water transfer, and a conflict has developed. The conflict is strongly embedded 
into the broader issue of regional struggles in Andhra Pradesh, and water has always 
been pivotal in the regional discourse, since for geographical as well as political 
reasons the three regions are unequally provided with irrigation facilities (see section 
5.1.1). The vehement protest that followed the issuing in 1988 by the Telugu Desam 
Party (TDP) government of a GO sanctioning the water transfer from the Krishna to 
Hyderabad neatly illustrates the link between regional issues and water supply to 
Hyderabad (see e. g. Deccan Chronicle, 1988 -a, 1988 -b, 1988). Though intertwined 
with parties politics (T. Bhaktavatsalam, 199 1), the protest of the Congress Party (CP) 
legislators from Rayalscema against the water transfei to Hyderabad (which is located 
in Telangana) were substantiated by genuine claims of regional disparities and 
injustices (Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1988). Additionally, there was a strong 
resentment for the non-implementation of agreements providing for the construction 
of water supply projects in Rayalseema. One instance is the Sri Bagh Pact, signed in 
1937 between Rayalseema and Coastal Andhra but never actually implemented, that 
made provision for privileged development of irrigation facilities in Rayalseema in 
order to redress the economic differences between the two regions (K. V. N. Rao, 
1972). 
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As shown in Figure 5.6, the transfer of waters of the Krishna River is contested 
because of the sense of injustice felt by people living in Rayalsccma that are relatively 
deprived of the resource when compared to the others regions, and particularly 
Coastal Andhra. Another factor that brings about conflict over the resource is what 
Bartos et at. (2002) call "belligerent culture or personality". Since the creation of the 
TDP and the election of its leader N. T. Rama Rao as Chief Minister of Andhra 
Pradesh in 1983, state politics have been characterized by harsh contestations between 
political leaders of the two opposing parties. These conflicts haven't always resulted 
from real grievances or frustrations. They developed because of the belligerent 
attitude of politicians, which may be at least partially explained by the bi-polarization 
of the political scene and the ruthless struggle for getting hands on the state 
government of Andhra Pradesh. Moreover, acting in a belligerent way is also a means 
for political leaders to demonstrate that they arc doing their job right; that is giving 
body and soul for their constituents. 
Figure 5.6: Factors of contested resources as a cause of goal incompatibility in the KDWP dispute 
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In addition to the regional relative deprivation and belligerent culture or personality of 
the disputants originally suggested in the conflict analysis framework of Bartos et al. 
(2002), there are two other elements represented in Figure 5.6 that contributed to the 
contestation over the KWDP: "resource uncertainty" and 64unmet water needs". The 
latter refer to insufficient water endowment to cover the needs of the existing or 
potential water users. 43 "Resource uncertainty" refers to the ambiguity pertaining to 
43 The term "needs" is used here in a broad sense, and it doesn't specifically designate the human need 
for water as specified in the human rights framework. For Hyderabad for instance, water is mainly 
needed to sustain the social and economic growth of the city. In their publication, Bartos ct al. (2002) 
report "Absolute deprivation" as a reason for contesting a resource, meaning when a party is deprived 
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the assessment of water availability quantity-,. location-, and/or time-wisc. The 
ambiguity can be related to two main factors: rainfall variability over the Krishna 
Basin, and thereby of river flow and water availability for bcncricial use; and 
information gaps due to retention of watcr-rclatcd information by the Andhra Pradesh 
authorities, but also by the upper riparian states of the Krishna River, that is 
Maharashtra and Karnataka. 
Rainfall variability is very significant in South-India, and the Krishna Basin is no 
exception. This variability is well exemplified by the fact that Andhra Pradesh 
recurrently asks for financial assistance from the Central government for drought but 
as well as for flood disasters (and it also happened that drought and flood occur in the 
same year). Uncertainty in rainfall puts a great pressure on farmers that depend 
exclusively on surface watcrs, and exploiting groundwater through borewclls has been 
the commonly adopted strategy for coping with drought. Nevertheless, since 
groundwater resources are becoming overexploited (Shah ct al., 2003a) and boring 
wells in hardrock aquifers entails a high risk of failure (see also chapter seven in this 
thesis), groundwater is not a sustainable option for coping with rainfalls variability. 
Information gap, the second factor of uncertainty that has been identified, stems from 
the attitude not to diffuse information on water resources availability and 
development. This applies to information sharing between riparian states as well as 
within a single state. The former case is illustrated by the sharing of the Krishna River 
between its three riparian states, which has been a source of controversies and 
disputes till the early 1950s (Bhongle, 2004). Already during the proceedings of the 
works of the Krishna Waters Dispute Tribunal it was observed that information on the 
use of water resources was not sufficiently shared (Government of Andhra Pradesh, 
1976). Since the time when the Tribunal gave its award in 1976, cross-accusations and 
disavowal of concealing the constructing of projects on the Krishna have been 
mutually exchanged between Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh. 
of whatcvcr it nccds to Icad a dcccnt lifc. This intcrprctation and the formulation "dcccnt lifc" strongly 
rcfcr back to the human rights framcwork 
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Lack of information sharing within a single state is illustrated with the case of the 
so-called Pothircddypadu head regulator located on the Krishna River in Andhra 
Pradesh. The structure diverts water to Rayalsccma region from the Srisailam 
hydroelectric project. The present government has issued the GO no. 170 ordering to 
raise the capacity of the regulator from 297 to 1246 m 3/S , and thereby augmenting the 
water supply to Rayalsccma (The Hindu, 2006). The GO has engendered a strong 
reaction from the political opposition parties, as well as legislators representing 
Hyderabad constituencies. Notably, the latter claim that the head-rcgulator will reduce 
the water availability to Hyderabad, since it is located upstream of the takeoff point of 
the Krishna Drinking Water Project (KDWP). The argument of the government is that 
Pothireddypadu under its new proposed design will only divert flood water that would 
otherwise flow further downstream and "get lost" in the sea, and thereby Hyderabad 
will not be affected whatsoever. It is not our purpose here to endorse one or the other 
theses put forth against of in favour of the modification of the hcad-rcgulator. What is 
significant is that information is lacking on something certainly well known since not 
so technically challenging to determine, that is whether Pothircddypadu diverts only 
flood waters or not. 
5.3.2 Emergence of open conflict and conflict actions 
Once groups develop incompatible goals, theory says that conflict actions can emerge 
following different paths and under specific conditions as the existing degree of 
solidarity between people, their capacity to organize, mobilize, and find useful 
resources for supporting their struggle. This section concentrates on two interrelated 
issues: primarily the modalities of conflict as waged by the political class, which has 
historically been the most active in contesting the Krishna waters; and secondly the 
involvement (or rather non-involvement) of the water users. 
According to the theory, solidarity is considered as a fundamental prerequisite for 
people to engage in conflict, and it develops when people interact frequently, like 
each other, and have similar beliefs, values, and non-ns (Homans, 1974). Conflict 
solidarity of politicians struggling for a same cause stems primarily from the 
importance that the issue has for the constituency they represent, as well as from the 
political (or electoral) payoffs that the action they engage in can bring about. In this 
sense, they don't necessarily need to like each other or interact frequently. Moreover, 
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many struggles can be understood in terms of party's strategies and struggle for 
power. The willingness and capacity of organizing is another crucial aspect. The 
affiliation to a political party offers a suitable platfon-n for politicians to organize, 
though diverging views and interests within the same party might play a major 
disruptive role. A good example of politicians that strengthen their bargaining power 
through organizing in a permanent manner is the constitution of the Members of the 
Legislative Assembly (MLAs) Forum for Hyderabad. Set-up by the initiative of 
Shashidhar Reddy and Janardhan Reddy, two influential politicians of the Congress 
Party representing Hyderabad constituencies, the forum promotes the development of 
Hyderabad and protects the interests of its citizens. Water supply to Hyderabad has 
been a major issue dealt with by the forum, which also opposed the increase in the 
capacity of the Pothireddypadu head regulator discussed in the previous section. 
Interestingly, the legislators are popularly well known and hold enough power to 
argue on decisions taken by the same party they belong to: the CP presently in power 
in Andhra Pradesh. 
Mobilization, which is the willingness to personally engage in conflict, is ensured by 
the legitimacy politicians have to struggle for the well being of their constituency, 
since they are actually expected to do so by those they represent. Nevertheless, 
personal interests and desire for personal power and prestige can strongly undermine 
politicians' willingness to take concrete action. As fariners often put it: "they [the 
politicians] make promises in pre-electoral rallies, but once sitting in the Hyderabad 
Legislative Assembly theyforget our problems". Availability of resources is the other 
pre-requisite for getting people into conflict behaviour. In the case study considered 
here, resources are generally not lacking. Politicians have time to consecrate to 
opposing water transfers (it is part of their job), they have legitimization, and in most 
of the cases they have sufficient financial resources. 
The discussion above clearly outlines the variables associated with each of the 
elements required to lead to an open conflict (that is solidarity, organization, 
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mobilization, and resources), but is not sufficient for predicting whether politicians 
will actually engage in a dispute over water. 44 
If the involvement of politicians in the dispute over the KDWP is well known, the fact 
that the water users play such a minor active role might seem astonishing, though the 
application of the conflict analytical toot sheds some light on the question. In the 
conflict over the KDWP, the water users arc Hyderabad citizens on one side, and 
farmers in Rayalsecma on the other. A key factor might be the lack of conflict 
resources. Farmers with poor access to water are generally those who have the hardest 
time to conduct a decent life. Though they are the more concerned by issues related to 
water supply, they lack the financial capacity to leave their fields and family and to 
bear transportation costs. Moreover, according to Dachepalli Durgaiah (1996) there is 
a lack of unity among farmers in Andhra Pradesh, since they are divided on the basis 
of political ideologies and because there are no leaders capable or willing to organize 
them. In addition to that, also resources such as NGOs that might support farmers or 
urban citizens with poor access to water are extremely scanty. 
What is still missing in our analysis is the last component of the triad "conflict origins 
- emergence of conflict - conflict action"'. When there is incompatibility of goals and 
people have formed conflict groups ready to engage in conflict, so-called conflict 
actions can take place. The dispute over the KDWP has been characterized by more or 
less standing protests that might be compared to a background noise, as well as by 
single and often vibrant protests. The latter have been triggered by particular events, 
as government decisions sanctioned through Government Orders (as in 1988 when the 
transfer of Krishna waters to Hyderabad was sanctioned for the first time, or with GO 
170 for the augmentation of the capacity of the Pothireddypadu head regulator), 
severe drought, or have been part of a targeted pre-electoral strategy. The main 
platform chosen by the politicians has been the Legislative Assembly, though the 
written media has served many of the purposes sought by the disputants. In the most 
44Using so-called payoff matrix would be an effective tool for assessing the likelihood that a conflict 
actor decidcs whether or not to engage in a dispute. The tool allows for assigning values (payoffs) to 
the outcomes (the consequences of an action) associated to the different alternatives offered to the 
conflict parties. See Bartos ct al. (2002) for a discussion over the utilization of payoff matrix 
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incisive cases, the proceedings went beyond the verbal confrontation and embraced 
struggle actions inspired by the conflict methods devised and applied by Gandhi. 
Among those, dharna (sit-down strike), rasta roko (road blockade), hunger strike, and 
fast unto death. Self-suffcring is very characteristic of many conflict actions in India, 
and was actively practiced during the satyagraha movement led by Gandhi during the 
independence struggle. Self-suffering and sacrifice are concepts deeply rooted in the 
Indian culture that can be traced back to the Vedic period (Bondurant, 1958). 
Nevertheless, in the KDWP conflict, fasting was probably void of any kind of 
philosophical meaning, and had just provided the emotional charge necessary to 
mobilize the media and farmers in Rayalsccma, thus putting pressure on the 
government of Andhra Pradesh that ordered the water transfer from the Krishna to 
Hyderabad. 
5.3.3 Conflict outcomes and resolution options 
Roughly speaking, there are basically two general ways to approach a conflict (Fisher 
et al., 2000). The first is to mitigate it when its outcomes are violent or/and morally 
unacceptable, which is generally done through third party interventions. The second 
one is to try to resolve the conflict, that is to understand its root causes and redress 
them with the direct involvement of the conflict actors. The conflict over the water 
transfer from the Krishna River to Hyderabad did not yield any violent action (though 
this might depend on how the term"violence" is defined), and it is institutionalized 
within the political process. Therefore, there is no scope for any kind of third party 
intervention, apart that of individuals requested to give their expert advice on techno- 
economic matters. 
The outcomes of the conflict are of another nature. Mainly because of its political 
sensitivity, the Krishna waters reached Hyderabad only in 2005, thus 32 years after 
the submission of the Srccnivasarao report. Likewise, projects like increasing the 
capacity of the Pothireddypadu head regulator that would benefit a drought prone area 
of the state are stalled because of political resistance, and regional divides. Trying to 
resolve the conflict over Hyderabad water supply from the Krishna River necessitates 
the understanding of its causes. 
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According to the preceding analysis, water is contested because of the interplay of -1) 
the sense of injustice brought about by regional disparities in Andhra Pradesh; -2) the 
belligerent (or conflicting) attitude of the political class; -3) resource uncertainty; and 
-4) umnet water needs. These are the issues that need to be addressed, and in 
particular those for which the chances to bring about a change are the highest. 
Tackling regional disparities can be done in several ways, the most radical being 
probably the one pursued by the Telangana Rashtra Samiti, that is to create a new 
state out of a region. The present government has launched the Jalayagnam program 
and is operating regional-targeted massive investment in irrigation works, though the 
effectiveness of Jalayagnam in terms of flattening regional disparities has been 
questioned (V. Ratna Reddy, 2006). Resource uncertainty can be reduced by 
prompting transparency and information flow, for instance by legal means as the 
government of India has recently done with the promulgation of the Right to 
Information Act in 2005. Moreover, transparency and efficiency in data handling 
could be fostered by restructuring the public administration that is in charge of data 
collection, storage, and dissemination. Unmet water needs can be addressed through 
water policies that promote water conservation and better use of the resource available 
(the so-coined demand-side policies). Then, there is still large scope to increase the 
productivity in agriculture, as well as to reduce water losses in urban water 
transmission and distribution systems (Davis, n. d. ). 
The last factor at the origin of the conflict over the water transfer to Hyderabad is the 
belligerent personality of the political class. Changing such an attitude for resolving 
the conflict is probably the hardest thing to do. Nevertheless, a stronger involvement 
of the civil society in the water discourse in Andhra Pradesh might at least partially 
depoliticize water reallocation and transfer between regions. 
5.4 Summing up 
The political and governance context in Andhra Pradesh addressed in section 5.1 
clearly shows how the political life in the state is influenced by regional divides and 
events that find their roots back in the period preceding the formation of Andhra 
Pradesh. The state is notably divided into Telangana in the north; Coastal Andhra 
along the coastal area of the Bay of Bengal; and Rayalseema in the south. This 
109 
research has reasserted how far regional economic disparities have often been called 
upon by politicians for electoral purposes. Section 5.1 also provides for an exposure 
on the main political forces in the state, and the development of parties politics since 
the formation of Andhra Pradesh. Two main parties, the Telugu Desam Party and the 
Congress Party have contested power in the last 20 years or so, along with the 
Telangana Rashtra Samithi, the latter's agenda being based upon the formation of a 
state out of the Telangana region. The analysis shows how far the political life in 
Andhra Pradesh has been dictated by strong opposition politics between the two main 
rival parties. 
Further, section 5.2 has drawn a neat picture of the policy milestones that have 
characterized Hyderabad water supply. The historical reconstruction has shown that 
increasing the city water supply has happened in a step-wise fashion, with 
governments asking for the opinion of expert committees, and then deciding whether 
or not to follow the recommendations according to political considerations. Another 
major features emerging is the more or less stiff antagonism of the major opposing 
parties to government decisions in regard to transferring water to Hyderabad. 
The analysis of the politics of Hyderabad water supply through the conflict analysis 
framework of Bartos et al. (2002) carried out in section 5.3 has proved particularly 
effective for teasing out the causes and possible remedies of the conflict around water 
transfers from agriculture to Hyderabad. The analysis on the origins of the conflict has 
showed that the factors explaining the politicization of water reallocation are 
multi-dimensional. They notably encompass -1) disparities in access to resources 
between the three regions that constitute the state of Andhra Pradesh; -2) the 
belligerent culture or personality of the political class; -3) resources uncertainty 
deriving from high inter-annual rainfall variability and gaps in collecting and 
divulging water-related information; and 4) unmet water needs, that is gaps between 
water supply and demand. Section 5.3 also illustrates how the conflict emerges and 
develops by looking at aspects like solidarity and politicians' capacity to organize, 
mobilize, and make use of resources. 
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In the perspective of optimal water transfers, 45 it is particularly pertinent to look at the 
means for reducing political contestation. The Hyderabad case and the analysis 
carried out in this chapter have brought to the fore some possible solutions. They 
notably consist of flattening regional disparities; prompting transparency and 
information flow; restructuring the way in which water administration is organized; 
promoting water demand management policies; or introducing measures so as to 
increase water productivity in agriculture. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning here the usefulness of addressing politics of resource 
allocation by adopting a conflict analysis framework, which provides for a number of 
tools and theoretical foundations for analyzing and understanding the political aspects 
of water supply. A further step complementing the results presented here would 
consist in collecting primary data by conducting interview with politicians from 
Andhra Pradesh, a step purposely kept beyond of the scope of this thesis. 
45 See section 2.1.2 
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6 Impact of water allocations on agriculture: evidence from the study 
of the water transfer to Hyderabad from the Manjira River 46 
"[water transfers are] draining the lifeblood of farms [and] tantamount' to 
agricultural suicide" 
Rocky Mountain News (1985; cited in Howe et al., 
1990) 
"This year, no crops have been raised in thousand of acres in the area, since 
there is no water. (... ) Farmers in Nizamsagar area say there is about 18 tmc-feet 
water in the Singur reservoir. ( ... ) Nizamsagar should get 4.8 Imc as its share. 
( ... ) 
The only way to revive the cultivation and canals under their ayacut is to bring some 
waterfrom the Singur dam to Nizamsagar" 
The Hindu (1996), Nizamsagarfarms dry up with thirst 
This chapter specifically focuses on the impact of the water transfer to Hyderabad on 
water availability and agricultural production at Nizamsagar irrigation project. While 
acknowledging since the outset that Hyderabad water allocdtion has not been the only 
factor having determined water inflows in Nizamsagar (section 6.1.2), this chapter 
deliberately spots out the specific role that the city (and not other factors) has played 
in influencing water availability at the reservoir. The third research question of the 
PhD is addressed, which asks "What is the impact of water reallocations from 
agriculture to cities on the areas of origin, and what role does groundwater play as a 
substitute and/or supplement to surface canal water? " The objective related to this 
question is to assess the actual impact of the water reallocations and groundwater 
availability on the agricultural sector in terms of modifications of quantity and timing 
46 Some of the findings of this chapter are reported in Celio et al. (submitted) 
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of water availability, and related changes in areas cultivated and agricultural gross 
revenue. 
Following this introduction, section 6.1 depicts the general features of the Manjira 
River and the transfer to Hyderabad. At the outset are addressed the physical 
characteristics of the Manjira River and the historical development of water resources 
in the basin. The implications of the development of water resources in the basin on 
the inflow in Nizarnsagar are addressed by section 6.1.2, which calculates the 
runoff. rainfall coefficient at Nizarnsagar and set forth some possible explanations for 
the reduction in the coefficient observed since the 1970s. Then, the water allocation 
rules that have been enforced in the early 1990s for sharing water between Hyderabad 
and agriculture in the stretch of the Manjira that flows in Andhra Pradesh are 
presented. Section 6.1 concludes by giving a description of the main features of 
Nizarnsagar irrigation scheme. 
The aim of section 6.2 is to determine the impact of the water allocation to Hyderabad 
on water availability and agricultural production at Nizamsagar. The section is 
divided into three main parts. The first one calculates what would have been the use 
of the irrigation canal at Nizamsagar if water had not been reallocated to Hyderabad, 
first by determining with a water balance from what would have been the inflow in 
Nizamsagar reservoir; and then by calculating another water balance at Nizamsagar 
reservoir so as to establish how much water would have been released in the irrigation 
canal if water had not been transferred to the city. Then, groundwater use in 
Nizamsagar command area is calculated. Section 6.2 concludes by calculating the 
impact of the water reallocation to Hyderabad in terms of variations in agricultural 
production and gross revenue from agriculture. 
Finally, a conclusive section sums up the main arguments and research findings 
presented and discussed in this chapter. 
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6.1 The Manjira River 
6.1.1 Physical and historical settings 
The Manjira originates in the Balaghat ranges of Bid District in the state of 
Maharashtra. After traversing Karnataka state, the Manjira joins the Godavari River in 
Andhra Pradesh. The basin area at Nizamsagar is 21,694 km 2, with an average annual 
33 
inflow to Nizarnsagar of 3,271 Mm /year and standard deviation of 2,712 Mm , 
indicating highly variable flow. 47 
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Figure 6.1: Hyderabad's water sources and catchment area of Nizarnsagar irrigation project in the 
Manjira river basin (gray area) 
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The waters of the Manjira basin have been allocated, or "awarded, " to the three 
riparian states within the framework of the Godavari Waters Dispute Tribunal that 
gave its final award in 1979 (Government of India, 1979 & 1980) . 
48 As per the 
47 Values calculated with runoff data from Government of Andhra Pradesh (1976) for 1925-26 to 
1973-74; and AP Irrigation & CAD Department, Irrigation Circle No. 3, Nizarnabad (NIS Excel file, 
data from 1981-82 to 2001-2002) 
4' River tribunals in India ostensibly separate water allocations from operational control over river 
basin management, which is the purview of state irrigation departments (that is, water is a 'state 
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agreements signed among the three states during the Tribunal process, Maharashtra 
was permitted to execute the Manjira and Lower Tima Reservoirs in the Manjira 
basin; Karnataka to build the Karanja Reservoir; and Andhra Pradesh to construct the 
Singur Reservoir to supply Hyderabad with drinking water (on Hyderabad water 
supply conveyance system, see also Figure 1.5, section 1.2.3). The year of 
construction and live storage capacity of the major irrigation projects in the Maniira 
basin are shown in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: Major irrigation projects in the Manj ira. River basin 
Project name State Year of construction Live storage capacity (Mm') 
Manjira Maharashtra 1980-1984 173 
Lower Tima Maharashtra 1983-to date 102 
Kararija Karnataka 1968-2006 207 
Sineur Andhra Pradesh 1976-1989 841 
Source: (Government of Maharashtra, n. d. ); (Government of Karnataka, n. d. ); Andhra Pradesh: 
Government of Andhra Pradesh (2005a) 
Sanctioned by the interstate agreements, in 1989 the government of Andhra Pradesh 
proceeded with the transfer of water from the Manjira River to Hyderabad through the 
construction of the Singur reservoir, primarily to stabilize flow and permit pumping of 
water over the basin divide between the Manjira (a Godavari tributary) and the Musi 
(a Krishna tributary) where Hyderabad is located. Water from Singur first reached 
Hyderabad in 1991 through a conveyance system with a capacity of 136,000 M3 /day, 
which was doubled to 273,000 in 3 /day in 1993. Singur was the largest water source 
for Hyderabad until 2005, when additional water was appropriated from the 
Nagaijunasagdr irrigation reservoir located on the main stem of the Krishna river, 
over 135 kin south of the city (Figure 6.1), and requiring a pumped lift in excess of 
400 in in elevation. 
subject' in the Indian Constitution). For large inter-state rivers such as the Godavari (including its 
tributary, the Manjira), the tribunal is constituted by the central (federal) government, headed often by a 
prominent national figure with legal credentials, e. g., a retired Supreme Court judge, and makes 
'awards' that are effective typically 25 years. Recent experience with over-committed river basins such 
as the Cauvery in south India indicates an erosion of central government authority through state-level 
politicization in which states systematically abrogate agreements. In effect, the Supreme Court of India 
and even the Prime Minister's Office, have had to step in to ensure compliance with inter-state 
allocations (Richards ct al., 2002) 
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6.1.2 Development and utilization of water resources 
The development of water resources in the Manjira basin has had an impact on the 
inflow received in Nizarnsagar reservoir. Figure 6.2 shows the runoffirainfall 
coefficient at Nizarnsagar between 1925-1926 and 2001-2002,49 and the nine points 
running average fit. Though variations in the runoff. coefficient have been observed 
since 1925-1926, the nine years running average reveals that from the mid- 1970s 
onward it clearly decreases and reaches historical minima in the mid- 1990s. This 
phenomenon may at least be partially explained by storage and withdrawals of water 
at the major reservoirs in Maharashtra and Karnataka, as well as Singur in Andhra 
Pradesh. 
Figure 6.2: Time-series of the rainfall: runoff coefficient at Nizarnsagar 
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Source: Rainfall data from Mitchell et al. (2005); runoff at Nizarnsagar from 1925-26 to 1973-74 drawn 
from Government of Andhra Pradesh (1976); runoff from 1981-82 to 2001-2002 from AP Irrigation & 
CAD Department, Irrigation Circle No. 3, I. B. Division, Nizamabad (MS Excel file) 
Other factors have also contributed to the modification of the rainfall: runoff patters 
starting the early 1970s. Increases in lift irrigation along the Manjira and its 
tributaries; groundwater abstraction all over the basin; and implementation of 
watershed program have certainly played a role. Watershed programs are notably 
'9 This notation refers to the hydrologic year, which begins on the first of June (that is the beginning of 
kharif, the monsoon cropping season) and ends on the 31" of May of the successive year 
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specifically meant to maximise water retention in the slopes through putting in place 
contour bunding and in-situ small water storage structures that can reduce surface 
runoff, lessen soil erosion; increase soil water moisture for fostering agricultural 
production and recharging aquifers (Farrington et al., 1999). Evidence showing that 
the implementation of watershed programs can reduce surface runoff in river basins 
has been put forth by scholars as Burt (2002), Madsen (1988), and Ramireddygari et 
al. (2000). Given the large extent to which watershed programs have been promoted 
and implemented in South-India, 50 one can suppose that water retention and storage in 
uplands had also certainly played a role in shaping the pattern observed in Figure 6.2. 
To add to this argument, Bourna, (2007) reports that the inflows in Osmansagar and 
Himayatsagar, the two water sources of Hyderabad located only a few tens of 
kilometres distance from the Manjira River, might have reduced because of the 
implementation of watershed programs in their catchment areas. 
6.1.3 Nizamsagarinigation project 
The Nizarnsagar irrigation scheme across the Manjira River was commissioned in the 
early 1900s by Osman Ali Khan, 7h Nizam of the erstwhile Hyderabad state. 
Nizamsagar is located in the Nizamabad District of Andhra Pradesh, around 100 km 
north-northwest of Hyderabad. The project was originally designed to irrigate 111,375 
hectares with its storage capacity of 821.2 Mm 3 of water, but this decreased to 334.1 
MM 3 by 1972 due to silt accumulation (Government of Andhra Pradesh, n. d. ). The 
present reservoir capacity of 504 Mm3 was obtained by renovating the project, and the 
average annual irrigated area is presently 67,965 ha. The main features and a map of 
Nizarnsagar irrigation project are reported in Appendix 3; whereas Figure 6.3 shows 
the reservoir flood gates. 
50 The great endeavours put into watershed programs is well illustrated by Farrington (1999) who 
relates that in the late 1990s the Indian central government was investing over $US 500 million per 
year into the rehabilitation of micro-watersheds (a "micro-watershed" falls in the range of 500-1,000 
ha) 
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Credits: M. Celio 
6.1.4 Intersectoral water allocation rules 
A particular feature of the transfer of water from the Manjira River to Hyderabad is 
that operation rules for allocating water between sectors have been devised by the 
government of Andhra Pradesh, in particular under the insistence of the World Bank 
that has lent the money for implementing the urban water supply project. The declared 
intention of the World Bank was to make sure that water supply to Hyderabad got 
priority over agricultural uses (Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1989). 
After the construction of Singur, water transfer to the city was administratively 
sanctioned via two Government Orders (GOs) in 1989 and 1990.5 1 The former 
allocates specific volumes of water to Hyderabad as well as to the Ghanpur and 
Nizamsagar irrigation projects downstream of Singur; whereas the latter specifies the 
operation rules of Singur dam, and more specifically the conditions to be met for 
51 Andhra Pradesh Housing, Municipal Administration and Development (A2) Department, 
Government Order Ms No. 190, dated April 12,1989; and Andhra Pradesh Irrigation and CAD (Irrgn. 
V) Department, Government Order Ms No. 93, dated February 24,1990 
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Figure 6.3: Main flood gates of Nizainsagar reservoir 
releasing water to the agricultural sector. The most relevant characteristics of the 
allocation rules specified in the two GOs are: 
Annual volumes of water are allocated. Hyderabad is entitled each year to 
197.1 Mm3 from Singur and Nizarnsagar to 236.4 MM3 (and Ghanpur to 115 
Mm 3)52 
9 Minimum levels at Singur to be maintained as a pre-condition for releasing 
water to the agricultural sector downstream. Water supply to Hyderabad gets 
the priority. This condition is ensured by ruling that releases to the agricultural 
sector can be done only if the water level at Singur reservoir is above a 
prescribed level for each month. The prescribed levels were reckoned in such a 
way to make sure that the water stored in Singur was always sufficient to 
cover Hyderabad water needs 
Since the beginning of the water supply from Singur, the policy of giving priority to 
Hyderabad over agriculture has been followed. As illustrated in Figure 6.4, the city 
received less than the amount allocated but only because of power cuts and 
maintenance works on the transmission system, which did not allow it to reach the 
maximum conveying potential. In contrast, Nizarnsagar till 2003-2004 never got its 
share of 236.4 Mm3. 
52 Actually the GOs do not mention the allocation for Nizarnsagar, but all the official documents 
released after 1990 that were consulted mention that Nizarnsagar is entitled to 236.4 Mm3 per year 
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Figure 6.4: Annual water conveyance from Singur to Hyderabad and releases for agricultural 
production at Nizamsagar irrigation project 
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Source: Andhra Pradesh Irrigation and Command Area Development Department, Singur Reservoir 
records 
The release to Nizarnsagar of less than its allocated share of water is the consequence 
of the uncertainty over monsoon inflows into Singur, which are highly variable from 
one year to the other. Under these conditions, the government of Andhra Pradesh 
proved reluctant to take the risk of providing Nizamsagar with all the water it was 
allocated and thereby reducing the storage in Singur (Celio et al., 2007a). 
6.2 Water transfer to Hyderabad: implications for agriculture 
In order to determine the implications of the transfer of surface water from the 
agricultural sector to cities, both surface and groundwater use needs to be considered. 
Even in public surface irrigation schemes, farmers often develop their own 
groundwater supplies to augment regular surface supplies or to mitigate the risk of 
surface water not being delivered in a timely fashion. Evidence has in fact shown that 
in many parts of South Asia, groundwater has become a major source - in some 
instances the primary source - of irrigation supply even within the command area of 
surface irrigation schemes (Deb Roy et al., 2002; Shah et al., 2003a). Thus, 
120 
co 
groundwater use might theoretically offset the reductions in canal water supply 
brought about by the transfer of water to cities. The following two sub-sections 
address the impact of the water transfer to Hyderabad on surface canal water 
deliveries from Nizarnsagar reservoir, and farmers' recourse to groundwater. Then, 
drawing from these insights, a third sub-section examines the implications of the 
water transfer to Hyderabad on agricultural productivity and gross revenue in 
Nizarnsagar irrigation command area. 
6.2.1 Canal water use for irrigation under Nizamsagar without water transfer to Hyderabad 
Calculating the inflow in Nizamsagar without water reallocation to Hyderabad 
The primary goal of this section is to establish the magnitude of the transfer of water 
to Hyderabad by determining, season-wise, how much surface water would have been 
used for irrigation at Nizarnsagar had the transfer not taken place. To do this, the 
monthly inflows that the reservoir would have received are first determined through a 
simple water balance between Singur and Nizamsagar as stylized in Figure 6.5 and 
calculated in Equation [1]. 
Figure 6.5: Schematic of Manjira basin reservoirs and water transfer to Hyderabad 
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Equation [1] states that the inflow to Nizamsagar without transfer to Hyderabad (Infl'. 
(N)) is calculated by adding to the- actual Nizamsagar inflow the water that has been 
retained (or "used") at Singur and the water used at the Manjira Barrage multiplied by 
a conveyance factor a, which accounts for water losses (because of seepage, 
evaporation, and lift irrigation) between Singur, the Manjira Barrage, and 
Nizarnsagar. Moreover, water use at Ghanpur irrigation project would also have been 
different without the transfer, which is accounted for in the last part of equation [11 
that specifies the difference between evaporation, water-use for irrigation, and storage 
variations at Ghanpur, with and without the water transfer to Hyderabad. 
Andhra Pradesh irrigation managers use a value of 0.6 for (x based on historical 
record, considering water releases from Singur and inflows to Nizarnsagar but without 
taking into account Ghanpur withdrawals (Nizarnabad District Irrigation Advisory 
Board, 2005). Values of monthly evaporation from the water body are calculated by 
multiplying pan evaporation obtained from the International Crops Research Institute 
for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) in nearby Patancheru by a constant surface area 
equivalent to half the reservoir surface area at maximum elevation. The differences 
between evaporation (AEvap. (G)) and storage variations (AAStorage. (c; )) at Ghanpurý 
3 
with and without water transfer to Hyderabad are assumed as nil, since the differences 
are expected to be low and offsetting when aggregated at an annual time step. 54 Thus, 
equation [1] can be rewritten as: 
Infl. ' 
(N) "ý 
InJL(Ag + vnjL(S) - OuIJL(S)) + (Evap. (M) + HYD (M) +, dvomg, (M) ýj *a- arr. (G) 
[2] 
53 The maximum storage capacity of Ghanpur anicut (weir) is only 5.7 Mm3 
54 The reservoir surface area at ftill reservoir level of the Manjira barrage is 600,000 M2, whereas 
Ghanpur is 190,400 m2. Because both are stabilization reservoirs, that is, intended to "head-up" water 
instead of store it, the resulting evaporation loss estimates are negligible compared to inflow or to 
irrigation utilization. Evap. (m)*(x so calculated ranges around 0.03 Mm3/month, with a maximcim of 
0.14 MM3/Month. As a comparison, the monthly inflow in Nizarnsagar between 1997-1998 and 
2004-2005 has varied between 0 and 2,888 Mm3, with an average of 98.9 MM3 . 
Moreover, taking half 
the reservoir surface area at full elevation is expected to compensate low elevation surface area with 
high when aggregating monthly data to the annual level 
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The last parameter that needs to be discussed here is the difference between actual 
water withdrawals at Ghanpur for irrigation and theoretical withdrawals if the water 
transfer to Hyderabad had not taken place (Alrr. (G)). Ghanpur has a storage capacity of 
5.7 MM3 , and partially acts as a weir diverting the Manjira waters to left and right- 
bank lateral canals. Because daily irrigation diversion data are not available, the 
model simulates diversions based on the assumption that if more water is received in 
Ghanpur in the scenario without transfer, then AIrr. (G) can be calculated as half this 
55 
extra volume, under the condition that actual water use for irrigation plus Alrr-(G) 
does not exceed the maximum monthly withdrawal capacity for irrigation. 
Conversely, if less water is received from upstream without transfer, Alrr-(G) 
corresponds to the monthly deficit, provided that actual water use for irrigation less 
the deficit is not less than zero. 
Another way for expressing the difference in monthly water withdrawals at Ghanpur 
is by using if - then - else statements: 
(InJL(S) - OutjL(S)) + (Evap. (M) + HYD(M) +, dstorage M ); -> 0 
Then: 
If-. irr. 
(G) 
+ [(InIL(S) - OutIL(S» + (Evap. (e + HYD(M) + Jstorage(31»1: 5 Irr. AUX(G) 
Then: Airr. 
(G) ýý 
[(InJL(S) - OuIJL(S)) + (Evap. (M) + HYD(Af) +, dstorage(m))] 
Else:, dirr. 
(G) `ý 
irr. 
MAX(G) - 
irr. 
(G) 
Else: 
1 f. irr. 
(G) + 
[(InIL(S) - OutIL(S» + (Evap. (Ag + HYD(M) + Astorage(M»] :0 
55 The daily maximum discharge capacity of all Ghanpur irrigation canals is 1.00224 Mrný, and the 
volumes of water diverted monthly for irrigation depends upon daily water availability in the Manjira 
River. The water balance in the Manjira River being done on a monthly basis, it is not possible to 
calculate how much water is withdrawn for irrigation at Ghanpur each month. Assuming that all the 
additional water available in the Manjira River if water had not been allocated to Hyderabad would be 
used for irrigation at Ghanpur might lead to an overestimate. The irrigation canals would not be able to 
convey all the additional flow in the Manjira River, particularly if concentrated over a few days. To 
avoid overestimating diversions, it is assumed that only 50% of the additional water available in the 
Manjira River at Ghanpur can be diverted for irrigation. 
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Then: AIrr. 
(G) = 
(infl. (S) - OutjL (S) )+ (Evap. (M) +H YD (M) + Astorage(M)) 
Else: Airr. Irr. 
(G) 
6.2.1.2 Reckoning canal utilization under Nizamsa-gar with and without reallocation 
Monthly canal water use for irrigation under Nizarnsagar in the without transfer 
scenario is calculated by applying a separate simple monthly water budget at 
Nizarnsagar. The variables of the water budget are the inflow in the reservoir, 
evaporation losses, supply for irrigation through the main irrigation canal, and surplus 
discharge (Figure 6.6). 
Figure 6.6: Variables used in the water budget at Nizarnsagar 
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Monthly inflows without transfer are calculated with equation [2] above; whereas the 
outflows consist of evaporation losses, surplus discharge, and water use for irrigation. 
Since these three parameters depend upon the available storage at a given time in 
Nizarnsagar reservoir, the water balance is: 
Storage(, ) = Storage(, - 1) - 
Evap. (, - 1) - 
irr. (, - 1) + 
InJL '(, ) [31 
That is, monthly storage is calculated as the storage less evaporation and irrigation 
diversion for the previous month. Storage is limited to the storage capacity of 
Nizarnsagar reservoir of 504 MM3 with any excess discharging as surplus. 
Evaporation is calculated as described for equation [1] above. Water use for irrigation 
(Irr. ) under Nizarnsagar is modelled according to a set of operational rules based on 
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actual practice at the reservoir and specifying how much water is to be released each 
month, which in turn depends upon the availability of water in the reservoir and the 
specific time of the year. 
The basic rule valid all throughout the year is that a minimum storage of 50 MM3 has 
to be maintained in Nizarnsagar. This secures the supply of water to Bodhan town and 
Nizamabad city in the dry season and prevents sediment flow into the main irrigation 
canal. Regarding monthly releases: in June and July there is no supply to farmers, 
since primary data shows that during these months paddy rice seedlings are raised in 
nurseries irrigated with groundwater. In the beginning of August rice is transplanted, 
and the model specifies that one eighth of the storage is released. Paddy requires good 
supplies of water in September and October when crop ET demand remains high, and 
the model accounts for this by specifying that during these months one fourth of the 
water stored in the reservoir is released in the main irrigation canal. 
In November kharif season paddy is harvested, and in December new groundwater- 
irrigated nurseries are started for the rabi season, that is, no release from Nizamsagar. 
Rice is transplanted in the beginning of January, and from January to March the 
model specifies that for each month one third of the water stored in Nizamsagar 
reservoir is released. In April half of the difference between actual storage and the 50 
MM3 minimum is released, whereas in the May (rabi rice harvest) the reservoir is 
emptied down to 50 Mm 3. Finally, in June there is no canal water available. The rules 
specified above are in line with the seasonal calendar and water requirements for rice, 
and minimize the standard deviations between actual and modelled monthly water 
releases at Nizamsagar. 
Before calculating canal water use for irrigation without transfer, the model is tested 
by applying equation [3] with the actual inflow in Nizarnsagar (instead of Infl. '), and 
the calculated vs. actual values of canal water use for irrigation (with transfer) are 
compared. 56 The results follow the trends in actual canal use and the standard 
56 The model is first calibrated with actual Nizarnsagar inflows and canal utilization data, and then used 
to calculate canal utilization with Nizarnsagar inflows that would have been received without transfer. 
This assumes that the rules governing Nizarnsagar releases are the same with and without water 
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deviation between actual and calculated values - on the order of one tenth of the mean 
values - shown in Figure 6.7 indicate that the model is robust. 57 
Figure 6.7: Scason-wise canal utilization at Nizamsagar, actual and calculated 
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Annual water use at Nizamsagar with and without water transfer is shown in Figure 
6.8, which also reports the actual inflow and the Nizamsagar inflow without transfer. 
During years with high rainfall, for instance, 1998-1999,1999-2000, and 2000-2001, 
Nizamsagar inflow is sufficient to fill up the 504 Mm3reservoir and canal water use 
exceeds the maximum reservoir capacity. In these cases, the water reallocation to 
Hyderabad had no impact on agriculture and differences between water use with and 
without transfer are due to the distribution and intensity of the precipitation during the 
rainy season. This explains why in 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 more canal water was 
used under Nizarnsagar with transfer than without. Conversely, if annual rainfall over 
transfer to Hyderabad, which is plausible given the prevailing cultivation of paddy rice under canal 
irrigation 
57 The standard deviation is calculated over the differences between actual and calculated canal 
utilization in the rabi and kharifseasons (16 points altogether) 
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the Manjira basin is low, the transfer has the effect of inducing canal water scarcity 
and curtailing its use for irrigation. This can be seen in Figure 6.8 in particular for 
2001-2002 (158 MM3 of additional water used for irrigation), and 2003-2004 (54 
Mm 3) . For the very 
dry years of 1997-1998,2002-2003 and 2004-2005, the difference 
between water use with and without reallocation to Hyderabad is very low: because of 
the reallocation Nizamabad has lost 14 MM3 in 2002-2003, and gained 15 Mm 3 in 
2004-2005. 
Figure 6.8: Inflow and canal utilization at Nizarnsagar, actual and calculated; and rainfall on the 
catchment area of Nizarnsagar. The vertical error bars on water use at Nizarnsagar without reallocation 
represent the standard deviation shown on Figure 6.7 
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Source: Rainfall data from Mitchell et al. (2005); actual inflow at Nizarnsagar and actual canal 
utilization drawn from AP Irrigation & CAD Department, Irrigation Circle No. 3, I. B. Division, 
Nizarnabad (NIS Excel file) 
Another way of representing the consequences for Nizarnsagar of the water transfer to 
Hyderabad is to look at the differences in storage in Nizarnsagar reservoir, as done in 
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Figure 6.9. The loss of water for agriculture in 2001-2002 and 2003-2004 clearly 
appears. 58 
Figure 6.9: Storage time-series at Nizarnsagar, actual and calculated (without reallocation to 
Hyderabad) 
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Source: Actual storage drawn from Andhra Pradesh Irrigation and Command Area Development 
Department, Nizarnsagar Reservoir records 
6.2.2 Groundwater use 
For increasing the precision upon the estimation of groundwater withdrawals at 
Nizarnsagar command area, two distinct methods are adopted and addressed. The first 
consists of multiplying the average discharge of the active borewells by their number, 
and further by the pumping duration. The second method relies on land-use 
information. Figure 6.10 shows the number of borewells in the Nizamsagar command 
5' The Figure only accounts for variations in storage at Nizamsagar reservoir with and without water 
allocation to Hyderabad, and plotted data draws from calculations in sections 6.2.1.1 and 6.2.1.2. 
Groundwater use under Nizarnsagar is not taken into account, as specifically dealt with in the following 
section. The implications on agriculture of the water transfer to Hyderabad plus groundwater 
availability in the command area of Nizarnsagar are the subject matter of section 6.2.3, with Table 6.4 
succinctly summarizing the findings 
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area reported in, or inferred from, a report of the Groundwater Department of Andhra 
Pradesh (2005b); the 2001 Census of India; and the number of electricity connections 
registered as "agricultural services" by the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board. 
These connections are generally assumed to correspond to the number of active 
borewells given that diesel pumps are no longer in use except for exceptional shallow 
lift from open water sources. 
Figure 6.10: Number of borewells in Nizarnsagar command area 
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For calculations presented here, the electrical connection data has been used, which is 
situated between the numbers provided by the Groundwater Department and the 
Census of India. The final parameter required for assessing groundwater use in 
agriculture is the duration of pumping. Evidence has shown that under the prevailing 
flat tariff regime in agriculture (electricity charged monthly on the capacity of the 
pump instead of metered hours and current used), fan-ners tend to operate their pumps 
for longer than farmers using diesel pumps (Shah et al., 2003b). The assumption is 
that with free power supply to agriculture in Andhra Pradesh, farmers permanently 
leave their pumps on during the crop growing season and pumping duration is thereby 
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governed by the hours of electricity supply. The weakness of this assumption is that 
groundwater is always available; although borewells may intermittently be dry, this is 
less likely in canal-irrigated command areas such as Nizamsagar compared with areas 
not irrigated by canals. 
Table 6.2 shows the calculated annual groundwater withdrawals in Nizamsagar from 
1999-2000 to 2004-2005, based on the electricity board's borewell census, seven 
hours of daily power supply, and a unit discharge of 150 litres per minute 59 with a 
total crop duration of 270 days/year in two seasons. 60 The annual groundwater 
withdrawals vary between 764 MM3 in 1999-2000 to 921 Mm 3 in 2004-2005. These 
values represent a maximum, since the actual time of pumping might have been lower 
due to intermittent groundwater depletion (dry borewells) as mentioned. 
Table 6.2: Maximum groundwater withdrawals in Nizarnsagar command area from 1999-2000 to 2004- 
2005. Note: number of borewells for 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 has been inferred by interpolation of 
the existing data 
Year 
Number of 
working borewells 
Annual withdrawals 
(MM3 /year) 
1999-2000 44,943 764 
2000-2001 46,739 795 
2001-2002 48,607 827 
2002-2003 50,402 857 
2003-2004 51,777 881 
2004-2005 54,137 921 
The second method infers groundwater use from land-use data based on the empirical 
relations observed in the field by Dewandel et al. (2007) in Gajwel area, located 
approximately 100 km southeast of our study area, characterized by similar aquifer 
geology, farmer socio-economic conditions, and crop type. These relations for kharif 
and rabi rice are as follows (with the separate coefficients equal to daily irrigation 
application): 
59 Based on February 2005 field data collected in Nalgonda and Rangareddy Districts, Andhra Pradesh 
in the Musi river (Massuel ct al., 2007) 
60 132 days in rabi (dry cropping season, December to May) and 139 days in kharif (wet cropping 
season, June to November) according to primary survey data 
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Equation [4] was established by collecting field data on 32 paddy fields with an area 
varying from 0.09 to 9.6 acres. Data collected concerned notably cropping patterns; 
daily duration of pumping; and the instantaneous yields of the borewells. Data used 
by Dewandel et al. (2007) for establishing the empirical relationship between daily 
groundwater abstractions and area cultivated under paddy is shown in Figure 6.11. 
Figure 6.11: Empirical relationship between daily groundwater abstraction and area cultivated under 
paddy in kharif2006 and rabi 2007 
700 
600 
. 500 
y=0.01 44x 
R=0.93 
0 
Rabi2007 
>% -I 
m 400 
-0 -Ol Z; 5 
300 
200 y= 0.0103x 
100 -g , ff 
- -, 0 Khadf2006 R=0.74 
0 
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 
Area of Paddy Fields (m2) 
Source: Dewandel et al. (2007) 
For other crops as tomato, chilli, maize, sunflower, and curry leaves the relation for 
rabi is: 
GroundwaterUse(m 3)= AreaCultivated(m 2)* GrowthDuration(days) * 0.0 115 [51 
Figure 6.12 shows the empirical data used for calculating the correlation between 
daily water abstraction and area cultivated under tomato, chilli, maize, sunflower, and 
curry leaves. 
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Figure 6.12: Rahi 2007: daily groundwater abstraction versus area cultivated under maize, vegetables 
(tomatoes, chilli, beans, curry) and sunflowers 
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Source: Dewandel et al. (2007) 
Equations [4] and [5] are used to calculate groundwater use in Nizamsagar command 
area in 2002-2003 and 2004-2005 when groundwater has been the only source of 
irrigation .61 The results are presented in Table 6.3, which 
does not account for other 
minor crops, maize, or pulses in kharif, since their empirical groundwater use 
correlations have not been established. Therefore, total groundwater extractions 
appearing in column [E] represent a minimum, whereas the figures in Table 6.2 
calculated by multiplying the number of borewells by their average discharge and 
further by the duration of pumping represent a maximum as discussed above. 
Table 6.3: Area cultivated (ha) and groundwater use (Mm 3) in Nizarnsagar command area, 2002-2003 
and 2004-2005. Source: Andhra Pradesh Directorate for Economics and Statistics. Note: Groundwater 
use for non-rice crops in kharij'has not been calculated since the correlation has not been established 
Rice Sunflower Maize Totpulses 
Year Season Area GW Area GW Area GW Area GW GW use 
cult. use cult. use cult. use cult. use [E]=[A]+[B] 
[A] [B] [C] [D] 
----+ 
-+IPL- TI 
2002 Kharif 38,979 558 0 0 2,138 4,608 558 
- Rabi 7,444 140 2,346 25 1,240 14 3,200 33 213 
2003 Total 46,423 698 2,346 25 3,378 14 7,808 33 771 
2004 Kharif 21,486 308 0 0 2,727 5,674 308 
- Rabi 4,909 93 18,083 195 980 11 3,878 40 339 
2005 Total 26,395 400 18,083 195 3,707 11 9,552 40 647 
Source: Data on area cultivated with reallocation is drawn from Andhra Pradesh Directorate for 
Economics and Statistics (NIS Excel file) and from village-level tabulated crop data 
61 Canal irrigation in 2004-2005 can be considered as nil, since only 15 MM3 of water have been 
actually released in the irrigation canal from Nizarnsagar reservoir 
132 
Groundwater withdrawals calculated with the two methods are different. 2002-2003 
groundwater withdrawals based on the number of borewells was 857 Mm 3 compared 
to 771 Mm3 with equations [4] and [5]. The 2004-2005 borewell-based estimate was 
921 Mrn 3 compared to 647 Mrn 3 using [4] and [5]. These differences are symptomatic 
of the fact that the method of calculation based on the number of borewells does not 
account for reductions in groundwater availability. Based on the differences above, 
the possible overestimation of groundwater withdrawals using the borewell-based 
method may be approximately 20%. 62 
6.2.3 Urban water appropriation and implications for agriculture 
Rice grown in flooded parcels, or "paddy", is the major crop in Nizarnsagar command 
area, followed by sunflower (in rabi only), sugarcane (annual crop), total pulses and 
maize as shown in Figure 6.13. 
Figure 6.13: Area cultivated under major crops in Nizamsagar command area (ha) 
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62 These findings on groundwater use under Nizarnsagar reservoir are further discussed while summing 
up the chapter (section 6.3) 
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Sunflower cultivation in rabi shows a steep increase from 2002-2003 onwards. This 
phenomenon is mainly due to the vibrant policy of the Indian government towards 
increasing the internal production of edible oil thus reducing the dependence on 
imports by, among others, free distribution of seeds to farmers,. In kharif from 
1999-2000 to 2004-2005 and rabi up to 2002-2003, the area cultivated with 
sugarcane, pulses, and maize showed little variation; in contrast, the paddy area 
fluctuated considerably, indicating that paddy depends on canal irrigation while 
non-rice crops do not. This is corroborated by field survey results. A subsequent 
assumption required for calculating rice area without transfer is that groundwater use 
is not contingent upon surface water availability; that is, farmers would withdraw the 
same volume of groundwater with or without the water transfer to Hyderabad. 63 The 
third and final assumption is that the rice area under surface water can be calculated 
using the same crop water use coefficient for groundwater64 in equation [4], that is: 
AAreaCultivated = (Irr. '(N)"rr-(N»1 
0.0144forRabi 1/ 
GrowthDuration(days) [61 
1 
0.01 03forKharif 
where Irr. '(N) is canal utilization without transfer, and Irr. (N) actual utilization with 
transfer. Seasonal areas cultivated under rice with and without transfer are shown in 
Figure 6.14. The 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 rabi area, which is higher with transfer 
than without is due to releases from Singur to Nizamsagar in the rabi season, giving 
effect to the provisions of the Government Orders (GOs) of 1989 and 1990 on 
Manjira water sharing between agriculture and Hyderabad(Celio et al., 2007a). 
63 Since water scarcity and drought are recurrent, the water stored in Nizarnsagar reservoir is generally 
not sufficient to cover all the water needs of farmers in the command area, even if water had not been 
transferred to Hyderabad. Under these conditions, recourse to groundwater is not primarily driven by 
the water transfer; therefore, borewells numbers and groundwater withdrawals with and without 
transfer to Hyderabad would have been similar 
64 Though some studies seems to indicated that in India crop yield on groundwater irrigated farms tend 
to be 1.2-3 times higher than on surface water irrigated farms (Dhawan, 1989; quoted in Shah ct al., 
2003a), there is no evidence showing that surface water - and groundwater use for a given crop differ 
by area 
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Summarizing these findings, Table 6.4 shows calculated production of rice and related 
gross revenue with and without reallocation to Hyderabad, and takes into account 
groundwater use under Nizarnsagar reservoir. Rice yields (Tonnes/ha) and sale prices 
(US$/Tonne) used for calculating production and gross revenue are inferred from 
primary data collected from 80 survey respondents located within the Nizarnsagar 
65 command area. 
Table 6.4: Production of rice and gross revenue with and without transfer to Hyderabad (production is 
in tonnes; gross revenue in million US$) 
Year Production Production Difference Gross Gross Difference 
with without in revenue revenue in gross 
reallocation reallocation production with without revenue 
[A] [B] [C]=[B]- reallocation reallocation [F]=[E]- 
[A] [D] [Ej [D] 
1999- 
2000 143,359 132,124 -11,235 30.1 27.8 -2.3 
2000- 
2001 157,569 148,924 -8,645 33.2 31.5 -1.7 
2001- 
2002 132,386 148,337 15,950 28.1 31.3 
3.2 
2002- 90,530 436 92 1,906 19.3 19.7 0.4 2003 , 
2003- 
2004 71,944 77,987 6,043 15.2 16.5 
1.2 
2004- 
2005 51,508 49,445 -2,063 10.9 10.5 -0.4 
6.3 Summing up 
This chapter has shed light on the complex and multi-faceted aspects of agriculture to 
urban water reallocations, in particular in regard to the impact of the transfers on the 
agricultural sector. While the main results of this chapter are summed up here, their 
broader significance is deali with in chapter eight discussing the findings of the thesis 
as well as in the conclusions (chapter nine). 
At the outset, section 6.1 has provided the reader with the main features of the 
Manjira River and the utilization of water resources. The waters in the basin are 
shared between the states of Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh. It has been 
shown that extensive diversion and utilization of surface water and groundwater, as 
65 Primary data shows that between 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 the average yield in Tonnes/ha of rice 
cultivation is 1.94 for kharif and 1.99 in rabi; whereas the average sale price of rice was of $US 214.6 
per tonne in kharif, and $US 202.7 per tonne (exchange rate InR to $US = 0.024449) 
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Summarizing these findings, Table 6.4 shows calculated production of rice and related 
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as well as in the conclusions (chapter nine). 
At the outset, section 6.1 has provided the reader with the main features of the 
Manjira River and the utilization of water resources. The waters in the basin are 
shared between the states of Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh. It has been 
shown that extensive diversion and utilization of surface water and groundwater, as 
65 Primary data shows that between 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 the average yield in Tonnes/ha of rice 
cultivation is 1.94 for kharif and 1.99 in rabi; whereas the average sale price of rice was of $US 214.6 
per tonne in kharif, and $US 202.7 per tonne (exchange rate InR to $US = 0.024449) 
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well as watershed development have reduced the runoff. - rainfall coefficient at 
Nizarnsagar. Thereby, the water reallocation to Hyderabad cannot be held as the 
unique factor responsible for the reduction of water availability for irrigation at 
Nizarnsagar. Section 6.1 concludes by presenting the allocation rules laid down by the 
government of Andhra Pradesh for regulating the sharing of Manjira water between 
agriculture and Hyderabad. Because of rainfall uncertainty the allocation rules have 
been only partially implemented, and agriculture has not always received its allocated 
share. 
Section 6.2 calculates in a step-by-step fashion the actual impact of the water transfer 
to Hyderabad on agriculture, by considering both surface waters and groundwater. 
The methods used are simple water balances and a model of water utilization for 
irrigation at Nizamsagar. The results obtained show in the first place the utility of 
calculating agricultural impact with simple water balances that draw from extensive 
and accurate hydrologic data. Then, it was calculated that because of the intersectoral 
allocation rules agriculture has not been systematically "the loser". Notably, farmers 
under Nizamsagar have benefited from the water transfer to Hyderabad and associated 
allocation rules in the dry season (rabi). The third important finding presented in this 
chapter is that the impact on agriculture cannot be straight forwardly calculated as the 
volume of water actual transferred to the cities, but it depends upon a number of 
factors and notably infrastructure design and its operation; rainfall; intersectoral water 
sharing arrangements; and groundwater availability. 
The analysis of groundwater utilization in Nizarnsagar irrigation scheme (section 
6.2.2) has highlighted the paramount importance of this resource in irrigated 
agriculture. Groundwater use in Nizarnsagar is higher than surface water use, and 
might a priori represent a good substitute - or compensation - to surface waters 
transferred to urban areas. 
The last part of section 6.2 calculates the impact of water transfer to Hyderabad on 
agricultural production and gross agricultural revenue in Nizamsagar command area, 
also drawing from primary data collected within the works of this thesis. These 
findings translate the water losses or gains into economic terms, and show that 
variations in gross revenue for agriculture in Nizamsagar irrigation project have 
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fluctuated from a gain of US$ 2.3 million in 1999-2000 to a loss of US$ 3.2 million in 
2001-2002. 
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7 Implications of water transfers on poor farmers and adaptive 
strategies to reduction in canal water supplies: evidence from the 
Manjira River 
"If we are to enunciate our Government's policy goal in a single phrase, it is 
eradication of poverty [bold in the original text]. Poverty anywhere is inimical to 
growth everywhere. And growth, by itself, is a meaningless statistic unless it makes a 
sustainable impact on the poor. ( ... ) We, on the other hand, believe that no end of 
growth has any real value unless the benefits of growth can be shared in equal or 
greater measure by the poor who, after all, are the large majority. ( ... ) To have spent 
hundreds of crores of rupees and yet to make no impact on the lives ofpoor people is 
a scandal of immeasurable dimensions" 
Speech of Sri P. Ashok Gajapathi Raju, finance minister 
while presenting the vote-on-account budget for 
1996-1997 to the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly 
on the 9th of March, 1996 
This chapter addresses the fourth research question of the thesis, which asks "How 
may poor farmers be impacted by reductions of canal water supply brought about by 
urban water transfers, and what strategies may they adopt? " The approach of this 
chapter consists in analyzing farmers' access to agricultural inputs, as well as their 
coping strategies when facing significant reductions in supplies of canal water. The 
second part of the research question is addressed by assuming that the observed 
coping strategies only depend upon water availability at the field level, no matter the 
reasons having curtailed the supply. Thus, even though multiple factors explain the 
water shortages in Nizamsagar command area which have ultimately triggered 
farmers' adaptive responses detailed in this chapter (see chapter six, section 6.1.2), it 
is assumed that farmers may also choose to adopt these coping strategies when 
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reductions in canal water supply is brought about specifically by urban water 
transfers. 
The findings presented here rest upon a primary data survey consisting in 219 
households 66 interviews carried out in Nizarnsagar and Ghanpur irrigation projects 
command areas. The methods employed for analyzing the primary data collected have 
been previously presented in section 3.3.4 of chapter three. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into five main sections. Section 7.1 provides 
in the first place for a general description of the main characteristics of the sample; 
then illustrates how the social category of the respondents can be used as a proxy for 
farmers' wealth. 
Section 7.2 sets the context of the study. The main features of irrigation and crop 
production in Nizarnsagar and Ghanpur command areas are presented, and notably: 
the area cultivated with each water source (rain; tank; canal; and groundwater); 
surface water versus groundwater use; and main cropping patterns for the kharif and 
rabiseasons. 
The following section analyzes the main features of farmers' access to surface canal 
water; groundwater; as well as other agricultural inputs. This approach, which spans 
beyond the study of access to water so as to embrace other inputs as government 
subsidies; sources of information and agricultural extension; and credits; has allowed 
for a finer understanding of the implications of reduced canal water supply on poor 
farmers. 
Section 7.4 moves on to the question of farmers' coping strategies to reduction in the 
supply of canal water, including widening the number of remunerative activities; 
migrating; or putting wife and daughters to the contribution of the household income. 
Finally, the last section of the chapter sums up the main research findings. 
66 "Household" encompass in this thesis all the persons that share the same kitchen 
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7.1 Households characterization and proxy for wealthlpoverty 
7.1.1 Respondents identification and family details 
This section characterizes the sample of 219 farmers' households that builds up the 
primary data survey. 67 The 219 individuals interviewed consist of 216 males and three 
females. The relation of the respondents with the head of the household (HH) was as 
follows: 204 were the HH himself, five were sons of the HH; five were fathers of the 
HH; one was the mother of the HH; three were brothers of the HH; and eventually one 
respondent was the wife of the HE The age of the informants spanned between 25 
and 76 years; whereas the number of adult family memberS68 in the household varied 
between one and ten, the highest percentage being two adult family members (32%). 
The number of children of the household varied between none and nine, with a mean 
of 2.56 and a standard deviation of 1.456. The three highest percentages observed 
were 35.2% for households with two children; 26% for three children; and 13.2% 
having only one child. The proportion between male and female children is 52.5% to 
47.5%. 
Regarding education, 37.9% of the respondents were illiterate; 8.2% are below 
primary school; 6.4% had primary school education; 11.4% secondary school; 15.1% 
had obtained a high school degree; 11 % an intermediate degree; and finally 10% were 
graduate. 
The respondents were predominantly Hindu (95.4%); and to a lesser extent Muslims 
(4.6%). Other religions are not represented in the sample. 
7.1.2 Social category as a proxy for wealth: the empirical basis 
Since this chapter investigates the relation between reduced supplies in surface canal 
water and poverty, it is necessary to classify informants according to their wealth. The 
questionnaire did not directly investigate farmers' economic situation. The answers to 
direct questions on revenue or ownership of assets would very likely have led to 
biased data since interviewees would have been reluctant in answering such questions 
67 The template of the questionnaire is reported in Appendix 5 
68 "Adult family members" were considered those older than 18 years old 
141 
(Hussain, 2004). Moreover, since government subsidies and schemes are targeted at 
low income individuals, informants would have very likely understated their wealth 
so as to get some chances - or not to compromise their chances - to access such 
schemes. 
A proxy for the informants' economic status is therefore required for investigating the 
impact of water reallocations on the poorest farmers. The existence of the caste 
system in India and the way it shapes access to resources and fosters discrimination 
(see e. g. Joshi et al., 2001) suggests that the social category of the informants might 
be used as a proxy for poverty/wel fare. The correlation between social category and 
access to resources, which clearly unfolds in the remainder of this chapter, is 
discussed in this section. To start with, Table 7.1 characterizes the sample according 
to the social category of the informants. 
Table 7.1: Representation of the different social categories in the sample 
Social category Frequency % 
Backward Caste 119 54.3 
Other Caste 52 23.7 
Scheduled Caste 38 17.4 
Scheduled Tribe 10 4.6 
Total 219 100.0 
Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) particularly, and Backward Castes 
(BC) to a lesser extent are disadvantaged Indian communities that are accorded 
special status by the Constitution of India; and that can benefit from special economic 
and social programs put in place by the union and the states governments. One could 
then expect - and put forth the hypothesis - that members of SC and ST are on 
average poorer than members of BC, and even more than individuals belonging to 
Other Castes (OC). This hypothesis is tested here by looking at the correlation 
between social category and other variables, as level of education of the informant, 
and the amount of cultivable land he/she owns. The results are shown in Figure 7.1, 
where one can observe that SC and ST are those with less education and owning the 
smallest irrigable areas, followed by BC, and with OC being the best endowed. 
142 
Figure 7.1: Education and cultivable area of the informants according to social category 
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The correlations between social category and education on the one hand, and 
cultivable area on the other is further detailed in Table 7.2, which shows that social 
category is strongly correlated with education (Pearson correlation > 0.5) and 
moderately to strongly correlated with cultivable area. Moreover, also the fact that the 
Sig. (2-tailed) is small and lower than 0.5 indicates that the variables are significantly 
correlated (see section 3.3.4 of chapter three for a review on primary data statistical 
analysis). 
Table 7.2: Correlations between the variables social category and cultivable area and with education 
Cultivable area Education 
Social category Pearson correlation 0.423 0.504 
coefficient 
Sig. (2-tailed) <0.005 <0.005 
Sample size 219 219 
The data and observations above are in line with the general correlation between 
social category and economic situation observed in India (see e. g. Dayal, 1985). 
According to the discussion above, in the following sections the social category of the 
respondents will be taken as a proxy of relative wealth, with SC and ST being the 
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most deprived, OC the relatively wealthiest farmer, and BC situated in between. The 
correlation does not straight forwardly mean that SC and ST farmers are poor, but 
rather that they are comparatively less wealthy than the other respondents. 
Notwithstanding this, one can confidently assume that in the rural areas investigated 
by this thesis most of SC and ST farmers are below or not far above the poverty line. 69 
7.2 Irrigation and agricultural production In the study area 
7.2.1 Irrigation in Ghanpur and Nizamsagar iffigation projects 
Details on irrigation and crop production in Nizarnsagar and Ghanpur irrigation 
schemes have been collected through the questionnaire survey. The questions referred 
notably to the 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 kharif and rabi seasons. These two years 
have been chosen because surface water availability has been very different, as can be 
inferred from Figure 7.2 that shows canal utilization, that is, the water that was 
released in the irrigation canal at Nizarnsagar. 
South-India has experienced a severe drought in 2004-2005, with precipitations in 
Andhra Pradesh of only 704 mm, that is some 25% below the norm (Government of 
Andhra Pradesh, 2006a). Conversely, 2005-2006 has been a year characterized by 
good monsoon rainfall and good availability of surface water in the irrigation 
reservoirs for the rabi season 2005-2006. 
'9 There are different means for determining when an individual falls below a poverty line. For Andhra 
Pradesh, the threshold for poverty is set at less than InR 3,155 per year (Hussain (2004); S. Mahcndra 
Dev et al. (2007); and S. Sudhakar Reddy et al. (2003)) 
144 
Figurc 7.2: ('anal utilization at Nizamsagar in 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 
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Source: Data drawn from Irrigation & CAD Department, Irrigation Circle No. 3, I. B. Division, 
Nizamabad (NIS Excel file and Nizarnsagar reservoir registers) 
NO 
a 
Pfimary data collected at Nizarnsagar and Ghanpur command area has also permitted 
to quantify the surfaces irrigated by fan-ners sources-wise. The different sources of 
water considered are rain (rain-fed cultivation); surface canal water; surface water 
impounded in tanks; and groundwater. Groundwater use was further detailed into use 
of water from one own borewell or groundwater bought/received from other farmers. 
Table 7.3 resumes the sources of water used in irrigation at Ghanpur and Nizamsagar 
irrigation projects altogether in the kharýf and rabi seasons of 2004-2005 and 
2005-2006. The total area potentially cultivable by the farmers interviewed adds up to 
841.5 acres (340.5 ha). 
3 
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Table 7.3: Sources of water for irrigation in kharif and rabi 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 (data is in % if 
not otherwise specified) 
Area 
cultivated 
(acres 
Scason Cultivated Fallow 
Sources of irrigation 
Own Others 
Rain-fcd Tank Canal GW GW 
Kharif 635.2 75.5 24.5 [9.9] 1.1 14.7 40.7 43.2 0.3 2004-2005 [257.1] [30.6] 
Rabi 2004- 300.9 35.8 64.2 [26.0] 0.0 4.2 16.8 78.3 0.7 2005 (121.81 [14.5] 
Kharif 719.5 85.5 14.5 [5.9] 1.2 15.6 44.1 39.1 0.1 2005-2006 [291.2] [34.6] 
Rabi 2005- 525.6 62.5 37.5 [15.2] 0.0 13.8 36.5 49.2 0.5 2006 [212.71 r25.31 
-- 
The percentage of area cultivated season-wise reflects the fact that in 2005-2006 more 
surface canal water was available. Notably, the area cultivated in kharif increased 
from 635.2 acres in 2004-2005 to 719.5 acres (coriesponding to a 10% difference). 
The area cultivated in the dry rabi season from 300.9 acres to 525.6 acres, 
representing a 26.7 % increase. The rabi increase is higher when compared to the 
kharif one, this being explained by the fact that Ghanpur and Nizarnsagar have 
received a considerable quantity of inflows in November 2005, used during the rabi 
season spanning from December 2005 to May 2006 (see Figure 7.2). 
Table 7.3 shows that rain-fed agriculture is very marginal when compared to the other 
types of irrigation. It represents 1.1 % of the area irrigated in kharif 2004-2005 
(corresponding to 6.75 acres), and 1.2 % in kharif 2005-2006 (8.75 acres). 40.7% of 
the area cultivated has been irrigated with canal water in kharif 2004-20059 
respectively 44.1% in kharif 2005-06. Canal water utilization is higher in kharif than 
in rabi; which seems to contradict actual canal utilization at Nizarnsagar in 2005-2006 
shown in Figure 7.2. Groundwater use follows an opposite pattern, being the main 
water source for irrigation in the dry rabi season. Bought or received groundwater 
secures a very small part of irrigation amounting to less that 1% of the total area 
irrigated. 
Another interesting feature emerges while reading Table 7.3. The area irrigated with 
surface canal water seems astonishingly high in 2004-2005 (40.7%), notably if one 
considers that it has been a very dry year. Different explanations can be called upon 
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for this. The first one is that though receiving less water, farmers have not 
significantly reduced the area under cultivation, expecting more precipitation and 
additional supplies later on in the season. If this hypothesis proves correct, the yield 
obtained by farmers that have only relied on surface waters should be less in 
2004-2005 than 2005-2006, since crops in the first year would have experienced more 
moisture stress that in 2005-2006. Season-wise yields of paddy grown uniquely with 
canal surface water are shown in Table 7.4. 
Table 7A Yield of paddy grown only with surface water 
Number of Mean St. dev. Mean St. dcv. 
Season observations (tonnes/acre) (tonnes/acre) (tonncs/ha) (tonncs/ha) 
Kharif 2004- 88 1.816 0.541 4.49 1.34 2005 
Rabi 2004- 3 2.193 0.768 5.42 1.90 2005 
Kharif 2005- 110 1.919 0.475 4.74 1.17 2006 
Rabi 2005- 39 1 713 0.530 4.23 1.31 2006 . 
Since the number of observations in rabi 2004-2005 is very small, the average yields 
calculated for this season are very likely not representative and thus not interpretable. 
For kharif, what can be observed is that the yield in 2004-2005 is lower than in 
2005-2006 (1.815 tonnes/acre against 1.919 tonnes/acre). This difference could be 
explained by the fact the water applied per surface cultivated has been lower in 
2004-2005, and rice has experienced more moisture stress. Thereby, the apparently 
high. percentage of area irrigated with surface canal water in 2004-2005 may be the 
consequence of farmers not having significantly reduced the area cultivated in spite of 
poor supplies of canal surface water. 
Another possible explanation for the high percentage of area irrigated with surface 
canal water in 2004-2005 is that farmers have overestimated the area irrigated with 
canal water while responding to the questionnaire. Farmers could have overestimated 
surface water use if they made conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water, 
since it can prove difficult to tell apart precisely the area irrigated with each of them. 
Table 7.5 differentiates between surface irrigated solely with surface water, 
groundwater, and by conjunctive use of both water sources. 
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Table 7.5: Surfaces irrigated by sample farmers solely with surface water, groundwater, and 
conjunctive use (all data is in acres [hectares] if not otherwise specified) 
Season 
Only surface 
water 
Only 
groundwater 
Conjunctive use of 
surface and ground 
water 
Conjunctive use 
N 
Kharif 2004- 169 [68.4] 79 [32.0] 387 [156.6] 61 2005 
Rabi 2004-2005 19 [7.7] 173 [70.0] 109 (44.1] 36 
Kharif 2005- 
2006 233 [94.3] 59 [23.9] 427 [172.8] 
59 
Rabi 2005-2006 131 [53.0] 125 [50.61 269 [108.9] 51 
Source: Primary data collected during questionnaire survey, December 2006 to April 2007 
As shown in Table 7.5, conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water is 
predominant in the kharif season, while in rabi the area irrigated uniquely with 
groundwater increases significantly. 
Finally, the data shown in Table 7.3 may suggest that the information collected at the 
village level in regard to surface irrigated source-wise in Nizamsagar and Ghanpur 
irrigation projects might not be representative of the situation at the scale of the whole 
command areas. This possibility is plausible if one considers the heterogeneity that 
characterizes water access in the commands of irrigation projects in developing 
countries and India in particular (A. Rajagopal et al., 2002; quoted in Hussain, 2005; 
Chambers, 1988). In addition to head versus tail disparities, villages located in 
different sections of distributaries are provided with significantly variable deliveries 
of water, particularly during years when water availability is below the average. 
7.2.2 Cropping patterns 
Chapter six has already dealt with the major crops cultivated in Nizamsagar command 
area as inferred from data from the Andhra Pradesh Directorate. for Economics and 
Statistics. In this section the crops cultivated in Nizamsagar and Ghanpur command 
areas are reviewed in the light of primary data collected by the author. Table 7.6 
shows crops cultivated in Nizarnsagar and Ghanpur command areas in kharif and rabi 
2004-2005 and 2005-2006. 
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Table 7.6: Crops cultivated by sample farmers in Nizamsagar and Ghanpur irrigation schemes as 
inferred from the questionnaire survey 
Paddv qiumm. nne Rnnflnwer Maize Sovabcans 
Acres 
fhal % 
Acres 
fhal % 
Acres 
fhal % 
Acres 
fhal % 
Acres 
[hal % 
Kharif 
2004- 
449 70 ,7 
156 24.6 7 [2.8] 1.1 12 [4.9] 1.8 12 [4.9] 1.8 
2005 
[181.7] [63.11 
Rabi 
2004- 81 26.9 156 52 42 14 14 [5.7] 4.7 6 [2.4] 2.0 
2005 [32.8] [63.1] [17.0] 
Kharif 
2005- 498 69.2 192 26.7 3 (1.2] 0.3 6 [2.4] 0.8 20 [8.11 2.7 
2006 [201.5] [77.7] 
Rabi 
2005- 218 41.4 192 36.5 83 15.8 20 [8.1] 3.8 11 [4.5] 2.1 
2006 [88.2] [77.7] [33.6] 
Kharif is characterized by the predominance of rice which accounts for around 70% of 
the total area cultivated. In rabi, rice is still a major crop during years with good 
precipitations (2004-2005); whereas in case of drought it is outstripped by sugarcane 
which relies mostly on groundwater. Sunflower is an important crop during the dry 
season, having represented 14% of the area cultivated in 2004-2005, and 15.8% in 
2005-2006. Maize in rabi and soyabeans during the whole year are additional crops 
grown, though to a lesser extent. Other marginal crops that have not been reported in 
Table 7.6 are sorghum (0.3% of the area sown in rabi 2004-2005), pulses (0.4% in 
rabi 2005-2006), and chilly that accounted for 0.2% of the total area cultivated by the 
informants in rabi 2004-2005 and kharif 2005-2006. 
7.3 Access to agricultural resources In the study areas 
In order to understand the implications of water transfers out of agriculture on poor 
farmers, water as well as a number of other agricultural inputs has to be taken into 
account since determinant in crop cultivation and output. This section discusses 
access by farmers to water; subsidies on seeds and fertilizers; agricultural extension 
services; and agricultural credits . 
70 The correlation of each of the variable considered 
with the social category of the informants will be tested, so as to highlight differences 
in access patterns to agricultural inputs. 
Access to labour has not been taken into account in the analysis 
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7.3.1 Water 
7.3.1.1 Surface - andmoundwater use in GhanDur and Nizamsagar kriqation scheme 
Water is an essential input for crop cultivation. This section sheds light on different 
features characterizing surface and groundwater access in Nizamsagar and Ghanpur 
irrigation projects, while emphasizing differences in water access according to the 
social category the respondents belong to. Canal water access is contingent in the first 
place upon timing and quantities of water released from the main headwork that stores 
and/or diverts water into the irrigation canals and distributaries. The position of the 
plots that are to receive water relative to the hcadwork and the main canals is also 
crucial. The furthest the plot to the sources and main conveyance system; and the 
lowest the chances to receive sufficient surface canal water for satisfying the water 
needs of the crops. Generally, the upper reaches of irrigation schemes enjoy better 
deliveries of water; whereas farmers located in the lowest reaches can even be 
completely deprived of canal water and solely rely on groundwater. Access to surface 
water is also deemed to reflect farmers' welfare: the wealthiest established in the 
head-ends; whereas the poorest in the tail-ends or in the lowest portions of the 
distributaries (Chambers, 1988). 
Access to groundwater diverges from what seen above. Groundwater could potentially 
represent a "A la carte" resource, that is of which farmers could avail where and when 
they most desire. But this is not entirely true in reality, in particular because of an 
array of factors limiting access. The first one has already been dealt with in section 
4.2.1 of chapter four. Indian water law restrains ownership rights over groundwater to 
landowners. Thus, farmers that do not own land are potentially excluded from its use, 
notably where groundwater markets don't take place. The second factor restraining 
groundwater access is that drilling a borewell and buying a pump requires an initial 
investment that most of the worse-ofý farmers can not afford. Adding to this, 
groundwater is not homogeneously spatially distributed, some areas being better 
endowed than others. This factor, along with resource overexploitation, further limits 
the scope of groundwater access. Erratic power supply is another element constraining 
access to groundwater, notably in regions where electrical pumps are installed. 
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Figure 7.3 shows the percentage of mean cultivated area with groundwater and 
surface water season-wise and according to social category of the infon-nants in 
2004-2005. All data present a good confidence interval at 95% except for the data on 
Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) in rabi 2004-2005, which is. 
therefore left out of the analysis. 
Figure 7.3: Access to surface and groundwater in kharifand rabi 2004-2005 according to the social 
category of the respondents. Vertical bars represent the confldence interval at 95% 
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Figure 7.3 shows that in kharif surface water accounts for more than 90% of the total 
mean area irrigated by SC and ST; whereas groundwater is only marginally used by 
those castes. Backward Castes (BC) also mostly rely on surface water, though to a 
lesser extent than SC and ST. Finally, in 2004-2005 Other Castes (OC) have utilized 
as much surface water as groundwater. This pattern is explained on the one hand by 
the fact that access to groundwater requires an initial investment that most of the 
worse-off farmers cannot afford, and on the other that groundwater markets that could 
provide poor farmers with groundwater are extremely limited in Ghanpur and 
Nizamsagar command area, as illustrated in Table 7.3 and discussed in the following 
section. 
The situation in rabi presents different features when compared to kharif. The mean 
cultivated area with groundwater in 2004-2005 is higher than the one irrigated with 
surface water, this being due to the very limited availability of canal surface water in 
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rabi 2004-2005. Rabi data for SC and ST cannot be interpreted since the number of 
farmers having cultivated some land is very low: five for the SC q'nd three for fanncrs 
belonging to ST. These low numbers show that farmers that do not have access to 
groundwater are less resilient to drought and have to relinquish crop cultivation in 
particularly dry seasons. Along these same lines, Table 7.7 illustrates that the 
percentage of farmers that have not gone for crop cultivation in rabi 2004-2005 when 
compared to kharif 2004-2005 drops more for SC and ST than for the other social 
categories. For OC, only 19% of the farmers had to relinquish crop cultivation in the 
rabi when compared to the preceding kharif season. 
Table 7.7: Farmers having cultivated crops in 2004-2005 according to social category 
Social category Kharif 2004-05 Rahi 2004-05 
Scheduled caste 31 out of 38 (82%) 5 out of 38 (13%) 
Scheduled tribe 9 out of 10 (90%) 3 out of 10 (30%) 
Backward caste 99 out of 119 (83%) 45 out of 119 (38%) 
Other caste 46 out of 52 (88%) 36 out of 52 (69%) 
7.3.1.2 Groundwater markets 
Groundwater markets may potentially redistribute the benefits of groundwater 
availability between farmers. Notably, those who have not physical access to 
groundwater can nevertheless avail of the resource. Groundwater markets in India 
occur in groundwater irrigated areas; in canal irrigated areas with unreliable supplies; 
and in areas with lift-based surface irrigation. The wells are dugwells or tubewells; the 
energy source either diesel or electricity; and the water conveyance system may 
consists of open channels; hoses; or underground pipelines. Saleth (1998) cites 
& 
following characteristics of the Indian groundwater markets. First, sales do not 
involve the reduction in irrigation by sellers. Second, though water sales are primarily 
for irrigation, sales for non irrigation uses are not uncommon, an example being the 
sale for urban purposes in Chennai, Tamil Nadu (Janakarajan, 1994; quoted in Saleth, 
1998). Third, while the government does play a catalytic role through electrification 
and credit support, it is the private farmers who develop and control groundwater 
irrigation and water markets in India. 
Borewells and pump-sets ownership in Ghanpur and Nizarnsagar irrigation projects as 
inferred from the primary data survey is shown in Table 7.8. Pump and borewell 
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ownership are manifestly correlated with social category, with the SC and ST being 
less endowed than the other two castes. 
Table 7.8: Borewclls and pump-scts ownership according to social category 
Social category Working borcwell Working borewell 
Scheduled caste 13 out of 38 34.2 
Scheduled tribe 3 out of 10 30 
Backward caste 58 out of 119 48.7 
Other caste 46 out of 52 88.5 
In addition to the costs that groundwater extraction entails, another reason explaining 
the reluctance of worse-off farmers to go for a borewell might be related with the high 
risk of borewell failure. Primary data collected among 219 farmers' households shows 
that the total number of working borewells in the sample amounts to 118, against 164 
that have failed (that is with no or insufficient yield). 
Primary data collected during the PhD research draws a clear picture of the extent to 
which water markets are active in the areas studied. Table 7.9 shows the number of 
sellers and farmers to whom water was given; the area irrigated with sold water and 
the total area irrigated; as well as the percentage of area irrigated with sold water 
against the total area irrigated season-wise. 
Table 7.9: Season-wise groundwater exchanges in Ghanpur and Nizamsagar irrigation projects 
Number of Area irrigated Total area Area irrigated 
farmers to with sold irrigated with sold water 
Number of which water water , (acres against total area 
Irrigation project sellers was given (acres [haj) [hal) irrigated (%) 
Kharif2004-05 6 13 10 (4.0] 635.2 [257.11 
1.6 
Rabi 2004-05 7 12 18 [7.3] 300.9 6 [121.81 
Kharif2005-06 7 14 10 [4.0] 719.5 1.4 [291.2] 
Rabi 2005-06 11 20 26 [10.5] 525.6 4.9 [212.71 
The number of sellers is low when compared to the sample size (219 households), as 
is the number of buyers. Table 7.9 also shows that sellers can sell their groundwater to 
more than one farmer. Data on area irrigated with sold water indicates that the 
percentage of area cultivated with bought water varies between a minimum of 1.4% in 
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kharif 2005-2006 to a maximum of 6% in rabi 2004-2005. As a general rule, the area 
irrigated with bought water is higher in rabi than in kharif. This can easily be 
explained by the fact that in rabi there is generally less canal water available, thus the 
demand for groundwater is higher. 
Data on number of sellers and buyers according to social category are presented in 
Table 7.10. Data show that markets mostly occur among and between farmers 
belonging to BC and OC. ST farmers included in the sample neither buy nor sell 
water; whereas four SC farmers have bought groundwater in 2004-2005 and 
2005-2006, and one has sold water in 2005-2006. 
Table 7.10: Number of buyers and sellers according to the social category of the respondents 
Social category 
Bought 
2004-05 
Bought 
2005-06 
Sold 
2004-05 
Sold 
2005-06 
Scheduled caste 1 3 0 1 
Scheduled tribe 0 0 0 0 
Backward caste 8 14 10 12 
Other caste 5 6 3 5 
The water exchanges patterns shown in Table 7.10 indicate that the worst-off fanners 
are less likely to have access to groundwater through markets when compared to 
farmers belonging to the BC and OC social categories. 
7.3.2 Other agricultural inputs 
The questionnaire survey has allowed for determining access to other agricultural 
inputs than water, and notably government agricultural subsidies on seeds and 
fertilizers; agriculture-related information; and agricultural credits. The results are 
discussed in the following paragraphs, which investigates in particular the differences 
in access according to the social category of the respondents. 
7.3.2.1 Govemment subsidies 
Agriculture in developing countries is often underpinned by government subsidies. 
Water rates that do not reflect at least the cost of operation and maintenance of public 
irrigation schemes is the most common example of government subsidies in irrigated 
agriculture. According to Gulati (2002), the subsidy figures for public irrigation turn 
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out to be around Indian Rs5l. Billion in the year 1999-2000. Other subsidies include 
the provision of agricultural inputs as seeds and fertilizers at low cost or for free. 
Table 7.11 shows the number and percentage of farmers that had access to seeds and 
fertilizers provided by the government at subsidized rates or for free, classified 
according to the social category the respondents belonged to. Nobody among the 
farmers interviewed from ST has had access to subsidized inputs, and only 5.3% of 
farmers from the SC. Conversely, 20.2% of BC and 28.8% of OC farmers could 
access subsidized inputs. The significance of these results is discussed in chapter 
eight. 
Table 7.11: Number of farmers that had access to government subsidies over the last three years 
classified according to their social category 
Social category Seeds Seeds (%) Fertilizers Fertilizers 
Scheduled caste 2 5.3 0 
Scheduled tribe 0 - 0- 
Backward caste 24 20.2 2 1.7 
Other caste 15 28.8 2 3.8 
7.3.2.2 Sources of information and aqricuftural extension 
The possibility for farmers to access to reliable sources of information for any matter 
related to crop growth is extremely important. Access to information and 
agriculture-related knowledge has been fostered by the Indian government by setting 
up special cells in charge of the so-called agricultural extension, which is concerned 
primarily with the following main objectives (Indian Council of Agricultural 
Research, 2006): 
0 The dissemination of useful and practical information relating to agriculture, 
included improved seeds, fertilizers, implements, pesticides, improved cultural 
practices, dairying, poultry, nutrition, etc. 
e The practical application of useful knowledge to farm and home 
0 To get feedback from the people about the latest scientific technology 
transferred to them through different media, and to improve all aspects of the 
life of the rural people with the framework of the national, economic and 
social policies, involving the population as a whole 
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The results of the primary data survey in regard to access to information by farmers 
are shown in Table 7.12. Among the farmers that relied on an external source of 
infon-nation, 54.3% had recourse to the mandal agricultural officer; 11.9% to a peer 
farmer; and 11.4% to a pesticide and/or fertilizer dealer. Other sources of information 
have been by far less consulted by farmers. 
Table 7.12: Sources of information for problems related to the growth of paddy 
Source of information Frequency Total % Partial % 
Mandal agricultural officer 119 54.3 65.0 
Pecr farmer 26 11.9 14.2 
Pesticide/fertilizer dealer 25 11.4 13.7 
Local trader 7 3.2 3.8 
Agriculture research station 3 1.4 1.6 
Village administrative officer 1 0.5 0.5 
NGO 1 0.5 0.5 
Thorough radio 1 0.5 0.5 
Sub-total 183 83.6 10060 
Farmers that did not rely on a source of 36 16.4 information 
Total 219 100.0 
The reason for having chosen a specific source of information has also been 
scrutinized while carrying out the questionnaire survey. Results are presented in Table 
7.13. The most cited reason for having chosen a source of information is confidence is 
the expertise of the source. Then, 38% of fan-ners affinns having chosen a source of 
information because of it$ proximity, and more specifically the nearest available. 
Table 7.13: Reasons for having chosen a specific source of information. Example for paddy growers 
Reason for having chosen a source of 
information Frequency Total % Partial % 
Confidence 139 63.5 76.0 
Nearest available 38 17.4 20.8 
Any other 5 2.3 2.7 
Convinced of the expertise 1 0.5 0.5 
Sub-total 183 83.6 100.0 
Farmers that didn't rely on a source of 36 4 16 information . 
Total 219 100.0 
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Another aspect. dealt with here is whether the information obtained by farmers helped 
in solving the crop-related problem they were facing. As shown in Table 7.14,91.2% 
of farmers that had recourse to a source of information affirms that the information 
helped in solving the problem; whereas 8.8% responded that the information was not 
useful. 
Table 7.14: Effectiveness of the source of information for solving the crop-rclated problem 
Effectiveness of the information received 
to solve the crop problem Frequency__ % 
The problem was solved 186 91.2 
The problem was not solved 18 8.8 
Total 204 100.0 
As per differences between social categories in access to information, data collected 
shows that these are not significant: SC and ST farmers had access to information as 
the other castes did. 
7.3.2.3 Access to credit 
Availing of credit is a crucial issue for farmers, in particular for those that are not able 
to build up financial reserves. The questionnaire has specifically addressed the 
question of credits. The responses given by farmers show that most of them have 
received a loan from a bank, mostly through farmers' co-operative societies. Overall, 
74.4% of the farmers interviewed have had access to a bank loan; whereas the 
remaining 25.6% either couldn't access to the loan or did not apply for any. Table 
7.15 shows data on access to bank loans according to the social category of the 
respondents. 
Table 7.15: Respondents' access to bank loans according to their social category 
Social category Access to agricultural credit Frequency % 
Yes 26 68.4 
Scheduled Caste No 12 31.6 
Total 38 100.0 
Yes 7 70.0 
Scheduled Tribe No 3 30.0 
Total 10 100.0 
Yes 85 71.4 
Backward Caste No 34 28.6 
Total 119 100.0 
Yes 45 86.5 
Other Caste No 7 13.5 
Total 52_ 100.0 
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Data shows that the difference between SC, ST, and BC in regard to access to 
agricultural credits is not significant. Responses obtained from respondents from these 
social categories indicate that around 70% among them had access to a credit. 
Conversely, members belonging to other (and higher) castes seem to have an easiest 
access to credits, since 86.5% among them accessed to an agricultural loan. 
7.4 Farmers'coping strategies: widening the spectrum of remunerative activities and 
recourse to migration 
There is a multitude of options at hand for farmers to cope with drought. A study of 
the World Bank (2006) in Mahbubnagar District in Andhra Pradesh has highlighted 
an array of strategies farmers had relied upon to face drought. These strategies, 
classified into irrigation practices; cropping practices; migration/labour; financial; and 
extreme practices are reported hereafter. 
Irrigation practices: 
0 Increase the number of tubewells and decreasing the number of traditional 
tanks and dugwells 
0 Increase the number of tubewells 
Cropping practices: 
0 Decrease the cultivable area 
0 Temporarily adapting crop cycles to suit the time of rainfall 
e Limited examples of changing to high yield crops, horticultural, and mixed 
cropping promoted by government programs 
Migration/labour: 
9 Migration of members of the whole family to outside the district for livelihood 
0 Sending children to work as labourcrs, 
9 Working at lower wages to generate some income 
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Financial: 
" Taking loans from money lenders or Self-Help Groups 71 
" Pawning of household items and jewelry 
" The poorest people reduce expenditure on basic needs 
" Sale of livestock at depressed prices owning to lack of fodder or agricultural 
work for the livestock 
Extreme practices: 
Suicide 
7.4.1 Remunerative activities of the household 
In the questionnaire survey, two specific aspects that can be considered as strategies 
for coping with drought and reductions in canal water deliveries have been 
scrutinized. They are notably the number of remunerative activities sustaining the 
livelihood of the household on the one hand, and migration on the other. The 
underlying assumption is that constraints on surface canal water availability trigger an 
increase in the number of alternative remunerative activities farmers take up, as well 
as force some farmers to migrate. 
The mean number of remunerative activities of the head of the household; his spouse; 
daughter(s); and son(s) are reported in Figure 7.4. The information is presented 
according to the social category of the respondents. Several interesting features can be 
observed. Farmers belonging to ST and then SC arc those which rely on the highest 
number of activities for making a living. Then, to a lesser extent BC and even less 
OC, the latter having the lowest number of remunerative activities. Another 
interesting feature is that women of SC and ST take up remunerative activities to a 
larger extent as compared to the spouses of BC and OC farmers. For OC, women are 
only partially involved in contributing to the income of the household. 
71 The major form of microfinance in India is that based on women's Self Help Groups (SHGs), which 
are small groups of 10-20 members. These groups collect savings from their members and provide 
loans to them 
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Figure 7.4: Mean number of activities contributing to the household income, according to the member 
of the household and social category 
Number activities head household 
Number activities spouse 
Number activities daughter 
Number activities son 
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In addition to the number of remunerative activities of the members of the household, 
the questionnaire survey has also shed light on the specific activities carried out by 
each member of the household, ranked according to their relative importance in term 
of revenue they generate. The results of the survey grouped according to the social 
category of the respondents are shown in Table 7.16 and discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
The main remunerative activity of the head of the household (HH) is by far crop 
cultivation all throughout the different social categories. Worth noting is that for ST 
the percentage of HH relying primarily on crop cultivation is 55.6%, thus significantly 
less than for the other social categories. Moreover, it appears that SC and ST rely to 
an important extent upon incomes from agricultural labour and government services. 
Another interesting feature is that the HH belonging to OC did not mention 
agricultural labor as one of their sources of income, this activity not being generally 
carried out by the wealthiest households. 
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The main remunerative activities of the spouse of the household (SH) follow a similar 
pattern, where crop cultivation is the main remunerative activity carried out by the SH 
for SC, ST, and BC. In the case of OC, dairying is the prevailing remunerative 
activity, followed by crop cultivation. The figures in Table 7.16 also show that the 
daughter of the HH is primarily engaged in crop cultivation and agricultural labour 
(OC); whereas the daughters of farmers belonging to OC that have responded to the 
questionnaire are not contributing to the revenue of the household. Finally, the sons of 
the HH are mostly engaged in crop cultivation when carrying out a remunerative 
activity. 
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7.4.2 Migration 
Migration 72 may be a possible response of farmers to cope with water scarcity and 
loss of gains in agriculture, or it can also be a recurring strategy with no tics 
whatsoever with water availability. As shown in Table 7.17, the responses to the 
questionnaire illustrate that migration is not common, and is an option used more by 
SC farmers than other groups. Out of the 38 respondents belonging to this social 
category, three affirmed to have migrated in the last three years (7.9%). All the 
farmers of ST and BC that have participated to the survey responded that they did not 
migrate; whereas only one farmer belonging to OC out of 51 responded affirmatively. 
All the farmers that have migrated stated that they had only done it punctually when 
they had faced water scarcity. 
Table 7.17: Data on farmers' migration 
Social category Migrated Frequency % 
No 35 92.1 
Scheduled Caste 
Yes 3 7.9 
Scheduled Tribe No 10 100.0 
Yes 0 0 
Backward Caste No 119 100.0 
Yes 0 0 
Other Caste 
No 51 98.1 
Yes 1 1.9 
7.5 Summing up 
At the outset of the chapter, after having characterized the sample of the survey, the 
correlations in section 7.1.2 between social category of the respondents and land 
ownership and education has indicated that members of Scheduled Castes (SC) and 
Scheduled Tribes (ST) are among the poorest farmers. This feature is in line with 
other scholarly works dealing with social discrimination in India (Dayal, 1985; Joshi 
et at., 2001). 
72 Migration was defined as a situation in which one or more members of the household live for more 
than one week away from the household for the purpose of carrying out a remunerative activity 
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The analysis further carried out in sections 7.2 and 7.3 have addressed access to 
agricultural resources by farmers according to the social category they belong to. The 
general trend emerging from the analysis is that SC and ST farmers have by far more 
difficulties in accessing agricultural resources. Availing of smaller areas of cultivable 
land, they heavily depend on surface water for cultivating crops, since they generally 
cannot afford to drill a borewell, and/or they are not willing to take the risk of 
investing in a borewell because of the a high risk of failure (not enough yield from the 
borewell). Data has also shown that groundwater markets are very limited, and if they 
occur they concern more Backward Castes (BC) and Other Castes (OC) than SC and 
ST. Drawing from these findings, a major conclusion is thereby that SC and ST 
farmers are more vulnerable to reductions in the supply of canal surface water because 
of the limited access they have to groundwater. 
Discrimination in access to resources is not limited to education, land, or water. 
Section 7.3.2 has clearly shown that SC and ST farmers have less access to subsidized 
seeds and fertilizers when compared against members of the other social categories. 
Conversely, it seems that access to agricultural extension and credits is similar all 
throughout the social categories. 
Section 7.4 has looked at two possible coping strategies that farmers can have 
recourse to, that is, diversification of the remunerative activities and migration. The 
results are interesting in many regards. First of all, the analysis has shown that SC and 
ST farmers rely on a highest number of remunerative activities than farmers 
belonging to the other social categories. This result tends to show that expanding the 
range of income possibilities is a coping strategy taken up by the poorest farmers, 
though a causal relationship could not be demonstrated. Moreover, women (notably 
the spouses of the head of the household and their daughters) of SC but particularly 
ST are more involved than those of BC and OC in contributing to the household 
income. This shows that reductions in the supply of canal water can also have gender 
implications. 
In regard to migration, primary data indicates that it is not common, and is an option 
used more by SC farmers than other groups. As stated by farmers, migration has been 
an explicit response to water scarcity. It can be therefore considered as a coping 
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strategy to reductions in the supplies of canal water. This is particularly true since SC 
farmers mostly rely on canal water and only to a minimal extent on groundwater. 
It is worth concluding by recalling that the findings of this chapter have shed light on 
coping strategies that farmers adopt when confronted with reductions in the supply of 
canal water in general. They pinpoint at possible farmers' adaptive responses that may 
also apply to water transfers from agriculture to urban areas, since these reallocations 
can curtail water availability in irrigation schemes. 
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8 Discussion of findings 
In this chapter, the research findings are discussed. Notably, in section 8.1 the existing 
knowledge on water allocation from agriculture to urban areas is re-examined in the 
light of the empirical findings of this thesis, which have been the concern of the 
previous four chapters. The issues examined are in particular water institutions; 
politics of water allocation; impact of transferring water from agriculture to urban 
areas; and implications of transfers for poor farmers. Then, the second section of this 
chapter addresses the original contribution of this thesis. 
M Administrative water transfers: re-examining existing knowledge in the light of 
empirical findings 
In environments where the utilization of the existing water resource gets close to the 
available stock, it becomes necessary and critical to efficiently allocate water among 
the different users and uses. For water allocation to be optimal, theory says that some 
conditions have to be met, and a number of shortcomings embedded into water 
transfers addressed. The four main aspects of water allocation that have been dealt 
with in this thesis are -1) water institutions, that is water law, policies and 
administration; -2) water reallocation politics; -3) impact of water transfers; and 4) 
implications of water transfers to cities on poor farmers and their adaptive strategies 
to cope with reductions in canal deliveries. 
The discussion that follows re-examine the existing knowledge on water allocation in 
the light of the empirical findings presented in chapters four to seven and addresses 
the research questions of this thesis. 
8.1.1 How are water institutions (law, administration, and policies) in Andhra Pradesh 
characterized, and how could they better account for water reallocation among 
sectors? 
As stated by Williamson (1994; quoted in Saleth et al., 2004), water policy 
prescriptions have moved from 'getting the prices right', to 'getting the property 
rights right', and eventually to 'getting the institutions right'. Water law, policy and 
administration are pivotal since they provide statutory or customary rules, formal and 
informal guidelines, as well as the administrative scaffolding for managing water 
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resources. Institutions are paramount where water scarcity is prevailing, and rules 
must provide for directions, among others, on how and according to which principles 
the resource has to be allocated between competing users and uses. 
The study of institutional reforms in Andhra Pradesh done in chapter four provides for 
an illustrative example of vigorous changes in water law and policies, though with 
very limited effects when it comes to smoothing and regulating interscctoral water 
allocation. This research has shown that in spite of institutional reforms, water 
allocation from agriculture to Hyderabad has been a tortuous and highly contested 
political process. As a result, the city suffers from chronic water deficit; urban supply 
is rationed and does not reach the whole of the population particularly the poor (C. 
Ramachandraiah, 2004); and according to estimates unaccounted for water attains at 
least 40% of the total volumes withdrawn at the sources. 
Recent literature stresses that institutional reforms need to achieve equitable and 
economically efficient water allocation (see e. g. Caponera, 2007; Salcth ct al., 1999b), 
and that this objective can be met if number of conditions are there. Among those: -1) 
conjunctive use of groundwater needs to be addressed; -2) water users' participation 
and decentralization of powers have to be pursued (Bruns, 2003); -3) allocation needs 
to account for the economic value of water; and -4) water conservation has to be 
promoted. The remainder of this section analyses water institutional reform in Andhra 
Pradesh since the mid of the 1990s in the light of the aforementioned conditions. 
Chapter four has shown that legislation in Andhra Pradesh only marginally deals with 
groundwater through the Andhra Pradesh Water, Land and Trees Act. Notably, the 
Act does not restrict groundwater withdrawals according to water availability and 
sustainable use, and there is no mention of conjunctive use of surface and 
groundwater in cases of transfers of surface water from agriculture to cities. The main 
reason of poor government control over groundwater is related to private ownership 
over the resource, secured by existing law in India that ties groundwater and land 
ownership (see section 4.2.1). Considering the paramount importance of groundwater 
for irrigated agriculture and other uses, as well as the fact that it can potentially 
compensate for transfers of surface waters to cities, as clearly demonstrated in chapter 
six, it appears essential to tighten government control over groundwater. 
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Recent developments in water law reform in Delhi (Delhi Water Board (Amendment) 
Bill, 2005) and in Kerala (Kerala Ground Water (Control and Regulation) Act, 2002) 
show the way for further reforms in India giving more authority to the governments to 
regulate groundwater use and withdrawals (Cullet, 2006), and indirectly to include 
groundwater in the whole discourse of transferring surface waters from irrigation 
schemes to cities. 
Decentralizing powers and promoting users' participation in water management is the 
second tenet of water law reform, and is considered an essential step for optimal water 
allocation (Hartman et al., 1970; Hearne et al., 1995). In regard to decentralization 
and water allocation, the findings of this thesis have clearly shown that constituting 
Water Users Associations (WUAs) alone is not sufficient for smoothing water 
allocation (section 4.2.2). Andhra Pradesh has been pioneering in establishing WUAs 
through the enactment of the Farmers' Management of Irrigation Systems Act in 
1997, as described in section 4.2.2. Notwithstanding the new Act, water management 
by farmers only applies to sub-distributaries of irrigation schemes and the scope for 
transacting water rights is very limited (Hooja, 2002). Considering the vibrant growth 
of cities and the limited resource available, mostly already appropriated by the 
agricultural sector, attributing wider powers to W`UAs for discussing water 
reallocations to urban areas appears essential. 
The third tenet of water law reform is to consider water as an economic good, and to 
allocate it from low to high value uses. In this regard, the Hyderabad case has clearly 
shown the well acknowledged drawbacks of administrative water allocation and tight 
government control (Briscoe, 1996; Dinar et al., 1997), in particular highly subsidized 
water fees both in irrigation schemes and in urban areas; and priority allocation to low 
value uses. The analysis of public expenditures in Andhra Pradesh from 1956-57 to 
1996-97 done in section 4.1.2 of this thesis has shown that budget allocation in water 
supply and sanitation has been given less priority when compared against the 
irrigation and flood control sector, this being also explained by the good electoral 
payoffs resulting from providing farmers with water, as will be discussed in the next 
section. 
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Chapter four has shown that the threshold of political will required for treating water 
as an economic good is by far not reached; the only actual economic measure adopted 
by the government of Andhra Pradesh being to increase water tariffs in Hyderabad. 
Finally, water conservation policies as advocated for instance by Gleick (2003) have 
had poor impact on the grim situation of Hyderabad water supply. Two of the water 
conservation measures introduced, that is rainwater harvesting and addressing 
unaccounted for water, have not brought about any significant impact. The other 
conservation measure devised by the government, that is to reuse treated wastewater, 
will not be sufficient to meet the demand in Hyderabad. Van Rooijen et al. (2005) 
have reckoned that even with the maximum reuse of wastewater, supplying the city 
with sufficient water to meet the demand would engender an average net loss of 
irrigated agriculture of 40,000 ha by 2030. 
8.1.2 What role does politics play in administrative reallocations from agriculture to other 
sectors? 
Though a number of studies have addressed the transaction costs of water reallocation 
(see e. g. Dinar et al., 1997; McCann et al., 2004), the politics of water management 
and reallocation constitutes a relatively unexplored area of research (Crifasi, 2002; 
Swyngedouw, 1995). As shown in chapter five of this thesis, politics have been one of 
the main drivers in the process of reallocating water from agriculture to Hyderabad, 
and their role in determining the modalities and the timing of the augmentation of 
Hyderabad water supply has outstripped economic and technical considerations. 
Reallocation has been harshly debated, and supporting reallocation had become a 
political pitfall that many governments in Andhra Pradesh have preferred to avoid. 
Eventually, political contestation has not been without consequences for Hyderabad 
water supply that has failed to respond to the quick increase of the urban population. 
The analysis in this thesis has shed light on the intertwined causes and complexity of 
the politicization of water reallocation. 
Chapter five has clearly shown the paramount importance that political debate and 
contestation can have in water allocation from agriculture to cities. In the specific case 
of Hyderabad, the delays in increasing the urban water supply brought about by 
political contestation have been dramatic, as shown in Figure 8.1. When the supply 
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from the Krishna was first proposed in 1973, the per-capita daily water availability 
was already at a low 91 litres, number well below the 205 litres suggested by Gleick 
(1994) as the lower minimum for satisfying domestic and some industrial and 
gardening needs in urban areas. It increased slightly over the next ten years due to the 
transfers from the Manjira River through the Manjira barrage. But as population 
continued to grow and the planned Krishna projects were delayed, per capita supplies 
dropped again to only 71 litres per day by 2001. The delay in augmenting Hyderabad 
water supply has had multiple consequences. The city is constantly on the brink of a 
major water supply crisis, with water users receiving water for only a few hours and 
not on a daily basis (Saleth et al., 1997; C. Ramachandraiah, 2004). 
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Source: Water supply per capita has been reckoned by the authors based on the conveying capacity of 
Hyderabad water sources, accounting for an estimate of 40% water losses because of leakages and 
water tampering in the supply system. Population data is drawn from HUDA (2003) 
The findings of this thesis support the "hydraulic society" model (Wittfoget, 1981; 
Worster, 1985; both quoted in Sheridan, 1995), in which water resources in 
water-scarce areas are controlled by bureaucratic elites, and provide for power in 
societies. Furthermore, the relation between water allocation and politics ties up this 
thesis with the broader political geography discipline, whose concern is, broadly said, 
the dialectic interactions between societies and nature, and the recognition that 
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environment is fundamentally politicized (Bryant, 1998). Parties' struggles that have 
characterized the water allocation political debate in Andhra Pradesh arc there to 
demonstrate the "non-neutrality" of water and the economic and electoral powers it 
provides. An additional feature that has clearly emerged from the PhD research is that 
water allocation between regional or administrative boundaries can be prone to 
political contestation. 
Besides, in chapter seven it was demonstrated how far access to resources depends 
upon farmers' wealth, the worse-off being those farmers belonging to the lowest 
social categories. A similar scenario applies to urban dwellers in Hyderabad, where 
the poorest section of the population is paying the highest cost of the lack of sufficient 
urban water supply, and often relies on unsafe sources and having to make do with 
insufficient quantities of water (Government of India, 1988). These findings recall for 
instance the writings of Swyngedouw (2004) on Guayaquil city in Ecuador, and 
reassert political ecology as an important discipline in the study of water allocation 
from agriculture to urban areas. 
8.1.3 What is the impact of water re6flocations from agriculture to cities on the areas of 
origin, and what role does groundwater play as a substitute andlor supplement to 
surface canal water? 
With rampant urbanization and increasing water resources variability, the pressure to 
reallocate water from agricultural to urban uses through transfers and appropriation of 
irrigation infrastructure and modified operations will increase, further inducing 
scarcity around many cities over the world. 
The impact of these transfers on agriculture is a major concern because it may 
negatively affects water users, and notably farmers that are in many contexts an 
already disadvantaged group. Understanding under which conditions and to what 
extent water transfers impact agriculture is therefore crucial, and constitutes an 
essential step for considering how those urban transfers which do take place might be 
best structured and what compensation should be provided to affected water users. 
The analysis presented in chapter six leads to three key findings on the complexities 
of understanding the impact in water reallocation, and identifies some major 
challenges for setting up compensation for the agricultural sector. 
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First, the findings show the limitations of estimating induced scarcity for irrigated 
agriculture through inferences from urban water supply data (e. g. van Roolj*cn ct al., 
2005). This point is substantiated by Table 8.1, which shows the difference in 
calculated canal utilization at Nizarnsagar brought about by the water transfer to 
Hyderabad along with the water actually transferred to the city. While the actual 
transfer to Hyderabad has been of 174 Mm3/year, the impact on water availability for 
irrigation because of the water transfer to the city has varied between a loss of 158 
MM3/year in 2001-2002 and a gain of 100 MM3/year in 1999-2000.73 
Table 8.1: Actual water scarcity at Nizamsagar versus volumes of water actually transferred to 
Hyderabad (Mm3/year) 
Year 
Difference in canal utilization 
because of the water transfer to 
Hyderabad 
Transfer to Hyderabad from the Manjira 
River 
1997-1998 -1 174 
1998-1999 23 174 
1999-2000 -100 174 
2000-2001 -95 174 
2001-2002 158 174 
2002-2003 14 174 
2003-2004 54 174 
2004-2005 -15 174 
Source: Difference in canal utilization because of the water transfer to Hyderabad is calculated with 
data from chapter six; data on transfer to Hyderabad from the Manjira River is from Andhra Pradesh 
Irrigation and Command Area Development Department, Singur Reservoir records 
The second finding is that the assumption that, because of the socio-cconomic and 
political power of cities, agriculture is systematically the "loser" in the competition 
for water (Molle et al., 2006) is arguable. The water transfer to Hyderabad from the 
Manjira River was neither uniformly negative nor positive for agriculture, but rather 
had mixed impacts depending upon a number of conditions. Over the period 
considered by this research, the differences in gross revenue from agriculture in 
Nizamsagar command area have fluctuated from a gain of US$ 2.3 million in 
1999-2000 to a loss of US$ 3.2 million in 2001-2002. The three main factors that 
determined the impact on agriculture were the temporal distribution and quantity of 
rainfall, infrastructure design and operation (in particular of storage works and 
73 The values for the differences in canal utilization shown in Table 8.1 result from the water balances 
calculated in chapter six 
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conveyance systems), and the implementation of the existing arrangement for sharing 
water between Hyderabad and the agricultural sector along the Manjira River. 
Specifically, the size and operation of the reservoir was pivotal, since it deten-nined 
how much runoff could be retained for flood control and beneficial releases. 
However, the single most important determinant that sometimes offset the potentially 
negative impact on agriculture of the water reallocation was the interscctoral water 
sharing arrangement, in which Ghanpur and Nizamsagar irrigation projects were 
entitled to a defined annual volume of water from Singur reservoir, provided that 
enough water is left in the latter for securing Hyderabad water supply (see also section 
6.1.4). Though the arrangement suffered from a number of weaknesses and was not 
strictly applied, it proved beneficial for Nizamsagar in 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 
when 118 Mm3 and 153 MM3 , respectively, were released form Singur reservoir 
during the rabi season for irrigation purposes. If the transfer to Hyderabad had not 
taken place, instead of having been stored in Singur and used in rabi at Nizarnsagar, 
these 271 Mm 3 of water would have been "lost" at Nizarnsagar during the rainy 
season as flood discharge. 
This example suggests that water transfers arrangements can offset or at least reduce 
the negative impact on agriculture of water reallocation to cities and represents a 
mutually beneficial instance of institutional appropriation of agricultural water 
resources infrastructure and management systems for urban purposes. 
The third main finding that can be drawn from the analysis carried out in chapter 
ýix 
concerns the paramount contribution of groundwater in irrigated agriculture. This 
phenomenon is illustrated by Table 8.2, which shows annual canal water and 
groundwater use in Nizarnsagar command area. 
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Table 8.2: Annual groundwater withdrawals and canal utilization at Nizarnsagar (Mm3/ycar). Note: 
Groundwater withdrawals are shown as calculated and, in brackets, the values obtained by subtracting 
the overestimation error discussed and calculated in section 6.2.2 
Year Groundwater withdrawals Canal water use 
1999-2000 764(612) 663 
2000-2001 795(636) 663 
2001-2002 827(661) 136 
2002-2003 857(686) 0 
2003-2004 881(705) 261 
2004-2005 921(737) 0 
Source: Groundwater withdrawals are calculated in chapter six; canal water use under Nizamsagar 
reservoir is from Andhra Pradesh Irrigation and Command Area Development Department (MS Excel 
file) 
When considering compensation for farmers for the water transfers to urban areas, the 
data in Table 8.2 might suggest that groundwater use represents a substitute to surface 
canal water. However, this interpretation requires careful consideration. In many 
areas, including much of India, groundwater is a limited and overexploited resource 
(Liu Changming et al., 2001; V. Ratna Reddy, 2005). The long-term sustainability of 
groundwater as an alternative to surface canal water must be determined. In addition, 
those farmers affected by induced surface water scarcity are not necessarily those with 
access to groundwater and access is not free. Groundwater access requires funds for 
well drilling and pump purchase or the availability of groundwater markets. In the 
study area, expected investment costs, and therefore expected difficulty for the 
poorest farmers, are increased by the risks of failure associated with drilling in 
hard-rock aquifers. 
8.1.4 How may poor farmers be impacted by reductions of canal water supply brought 
about by urban water transfers, and what strategies may they adopt? 
Drawing from the study of farmers' access to agricultural inputs, as well as farmers' 
adaptive strategies when confronted to reductions in the supply of canal water, chapter 
seven in this thesis infers what coping strategies farmers may adopt when facing 
surface water shortages specifically brought about by urban water transfers. 
As per Molle's (2003) basin development model presented in chapter two (section 
2.1.1), the evolution of water resources in a river basin can trigger social responses 
and adaptive strategies of water users. In turn, these responses can shape the way in 
which river basins develop. The analysis of primary data collected at Nizamsagar and 
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Ghanpur command areas carried out in chapter seven of this thesis has shed light in 
particular on the way poor fanners can be affected by water transfers, and to which 
adaptive strategies they may have recourse. 
According to Ohlsson (1999), adaptation to natural resources scarcity entails the 
mobilization of an increased level of social resources. These are embodied in 
institutions or within an institutional framework, including actors and rules. An 
essential finding of this thesis is that the farm society does not adapt as a whole, or 
rather not every individual is given the same chance to adapt. Notably, adaptive 
capacity is in fact contingent upon the social category to which farmers belong. This 
thesis has shown that in Nizarnsagar and Ghanpur irrigation projects the poorest 
farmers have a harder time in accessing water and other agricultural resources when 
compared to the better-off farmers. The social category of the respondents appears to 
be positively correlated with access to agricultural resources as land; surface canal 
water; groundwater; and subsidized seeds and fertilizers. This finding is corroborated 
in the literature on access to resources in India. For instance, Aasha Kapur Mehta et 
al. (2003) report on the chronicle persistence of poverty within Indian individuals 
belonging to Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST). These findings are 
further asserted in Lanjouw et al. (1991; quoted in Aasha Kapur Mehta et al., 2003) 
that postulate a strong correlation between caste and poverty. 
Chapter seven has shown that one of the direct consequences of poor access to 
resources by the disadvantaged groups is vulnerability to drought: in the dry year of 
rabi 2004-05 a much higher percentage of farmers belonging to SC and ST had to 
give up cultivation when compared against farmers belonging to the other social 
categories. Vulnerability of the poorest and marginalized farmers to drought and 
shortages in supplies of canal water has also been reported in Hussain (2004) and 
Rajagopal et al. (2002; quoted in Hussain, 2005). 
There is a strand of researchers that seek to understand existing adaptive strategies for 
coping with drought, which can reduce the vulnerability of farmers. Among the 
published studies, one can mention Moench (2004); Turton (1999); and Millar (2002). 
Vulnerability and adaptation are also main tenets within the recent discourse on global 
climate change, best exemplified by the last Human Development Report published 
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by UNDP (2007) which specifically deals with climate change and its consequences 
for developing countries. This thesis has shed light on an array of reasons why poor 
farmers may have a particularly hard time in adapting to water transfers. Notably, the 
analysis carried out in chapter seven has integrated different aspects of adaptation to 
drought, and notably access to -1) groundwater as an alternative source of irrigation; 
-2) subsidized agricultural inputs as fertilizers and seeds; -3) alternative remunerative 
activities; and -4) agriculture-related information. Additionally, migration as a 
drought coping strategy has been scrutinized. 
Results on access to groundwater show that the worse-off farmers experience 
difficultyin accessing groundwater. Notably, they generally cannot afford to go for a 
borewell and there is a high risk of borewell failure (that is, not yielding sufficient 
groundwater). Furthermore, chapter seven has shown that water markets that could 
provide groundwater to fanners that do not own a borewell are poorly developed, and 
when they exist they mostly occur between better-off farmers. These findings tend to 
support the postulate that groundwater markets are not necessarily pro-poor. 74 
Hardship in accessing groundwater has major implications for the capacity of poor 
farmers to cope with reductions in canal water supplies. Groundwater is considered as 
a more reliable water source than canal surface water, and availing of it can 
dramatically reduce the risk of crop losses in case of protracted spells of drought. The 
security that goes along groundwater availability also encourages farmers to invest in 
fertilizers and other inputs, and eventually increase the revenue from agriculture 
(Moench et al., 2004; Tsur, 1990). 
Chapter seven has shown that the main strategy of the poorest farmers to cope with 
reductions in canal water supplies consists essentially in broadening the number of 
remunerative activities sustaining the household; whereas changes in cropping 
patterns have not been observed. Consequently, adaptation depends upon the 
spectrum of remunerative possibilities at hand in the area of origins of the water 
transfer. This seems to supports the thesis of Howe et al. (2003), who suggest that the 
economic impacts of water reallocations to urban areas are to be mostly expected in 
74 For a short discussion on water markets and poverty, see e. g. Mukhcdi (2004) 
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marginal agricultural regions. Notwithstanding this, data collected within this thesis 
also shows that SC and ST farmers rely to an important extent on agricultural labour 
and government services as alternative sources of income. Since these activities are 
not typical of urban areas, one can expect that poor farmers might not necessarily 
benefit fr6m the closeness of urban agglomerations, which would support the thesis 
that the closeness to an urban area does not straight forwardly entails benefits for poor 
farmers (Tacoli, 1998). 
This research also corroborates the findings of Rani et at. (2000; quoted in Gordon ct 
al., 2001), who have shown that one of farmers' most favourite mechanisms for 
coping with drought are to diversify into non-farm activities and seasonally migrating 
to other areas. The same authors also note that the households that are badly hit in the 
semi-arid areas are those of small, marginal farmers and landless households and 
those belonging to lower castes that also diversify the sources of income first. Another 
element that has clearly emerged from the analysis in chapter seven is that the spouse 
of the household and daughters are called upon to contribute to the income of the 
household in the lower social categories, notably within Scheduled Castes but in 
particular Scheduled Tribes. 
&2 Original contribution of this research thesis 
The research conducted in Hyderabad by the author is original in many aspects. In the 
first place, there are very few studies based on detailed empirical evidence that have 
analyzed administrative water allocation from agriculture to urban areas, and 
particularly with cases from developing countries and Asia. Exceptions, though less 
detailed studies are for instance Molle (2005) with a case from the Chao Phraya River 
Basin in Thailand; C. C. Huang et al. (2007) for Taiwan; or Bhattarai et al. (2005) that 
have addressed the Melamchi water transfer in Nepal. In this regard, this thesis and 
related publications have contributed to shed light on the underdeveloped area of 
research of water allocation from agriculture to urban areas in developing countries. 
Another specificity of this thesis is to have addressed water allocation to urban areas 
in different angles and methods. Though losing detail when compared to works 
drawing from a unique discipline of research, this inter-disciplinary thesis has allowed 
for drawing a multifaceted and scientifically sound picture of water allocation. In 
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particular, the approach adopted has permitted to grasp part of the complexity of 
water management in its technical, socio-economic, but also political dimensions. 
The originality of this thesis also stems from the specific issues that have been 
addressed, and notably their relevance for ongoing research in water management. 
Firstly, research on the political aspects of water management is still at its infancy, 
and this thesis has clearly illustrated that politics must be taken in full consideration. 
As water becomes scarce, its value increases, and competing claims emerge along 
with politics. Secondly, integrating groundwater in the assessment of the impact of 
water allocation is original in the sense that groundwater is often not considered by 
researchers as well as policy makers. The findings of this thesis make a strong case 
for addressing groundwater and surface water conjunctively in water management. 
The third specific original contribution of this thesis concerns farmers' coping 
strategies to reduction in canal water supplies. Nowadays, policy makers and 
researchers are putting conspicuous efforts in better understanding water users' 
vulnerability to drought and coping strategies, notably within the larger issue of global 
climate change and its impact on water users. 
Finally, this thesis embraces different scales of analysis: from the macro-level, where 
for instance the influence of regional politics on water allocation is scrutinized, down 
to the micro-level where the households survey has shed light on the implications of 
water transfers on farmers and their adaptive strategies. To perform such a multi-scale 
analysis has been possible because of the methodical collection of large sets of 
primary as well as secondary data, another specific feature characterizing this 
research. 
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Conclusion 
The main concern of this research was to analyze and understand a number of key 
issues pertaining to water allocation from irrigated agriculture to urban areas, a fast 
growing phenomenon in water management, by specifically drawing from the 
Hyderabad case study and existing literature on the topic. The contention of this thesis 
is that administrative water allocation can be a highly contested process which 
negatively impacts on water availability in irrigation schemes; and that farmers tend 
to adopt coping strategies when canal water supply is reduced. Thus, this thesis has 
mainly focused on institutions for water allocation; politics of administrative 
mechanisms; the impact of drawing water from irrigation to urban areas on agriculture 
and farmers; and farmers' adaptive strategies in the agricultural sector. The approach 
has been to provide answers to the research questions and meeting the declared goal 
of the PhD by adopting a multitude of research methods, and by collecting extensive 
and detailed primary and secondary data. 
This concluding chapter consists of two distinct sections: the first one resumes the 
core features of water allocation from agriculture to Hyderabad. The second section 
builds upon the PhD findings to put forth policy recommendations for optimal 
administrative water allocation, and for addressing equity challenges in the transfer of 
water from irrigation schemes to growing urban areas. 
9.1 Core features of water allocation from agriculture to Hyderabad 
The way water is allocated from agriculture to urban areas and the implications of 
transferring water depend upon a number of factors. Notably, allocation is primarily 
governed and shaped by existing institutions, that is, water law; policies; and 
administration. 
The first question of this thesis has addressed water institutions and reallocation. This 
research has shown and reasserted the drawbacks of centralization of powers over 
water resources and inefficient water administration. If on the one hand over the last 
decade the government of Andhra Pradesh has embarked on a vibrant reform of water 
law (chapter four, section 4.2.2), its effects and implications towards optimal water 
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allocation have been qualified. In particular, instead of actually devolving 
decision-making powers to water users, the government has kept its grip on resource 
allocation. The reluctance of handing over powers over water stems from a number of 
factors, and in the first place from the essential economic and electoral role of the 
resource in a state prone to drought where the revenue of more than 60% of the 
population relies in a way or another on the agricultural sector (and thus on water 
availability), and where vibrant urban growth depends upon appropriate water supply. 
Section 4.3 has also illustrated the shortcomings in the administration of intcrsectoral 
water use in Andhra Pradesh. In particular, there is lack of clarity in the way urban 
water supply is administered as compared with water for agriculture (chapter four, 
section 4.3). Though by law the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage 
Board should hold responsibility for the city's water sources, it is actually the 
Irrigation and Command Area Development (CAD) Department that is in charge of 
Hyderabad main water sources. The reason is that the city's sources also serve 
irrigation, and have been historically under the control of the Irrigation and CAD 
Department. 
The findings make the strong case that the institutional set-up described above, and in 
particular the government overarching role in water allocation, interplaying with the 
specific political set-up in Andhra Pradesh, is among the main reasons for the poor 
water supply in Hyderabad, and in particular the chronic gap between demand and 
supply. By answering the second research question of this research on the politics of 
water allocation it was shown that the water transfer from agriculture to Hyderabad 
has undergone very high political costs, and in particular political opposition and 
delays in the decision-making process. Referring back to the contention of this thesis, 
this research has clearly illustrated that water allocation from agriculture to cities can 
be a highly contested process. In chapter five it was demonstrated that political 
opposition can be explained by the interplay of three main factors, that is, a political 
environment characterized by two main parties practising opposition politics; the key 
strategic economic and electoral role of water in Andhra Pradesh; and the 
inter-regional character of the water allocation, in particular the one from the Krishna 
River to Hyderabad. 
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Another core feature of water transfer from irrigated agriculture to Hyderabad is on 
the impact that reallocations can have on the agricultural sector, and to the specific 
role that groundwater can play in surface water transfers between sectors. This was 
also the concern of the third research question which has specifically addressed the 
impact of the allocation to Hyderabad on Nizamsagar irrigation project, while 
acknowledging the fact that agricultural production under Nizamsagar is also 
contingent on other factors that the urban water transfer, as for instance development 
of water resources in upstream areas or watershed development programmes. 
The findings of this thesis have shown that agriculture is not systematically the 
"loser" when water is reallocated to urban areas, in particular if a set of intersectoral 
allocation rules are established (chapter six). Notably, for Nizarnsagar irrigation 
project along the Manjira River farmers have benefited from the water transfer to 
Hyderabad in some specific years. Another essential finding is that calculating losses 
in agriculture because of transfers to cities calls for precautions and needs to draw 
from detailed data and water balances. In particular, losses for irrigated agriculture 
cannot be straight forwardly inferred from urban water supply data, as generally done 
in the literature. 
Assessing the contribution of groundwater to agricultural production in public 
irrigation schemes represents for developing countries a relatively unexplored area of 
research. Drawing from extensive data and from a set of research hypotheses, 
groundwater use in Nizarnsagar command area has been investigated. The thesis has 
shown that groundwater contributes more to irrigation than canal water supplied from 
Nizarnsagar reservoir. This strongly suggests that groundwater might compensate 
farmers for transfers of surface waters to cities, though evidence on over drafting and 
scarcity all over India tends to put this option into perspective. Moreover, the findings 
have revealed that groundwater access is not necessarily equitable since contingent 
upon a number of conditions, as local resource availability and land ownership. 
The findings of chapter six have shown that the contention of this thesis that "( ... ) 
administrative water allocation (... ) negatively impacts on water availability in 
irrigation schemes ( ... )" only partially applies. Among others, water allocation rules 
may bring about beneficial effects on the agricultural sector when water is reallocated 
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to urban areas; and groundwater availability can play a major role in irrigation 
schemes and offset urban water transfers. 
The fourth research question addressed the implications of water transfers on poor 
farmers, and their coping strategies. The research findings support the contention of 
this thesis which states that farmers tend to adopt coping strategies when canal water 
supply is reduced. It was shown that access to land and the social category of farmers 
determine their possibilities to adapt - and choose strategies for responding - to 
reductions in canal water supplies, with major policy implications as discussed in the 
next section. This thesis has shown that poor farmers belonging to low social 
categories as Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) have more limited 
access to surface water, groundwater, and other agricultural inputs when compared 
with better-off farmers. Notably, access to groundwater is very difficult for poor 
farmers: on the one hand they generally cannot afford to drill a borcwcll and maintain 
a working pumpset, and on the other there is a high risk of borewcll failure. Another 
factor constraining access to groundwater by poor farmers not owning a borcwcll is 
that groundwater markets are very limited, and if existing they mainly occur between 
the better-off farmers. 
The responses to reductions in supplies of canal water are diverse and the research 
findings have shown that they are contingent upon the social category farmers belong 
to. The general trend observed is that poor farmers tend to diversify their sources of 
income, particularly by taking up remunerative activities out of the agricultural sector, 
and that wife and daughters are called upon to contribute to the income of the 
household. On the other hand, in Nizarnsagar command area migration appears to be a 
strategy only for a limited percentage of poor farmers belonging to ST. 
These research findings apply to fanners' responses to reductions in supplies of canal 
water in general, and not only because of Hyderabad. Since an array of factors has 
contributed to reduce runoff in the Manjira River (chapter six, section 6.1.2), a causal 
link between the water transfer to Hyderabad and fanncrs' strategies could not be 
drawn (see also section 7.5). Notwithstanding this, the stand of this thesis is that when 
urban water transfers entail reductions in canal water supply in irrigation projects, 
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then farmers may respond by adopting the coping strategies observed in Nizamsagar 
command area. 
9.2 Placing the Hyderabad case In the broader context of administrative water 
allocation from agriculture to cities In water-scarce areas: policy Implications 
and Issues for further research 
In the 1990s water allocation in developing countries had started attracting growing 
attention from researchers, who were particularly interested in the case of the water 
law reform in Chile where water markets had been introduced (Bauer, 2004b). 
Interestingly, administrative water allocation has been poorly investigated, since 
scholars have generally observed - and taken note of - the poor performance of 
administrative water transfers rather than digging into its causes and possible 
solutions. 
By addressing administrative water allocation this thesis acknowledges the reported 
failures of institutional reforms towards introducing water markets in developing 
countries (see e. g. Madar, 2005; Trawick, 2003), and accounts for increasing evidence 
highlighting the need of a high degree of good water governance and technology for 
markets to function efficiently (Perry et al., 1997), conditions generally not met in 
developing countries. 
9.2.1 Reducing politics of administrative water allocation: compensating farmers and 
providing for water users'participation in decision-making 
Though water allocation in general cannot be impervious to politics, allocation by 
public governments is particularly vulnerable to the political discourse and 
interference (Dinar et al., 1997), as highlighted in this thesis. The Hyderabad case 
shows that the way in which politics intervene in water allocation is site-specific, and 
depends upon the existing political and geographical environment (chapter five). 
Regional disparities in access to resources have had a major role in fueling the 
political opposition against the inter-regional water transfer from the Krishna River to 
Hyderabad. Consequently, policies should account for trans-boundaries allocations, 
and appropriate compensations have to be ' devised and put in place (on 
compensations, see also section 2.1.4.3). The main difficulty with compensations is 
that it is generally difficult for the parties to come to an agreement on how and how 
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far farmers should be compensated, in the first place because it is generally not 
possible to precisely detennine the loss of water that each fartncr will experience 
because of the transfer (Scott et al., 200 1). 
Notwithstanding this, policy makers should consider options as reclaimed water (see 
section 2.1 in this thesis), where cities cover rehabilitation costs of irrigation projects 
and in particular canal lining, and draw from those project the volumes of addition 
water available (Matsuno, et al., 2007). Another possible compensation consists in 
returning urban partially treated wastewater to those irrigation projects from where 
water had been previously reallocated to urban purposes, though this option may 
presents economic and public health drawbacks, as discussed in Celio et al. (2007a). 
In any case, because of their potential key role in reducing the transaction costs and 
the impact of water transfers, compensation mechanisms deserve further research. 
Notably, an additional effort needs to be done for collecting empirical evidence from 
developing countries on cases where agriculture has been compensated for a water 
reallocation to an urban area. 
Political interference also stems from the overarching powers of the public authority 
over water resources. Such powers throw each and every decision on water allocation 
made by the standing government into the political arena, and expose water transfers 
to contestation from opposing political parties. This feature has been very well 
illustrated in chapter five discussing the struggles between the Telugu Desarn Party 
and the Congress Party. It is the stand of the author that integrating water users in the 
decision-making process for transferring water from agriculture to cities may reduce 
political opposition and transaction costs of intersectoral water reallocations, since 
broader participation would provide for legitimacy to the decisions taken by the 
government. Integrating water users in decision-making processes is also one of the 
main pillars of institutional reforms theory (Caponera, 2007) and practice. 75 By 
including water users and particularly farmers, the acceptability of the transfers would 
also have good chances to increase, since appropriate compensations and/or water 
sharing mechanisms could be discussed between the parties. 
75 For South-Africa, see Naidoo et al. (2000); for a case from Asia, see Biswas ct al. (2005) 
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An issue for further research which was beyond the scope of this thesis would be to 
deepen the analysis of the politics of water allocation by conducting interviews with a 
sample of politicians from Andhra Pradesh, and analyze the primary data collcctcd 
through frameworks provided within the discipline of political sciences. 
922 Tackling the impact of water transfers 
In order to reduce the effects of water transfers from agriculture to urban areas, 
compensation can be provided as discussed in the previous section, or then water 
sharing arrangements have to be devised. The water transfer to Hyderabad from the 
Manjira River is an exemplar of reallocation through a water sharing mechanism. 
Putting in place such a water sharing arrangement is a compromise. Though 
Hyderabad got less water than what it would have received without the arrangement, 
the political opposition against the water transfer from the Manjira has been less. On 
the other hand, the impact of the reallocation on farmers has been attenuated, and in 
some years agriculture has got benefits from the reallocation, in particular during the 
hot season. If political opposition is to be expected, and compensation can not be 
provided to farmers, water sharing arrangements are an option for policy makers 
while intending to increase urban water supply through reallocation from the 
agricultural sector. 
Another main finding is that poor farmers are more likely to be negatively affected by 
water reallocations. Thus, policy needs to account for this, in particular by providing 
targeted compensations. The main problem in this regard is that determining how far a 
single fanner is - or will be - affected by a water transfer to a city is beyond human 
capacity, particularly in developing countries: information and technology do not 
provide for the accurateness required to perform such an assessment. Pro-poor water 
reallocation policies should thereby be addressed at poor farmers as a whole, and not 
try to reach solely those farmers supposedly impacted by the reallocation. 
Though this thesis has provided some insights on water sharing arrangement between 
- urban areas and agriculture, this field of research is still underdeveloped and deserves 
more scholarly efforts and investigations. Additional empirical cases have to be 
documented. Notably, the Hyderabad case has shown that the main weakness of the 
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existing water sharing arrangement is that it does not account for intcr-annual rainfall 
variability. Thus, a much better theoretical understanding on climatic variability and 
uncertainty and its implications for water sharing arrangements is required. The 
current debate on climate change, which is vigorously getting the attention of policy 
makers and researchers all around the world, is likely to bring a valuable contribution 
to research on water sharing arrangements in uncertain climatic conditions. 
9.23 Integrating groundwater in allocation policy and practice 
Assessing groundwater contribution in agriculture is not an easy task, which probably 
explains why this resource has been disregarded in the transfer from agriculture to 
Hyderabad. If one considers the results of this thesis research and notably the 
paramount role that groundwater plays in public irrigation schemes (section 6.2.2), 
there is scope for recommending its full consideration into water allocation policies. 
In particular, if groundwater resources are sufficient and can balance the transfer of 
surface waters to urban areas, then public authorities may compensate farmers in the 
irrigation schemes affected by the reallocation by facilitating access to groundwater, 
for instance through funding schemes covering part of the costs of borewell drilling; 
or then by providing electricity at lower rates. Though these options seem very 
promising, their actual implementation would face a number of difficulties. In the 
Indian context, where state control over withdrawals is very limited, groundwater 
resources are over-drafted and water tables lowering at worrying levels (Government 
of India, 2007). As long as these conditions persist, facilitating access to groundwater 
won't be a sustainable option for compensating water transfers to urban areas. 
Another factor that need to be considered by policy makers are groundwater markets. 
If evidence shows that in the irrigation scheme affected by the reallocation 
groundwater markets are prosperous and are accessible to poor farmers, then the 
impact of the reallocation on poor farmers is likely to be less than in schemes where 
groundwater markets do not benefit the poor. 
Further research in the field needs to come up with evidence and theory on 
institutional arrangements capable of regulating groundwater withdrawals at 
sustainable levels in specific context such as India. Though efforts arc being done to 
186 
regulate groundwater use in India (Cullct, 2006), over-drafting is far from being 
solvcd. 
Other research efforts that would certainly contribute to more targeted agriculture to 
urban areas reallocations policies arc those looking at the interaction between surface 
canal water and groundwater in irrigation schemes. In particular, a better 
understanding of the implications of diminished availability of canal water (because 
of water reallocation to urban areas) on groundwater levels would permit to determine 
more precisely how much groundwater would still be available for irrigation if water 
was to be transferred out of agriculture. 
9.2.4 Addressing equity in water allocation from agriculture to urban areas 
Optimal water allocation needs to be equitable. Though equity is a difficult concept to 
define (see section 2.1.2 in this thesis), a precondition for achieving equity is that the 
poor should at least not be negatively affected by a water transfer. This minimal 
objective should also be clearly spelled out in - and pursued by - public policies. The 
study of Hyderabad water supply makes a strong case for policy makers to be aware 
of the possible negative impact of urban water supply on poor farmers. Evidence 
collected within the works of this thesis and discussed in chapter seven has shown that 
poor farmers are precisely the ones who are more vulnerable to reductions in the 
supply of surface canal water, since -1) located in less favorable areas of irrigation 
schemes when it comes to canal water supply; -2) have limited access to groundwater 
as an alternative source; and -3) have less access to subsidized agricultural input when 
compared against the better-off farmers. 
It is worth noting that also the poorest section of the population in Hyderabad is the 
one that is more affected by urban water scarcity due to delays in reallocating water 
from the agricultural sector. This pattern of selective water access based on the wealth 
of water users is a characteristic feature of the political economy of urban water 
supply and access in developing countries, probably best exemplified by the works of 
Swyngedouw on water access in Guayaquil in Ecuador (1997; 2004). 
It is opinion of the author that when it comes to water policy, water allocation and its 
shortcomings for water access by the poor in cities and irrigation schemes cannot be 
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dealt with separately from the general discourse on access to water by the poor. 
Difficulty in accessing resources by the weakest sections of the population is a well 
acknowledged feature in developing countries, which to a large extent stcms from 
lack of good governance. If this issue of good governance is not solved, any policy 
trying to redress the shortcoming for the poor of water allocation will only have 
limited effects. 
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Appendix 1: Samples of hydrologk records from Singur Reservoir, Ghanpur, and Nlzamsagar 
irrigation schemes 
Singur register, November 2000 data (on two pages) 
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Appendix 2: Samples of village registers reporting crop data: Makloor Mandal, Nizamabad 
District, kharif 2002-2003 
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Appendix 3: Nizamsagar irrigation project specifications and map 
Nizarnsagar irrigation project specifications 
Year of commencement of project 1923 
Year of completion of project 1931 
Catchment area 21,694 km 2 
Maximum flood discharge 17.981 M3/S 
Reservoir T. B. L. 430.365 m 
Reservoir M. W. L.: 428.25 m 
Full Reservoir Level 420.25 m 
Gross capacity 518.2 MM3 
Live capacity 503.74 MM3 
Water spread area at M. W. L 140.14 kM2 
Height of dam above deepest foundation 47.72 m 
Road width at top of dam 4.27 m 
Scouring sluices in dam 2.44 mx4.57m 
Total length of dam 5273 m 
Crest level of spill way 422.15 m 
Left flank 12.19 x 4.72 m 
Saddle weirs I&2 606 m 
Right flank spill way 12.19 x 4.79 m 
Sill level of canal sluices 415.75 m 
Number of villages submerged 40 
Main canal 
Irrigation sluice 2.44 x 3.2 m 
Discharge 96.28 M3/S 
F. S. D. 3.2 m 
Bed width 30.48 m 
Length of main canal 155.3 km 
Ayacut 
Irrigable area I 11,000 ha 
Number of villages served 326 _71 
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Appendix 4: Ghanpur Irrigation project specifications and map 
Nizamsagar irrigation project specifications 
Co-ordinates 
Longitude 78'-15'-0" 
Latitude 18'-10'-0" 
Project cost 2,305,000 InR 
Ayacut 8,571.3 ha 
C. A. 7,000 sq miles 
Maximum flood discharge 11,610 m3/s 
Head of discharge 4.7 in 
Gross storage 7.9 Mm3 
Utilization 84.95 MM3 
Live storage 5.66 Mm3 
Year of completion 
Anicut Mahboob Naher 1905 
Fathe Naher Canal 1925 
Mandals benefitted Medak, Papannapet, & Kulcharam 
No. of villages benefitted 33 
Anicut 
T. B. L. 469.025 m 
M. W. L. 467.500 m 
Full reservoir level 462.775 m 
Sill level 460.25 m 
Length of anicut 724.5 m 
Top width of anicut 3.4 m 
Length of flood bank 500 m 
Canals 
Right flank Mahboob Naher 
Lenght 42.8 km 
Discharge 7.1 m3/s 
Ayacut 11.425 AC 
No. of tanks fed 12 
No. of villages benefited 21 
Left bank canal Fathe Naher 
Main canal length 12.8 krn 
Branch canals Icright 26.2 km 
Discharge 4.5 m`/s 
No. of tanks fed 12 
No. of villages benefitted 12 
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